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Populism has become an often-scrutinized research topic in social sciences, especially 
in the last two decades. Since the early 2000s, the phenomenon has started to affect 
the globe extensively. According to The Guardian’s investigation, which was led by 
Kirk Hawkins, the population living under leaders who are considered to be ‘at least 
somewhat populist’ has increased by almost 2.5 billion from 2003 to 2019 (Lewis et 
al., 2019). In contemporary years, many significant occurrences in politics were 
affected by populism. As several scholars suggest, the rise of the Greek Syriza, the 
successful campaign for Brexit by the UK Independence Party, Donald Trump’s and 
Jair Bolsonaro’s ascendancy to lead, Vladimir Putin’s and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
obtainment of their presidencies are just some instances that might be supported by 
populism (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Fish, 2017; Hunter & Power, 2019). As the 
specific instances above suggest, the analysis of populism is a crucial, if not an 
inevitable, task for scholars to understand the logic, the effects, and the causes of the 
successful, rising phenomenon (Hawkins et al., 2017). According to many experts, 
accurate responses to populism cannot be formulated without more in-depth 
knowledge on this hot topic (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; 
Tóth & Demeter, 2019). Therefore, further observations and analyses are needed at 
grassroot level, namely the content of the discourse (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). This 
thesis makes an effort to follow this direction. 
This study aims to operationalize and test a new theoretical and methodological 
refinement, namely Explicit and Implicit Populism.1 The concept above accepts that 
populism is a specific political communication style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).2 As 
such, it focuses on stressing dichotomies between the ‘good’ people and ‘evil’ others.  
EP and IP might show the degree and type of PPCS among political agents. The thesis 
also takes into account two features of PPCS, which might affect voter’s negative 
emotions, namely fear and anger. 
 
1 In this study, Explicit and Implicit Populism are referred as ‘EP’ and ‘IP.’ 
2 In this thesis, populist political communication style and political communication style are referred 
as ‘PPCS’ and ‘PCS.’ 
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Recently, EP and IP were already tested on Hungarian language (Tóth, 2020), 
but this investigation aims to go further and implement them in English too. The 
essential goal of the thesis is to provide a feasible method for scholars who work on 
(textual) analyses to support the exploration of PPCS.    
One of the most scrutinized political leaders is Donald Trump in the research 
field of populism. Therefore, providing a new aspect that analyzes his populist style is 
a challenging task. However, EP and IP have not been tested on Donald Trump’s 
communication so far. This study also investigates Hillary Clinton’s tweets to compare 
to what extent the two agents utilized the elements of PPCS. Consequently, Trump’s 
PPCS is the reference point, while Clinton’s is the test. The comparison of the two 
nominees’ PPCS focuses on the last stage of the presidential election in 2016. It starts 
from the 1st of September 2016 and lasts until the 8th of November 2016. This part of 
the scrutiny was labelled Period One3, in which 738 and 1,595 tweets from Donald 
Trump and Hillary Clinton were analyzed. 
A second comparison also emerges in this dissertation. The study compares 
Donald Trump’s PPCS in the campaign and after his victory. Therefore, the thesis aims 
to scrutinize 798 tweets from Donald Trump in Period Two. This phase starts from the 
election day and lasts until the very beginning of May 2017. The second comparative 
aspect was implemented to show how EP and IP might change in two dissimilar 
political situations. The thesis does not analyze Hillary Clinton’s tweets in the second 
stage, because her tweeting frequencies significantly decreased after the defeat.  
The third and final comparative method aims to highlight the typically 
emerging topics in Donald Trump’s tweets. It introduces the characterization of his 
topics during the campaign period and the subsequent half a year by considering his 
adjustments to diverse situations. Moreover, this type of comparison in Donald 
Trump’s tweets supports finding possible changes in his PPCS in the two examined 
phases. In a nutshell, characterizing and measuring topics supported the part of the 
analysis, which focused on the blame-shifting tactic of Donald Trump. Who are the 
prominent enemies in P1 and P2? Did Donald Trump shift his focus from one 
antagonistic agent to another after his victory? Is there one foe, or are there many in 
 
3 In this study, Period One and Two are referred as ‘P1’ and ‘P2.’ 
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the different phases? The third comparative investigation tried to support the answers 
to the questions above. 
It is important to note that the thesis implements research questions. The 
reasons for choosing research questions instead of hypotheses are threefold. First, the 
dissertation attempted to scrutinize an extensive database with a lot of possible trends, 
patterns, and outcomes. Consequently, to avoid vague concepts, the research questions 
seemed to be more appropriate than hypotheses. Second, reviewing the relevant 
literature on populism indicated additional accurate questions that might support the 
profoundness of this study. Finally, the thesis aims to provide a study that functions as 
a starting point for other analyses focusing on the same database to construct well-
grounded hypotheses. The research questions of the thesis are presented below. 
At this point, it is important to repeat the core sentence of the thesis because the 
research questions connect to the focal point of this study. The concept of Explicit 
Populism, which might be between the thin and thick political communication style, 
and Implicit Populism, which attempts to explore fragmented dichotomies between the 
‘good’ people and ‘culprit’ others, also function as methodological refinements in 
textual analyses by focusing on the content of the discourse. 
First, this subchapter introduces five research questions related to 
@realDonaldTrump’s topics that featured his Twitter communication. As mentioned 
above, to conduct one of the comparative analyses in this thesis, the relevant content 
was separated into two periods. P1 lasted from the 1st of September 2016 until the 8th 
of November 2016, while P2 started from the 8th of November 2016 and finished on 
the 1st of May 2017. The separation of the two periods was made because Donald 
Trump’s situation changed after the victory. There was a considerable possibility that 
the Republican politician focused on different topics and antagonist entities in P2 than 
in P1; he was not a candidate anymore, but the elected leader of the United States. 
RQ1-RQ5 attempt to highlight the shares of topics, antagonism, people-centrism, the 
portion of populist-like expressions, and topic correlations in Trump’s tweets. The 
findings of these questions might precondition and support the subsequent questions 
and discussion related to Trump’s EP and IP PCS. 
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RQ 1: What is the most frequent topic4 in real@DonaldTrump’s Twitter 
communication during the two periods? 
RQ 2: Which entity occurs with the highest frequency as an ‘Enemy’ in P1 and 
P2? 
RQ 3: Which period consists of more populist words in @realDonaldTrump’s 
tweets? 
RQ 4: Which element of the PPCS emerges with a higher frequency in 
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets in P1 and P2? The antagonist entities or the people? 
RQ 5: What are the most robust correlating topics in the analyzed sample? 
It is essential to note that other research questions also emerge below to provide 
a detailed analysis of the database. 
The second comparative section also aimed to analyze Donald Trump’s tweets 
from the 1st of September 2016 to the 1st of May 2017. Chapter 5 intended to examine 
the features of the Republican leader’s PPCS. In order to provide a supportive in-depth 
analysis, a comparative method also emerged between P1 and P2. The analytical 
approach relies on the concept in which scholars state that populism is a thin-centered 
ideology and PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). In other words, 
the minimal criteria of populist discourse rely on appealing to the people and blaming 
the culprit elite or dangerous out-group(s) (Mudde, 2004). This section of the analysis 
focuses primarily on the Explicit and Implicit PPCS of the leader. Hence, new research 
questions appeared to support the results and the discussion of the dissertation:   
RQ 6: To what extent did Donald Trump utilize Explicit and Implicit Populist 
Political Communication Style? Which one’s proportion is dominant in his tweets?  
 
4 This study uses ‘topic’ and ‘category’ interchangeably. 
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In order to support the investigation’s qualitative nature, further research 
questions were created. Therefore, the scrutiny tried to characterize the actors of the 
perceived dichotomies. For instance, the harmful exploitation conducted by the corrupt 
elite that undermined the everyday lives of ‘blue-collar workers.’ 
RQ 7: What segments of the society do suffer from the culprit elite’s 
deficiencies, according to Donald Trump? Does the Republican candidate 
characterize specific groups, or does he generally appeal to the people in his Explicit 
Populist Political Communication Style? 
The following research question, which intended to focus on the exploration of 
people-centrism or antagonism, refers to the actors of IP tweets: 
RQ 8: Which entity (antagonist actors versus the people) emerge with higher 
frequency in Donald Trump’s Implicit Populist Political Communication Style?    
As discussed above, the PPCS relies fundamentally on affecting negative 
emotions (Bracciale & Martella, 2017), especially on fear and anger (Hameleers et al., 
2017). This section also attempted to examine specific words in Donald Trump’s 
tweets to seek expressions that may have influenced follower’s negative emotions, 
namely fear and anger.  
RQ 9: What words might indicate negative emotions like fear and anger in 
Donald Trump’s tweets? If there so, does he utilize any of them with considerable 
frequency? 5 
Additionally, the thesis aims to analyze Hillary Clinton’s tweets during the last couple 
of months of the 2016 electoral campaign. According to the author’s knowledge, no 
analysis emerged in the research field of PPCS focusing on Secretary Clinton’s tweets 
regarding the perspective of EP and IP. Although scholars do not refer to Hillary 
Clinton as a populist politician, this part of the scrutiny still assumed that she utilized 
PPCS in her tweets. The examination’s analytical approach relied on the concept by 
which scholars state that there is no necessity to be a populist politician in order to 
employ PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). 
 
5 In this case, the considerable frequency equals the minimum criteria of the Populist Dictionary (f=8).  
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The next research question relies on a quantitative perspective; therefore, the 
subsequent segment of the study sought the answer for the proportions of EP and IP: 
RQ 10: To what extent does Secretary Clinton utilize Explicit and Implicit 
Populist Political Communication Style? Which one’s portion is dominant in her 
tweets?  
The eleventh research question was created to support the investigation’s 
qualitative nature. Thus, the analysis attempted to characterize the actors of the 
emerging dichotomies in Clinton’s PPCS.  
RQ 11: What segments of the society do suffer from the antagonist-challenger 
political force’s deficiencies, according to Hillary Clinton? Does the Democratic 
candidate characterize specific groups, or does she generally appeal to the people in 
her Explicit Populist Political Communication Style? 
Similar to RQ 8, the following research question refers to the agents of IP 
tweets. In other words, seeking people-centrism or antagonism is the most important 
task to complete by the question below: 
RQ 12: Which entity (antagonist actors versus the people) emerge with higher 
frequency in Secretary Clinton’s Implicit Populist Political Communication Style?    
As mentioned above, the PPCS relies fundamentally on affecting negative 
emotions (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). This section also aimed to examine specific 
words in Hillary Clinton’s tweets to seek phrases that might influence follower’s 
negative emotions, namely fear and anger.   
RQ 13: What words might indicate negative emotions like fear and anger in 
Hillary Clinton’s tweets? If there so, does she utilize any of them with considerable 
frequency?6 
The thesis consists of eight main chapters. After the introductory chapter, the 
second unit highlights the literature review on populism. First, it presents several 
theoretical concepts in the research field, then it goes further and introduces the most 
relevant conceptualizations and their criticisms. Second, the detailed description of EP 
 
6 In this case, the considerable frequency equals the minimum criteria of the Populist Dictionary (f=8).  
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and IP emerges in chapter two. Third, the core aim of the thesis is also supplied: The 
concept of Explicit Populism, which might be between the thin and thick political 
communication style, and Implicit Populism, which attempts to explore fragmented 
dichotomies between the ‘good’ people and ‘culprit’ others, also function as 
methodological refinements in textual analyses by focusing on the content of the 
discourse.  Finally, to construct an abstract bridge between the theoretical background 
and the methodology, the literature on textual analyses ends the second part.  
The third chapter introduces the methods, the data and the features of the 
emerging topics in Donald Trump’s tweets and highlights the specific 
characterizations of EP and IP related to the two specific politicians. The explanation 
of the computer-assisted mixed-method is also supplied in this part.  
The fourth unit descriptively introduces the outcomes by focusing on the 
occurring topics and the utilization of EP and IP in Trump’s Twitter communication. 
This chapter also provides the results related to Clinton’s PPCS by taking into 
consideration EP and IP.  
The fifth chapter discusses the possible explanations of blame-shift and the 
significant change in the balance of EP and IP in Trump’s tweets. The sixth unit tries 
to provide a clarification by which the ratio between antagonism and people-centrism 
might be understood from the ‘expert-like’ Democratic politician’s perspective. The 
previous two chapters also draw attention to the limitations of the thesis.  
The seventh chapter attempts to describe the possible differences and 
similarities between the two rivals’ PPCS. The final part supplies the most important 
conclusions and ways which EP and IP might support future studies. 
After the brief introductory chapter, the subsequent unit renders the essential 
theoretical backgrounds of the thesis.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE 
INTRODUCTION OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT POPULIST 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION STYLE 
The previous chapter introduced the research field connected to the thesis and its 
relevance to contemporary social science. Additionally, it collected the research 
questions related to the two scrutinized agents. Some questions drew attention to the 
emerging topics in Trump’s tweets, and the rest of them focused on EP-IP ratios, the 
utilized elements of PPCS, and negative emotions such as fear and anger in both 
leaders’ Twitter communications. This stage provides the description of the results 
separated by periods and leaders. 
2.1. Mass media and campaign rhetoric in presidential elections in the United 
States 
Media have a significant role in influencing public opinion. Hence, there is also a vital 
fight to control it, especially among political and economic figures (McNair, 2018). 
Consequently, the media holds critical fields in political actor’s communication. As a 
result, they utilize various channels to spread their core messages to the audience, 
namely the potential voters. (Aalberg et al., 2016).   
Mass media and political persuasion emerged as early as the 1930s in the 
United States (Sears & Kosterman, 1994). Radio was so critical for political 
communication in the United States that successive presidents thought that it was 
crucially necessary to control the channel, which would perhaps help them to be in 
touch and manage the interwar society from the early 1930s. (Craig, 2000). For 
instance, Roosevelt who could ‘...mobilize a mass public separated from him by time 
and space.’ utilized radio to create a series of ‘Fire Side Chats’ to inform citizens about 
the bank crisis, brief them on the Second World War, and quell political rumors from 
1933 to 1944 (Ryfe, 1999, p. 89). As previous research shows, television and political 
communication in campaigns for the presidency are also crucially interrelated in the 
United States (Schroeder, 2000). One of the most prominent political events analyzed 
by researchers is the first Nixon-Kennedy debate in 1960, in which a drastic difference 
16 
 
emerged between the two nominees’ appearance (Druckman, 2003). Kennedy looked 
like a fresh, handsome, and dynamic politician, while Nixon seemed like an exhausted 
person who was lacking energy (Stanton, 2000). On the other hand, according to 
different specific research and polls, radio listeners preferred Nixon to Kennedy, or 
they at least felt like the two ‘came off almost equal’ (Vancil & Pendell, 1987; White, 
1961, p. 290). However, according to Druckman (2003), some significant problems 
emerged in the measurement of the debate: (1) unclear sample size, (2) unreliable ‘self-
reported measures,’ and (3) time delay between data collection and the debate. In 
addition, as Joseph Campbell argues (2016), more than 70 million people watched the 
debate on television, while the sample of the survey was 2,138,  of whom 282 listened 
to the radio and 178 of them expressed their opinions (Vancil & Pendell, 1987, p. 20). 
In sum, there were important limitations by which no direct and explicit evidence could 
have been supported between listener-viewer disagreements. 
Television, radio, newspapers, and bulletin boards were still one of the most 
powerful and essential tools of political communication until the early 2000s; then, the 
web became part of the communication universe (Castells, 2010). Platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram do not replace the traditional mass media, but they 
change the way audiences reach the pieces of information (Chadwick, 2014; Enli & 
Syvertsen, 2016). Social media have given rise to interactive communication and 
facilitate collaboration among people. However, some scholars think that the internet 
polarizes the citizens political views (Sunstein, 2007). Now information is not a static 
mass anymore; people may easily interact with and become content creators 
themselves (O’Reilly & Battelle, 2009). 
2.2. Twitter and presidential elections: sending messages via the blogosphere 
‘Communicating with the electorate is vital for politicians, and to do it proficiently, 
candidates must go where the voters can be found—online and using social 
media’(Hendricks & Schill, 2017, p. 121). The utilization of Twitter is advantageous 
for politicians because the microblog is rather more similar to a campaign tool 
controlled by the candidates than a debating platform (Davis et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
journalists do not filter the political agent’s messages. However, the media can still 
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construct different kinds of realities about political tweets. The basic concept of 
political communication does not change via Twitter; therefore, persuasion is the 
essential goal of the messages. 
The 2008 United States presidential election has proved that social networks 
have a role in forming public opinion and mobilizing voters. The campaign above was 
the first effort in which new social media technologies became a remarkable part of 
political persuasion, similarly to the traditional media such as television, radio, and 
newspapers (Robertson et al., 2009). It was not the first time candidates utilized new 
media technologies; however, it was the first campaign in which they were used 
extensively (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010). The proper usage of social media 
momentously contributed to Barack Obama’s victory during the 2008 (Metzgar & 
Maruggi, 2009) election and later the 2012 presidential campaigns. Among the social 
platforms, Obama also used Twitter in the 2008 electorate. Moreover, before the 2008 
campaign stage, his first official tweet he shared in 2007 was about encouraging people 
to sign a petition against the war in Iraq (Solop, 2010). Nevertheless, it is questionable 
whether Twitter had a critical impact on Barack Obama’s popularity. First, a study by 
the Pew Research Center found that about six percent of American adults had joined 
the site by 2008, which made Twitter only one slice of an enormous communication 
channel (Smith & Rainie, 2010). Second, in November 2008, Obama was followed by 
118,000 users, which is an insignificant portion of the voters in the United States 
(Solop, 2010). In contrast, 24 percent of the American adult population used Twitter 
in 2016 (Greenwood et al., 2016). 
Based on the statistics above, the significance of Twitter activity is 
controversial during the 2008 presidential election in the United States. According to 
the critics, the campaign was neither won or lost on Twitter, but the social platform 
was an important channel to communicate directly with supporters and to convey 
political conversations far beyond the reaches of the site. On the other hand, scholars 
point out that crucial tweeting patterns are not completely insufficient in terms of 
boosting the support of the citizens. The more a politician tweets, the more votes they 
gain during the elections (DiGrazia et al., 2013). 
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In the 2016 US presidential election, candidates actively embraced Twitter to 
communicate with masses and mobilize supporters (Enli, 2017). Therefore, this thesis 
also focuses on Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s Twitter communication. 
2.3. Shifting the focus during and after the campaign via Twitter 
Presidential campaign and post-campaign communication may differ in politicians’ 
public messages, even on social sites. Persuading people to gain electoral victory is 
one task, but ruling a nation is another. Consequently, modifying the topics or the 
frequencies of specific issues is essential; therefore, shifting the focus from one (or 
more) task(s) to another is a necessary part of the communicational strategy.  
According to Frederic I. Solop (2010), Barack Obama emphasizes two 
essential topics in his tweets during the 2008 presidential campaign stage. First, he 
shares his exact location. Moreover, references to his particular position emerge almost 
eighty percent of his tweets. Second, directing Twitter followers to his campaign web 
site is the second-highest topic that occurs in two-thirds of Obama’s messages. After 
the victory in 2008, Obama did not tweet for almost a month and a half, but after the 
15th of January 2009, he tweeted fifty times until the 30th of July 2009. In other words, 
as a President-elect, Barack Obama almost halted tweeting, but as the President of the 
United States, he used Twitter actively again. In his messages, he asked his followers 
to support clean energy and healthcare policy, which were two vital topics that 
determined the campaign. Informing the audience was also a crucial issue in Obama’s 
post-campaign Twitter communication. Public events and meetings, nominations, and 
House activities were among the topics which the President shared with his audience 
via Twitter. Moreover, Obama introduced a specific feature on his Facebook page, 
which is an icon with a hyperlink to direct his followers to his Twitter account. 
Coordinating the audience and keeping people informed about the essential events 
were also remarkable aspects of Obama’s post-campaign tweets. 
Contemporary literature examined the possible modifications in adversarial 
tweets of the prominent Dutch populist, Geert Wilders, from the radical right and 
Emile Roemer from the left-wing (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). As they pointed out 
(van Kessel & Castelein, 2016, p. 610) in their analysis: ‘Our results indicated that 
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populists tend to be selective in choosing their enemies and that the targets of their 
criticism can change over time. This was clear in the Twitter behavior of the radical 
right PVV leader Geert Wilders in particular. From the outset, Wilders’ criticism – in 
tweets as well as in the 2010 election manifesto – focused more often on cultural issues 
than on the economy, blaming primarily politicians from the ‘‘left.’’ Especially after 
his party withdrew its support from the center-right VVD-CDA minority government, 
Wilders shifted his targets.’ While specific studies emerged related to changing topics, 
objectives, and populist voices via Twitter, their portion is remarkably low. Therefore, 
the fifth chapter aims to provide an explorative analysis by depicting the possible 
perceived modifications in Donald Trump’s tweeting strategy.  
 In short, the fifth unit of the thesis also focuses on the changes in topics and 
populist-blaming PCS referred to targeted entities in Donald Trump’s tweets during 
the campaign stage and the following six months. 
2.4. The early instances of populism 
Accounting for a brief historical review is necessary to characterize the populist 
phenomenon. In this chapter, the fundamental features of the two populist phenomena, 
which were possibly the most significant in the 1800s, are presented. The detailed 
examination of populism’s history is not present in the dissertation because the thesis 
mainly focuses on the conceptualization and operationalization of EP and IP. One of 
the most remarkable historical instances from the 1800s emerged in the United States, 
while the other appeared in Russia. 
As Ernesto Laclau argues (2005a) in his work, by referring to Margaret 
Canovan’s (1981) analysis, there are two significant divisions within populism, 
namely agrarian populism and political populism. The former can be divided into three 
categories, while the latter consists of four classifications. The agrarian populism 
implies farmer’s radicalism (People’s Party in the United States), intellectual agrarian 
socialism (the Narodniki movement in Russia), and peasant movements (Green Rising 
in Eastern Europe). Political populism might apply politician’s populism (appealing to 
the sovereignty of the people during the elections), populist dictatorship (for example, 
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Perón), reactionary populism (George Wallace and his supporters), and populist 
democracy (acclaiming referendums and mobilization of the voters).   
 Historically, the agrarian populism provides the early formations of populism, 
namely the People’s Party in the United States and the Narodniki movement in Russia. 
People’s Party originates from the farmer’s dependency of the railroad corporations in 
the Western Part of America. The farmers had ambivalent feelings about the railroad 
companies in the 1800s. On the one hand, the corporations provided an opportunity 
for them to move their products and the necessary equipment from one location to 
another by improving the infrastructure. On the other hand, the railroad companies had 
a monopoly on moving goods; therefore, they made an effort to increase taxes. The 
farmers felt that railroad companies abused their power over hard-working people; 
consequently, a need for opposing the unfair situation emerged. As Canovan states 
(1981), it is challenging to locate precisely the origin of the American Agrarian 
Populist movement. Nevertheless, Canovan argues (1981) that one of their starting 
points was Texas, a state where lecturers shared the idea that the working people 
became poor while the others acquired a massive profit. The People Party, which is 
the successor of Farmers’ Alliance, might originate from the state above, but there is 
no definite proof for that. Even so, the People Party held its first national convent in 
Omaha, 1892. The party provided a candidate, James B. Weaver, to run for the 
presidency against the conservative and old-fashioned political elite. Finally, Weaver 
collected more than one million votes in the election. Despite the popularity of the 
People’s Party in 1892, it could not acquire such a significant reputation within the 
United States to defeat the Republicans and the Democrats. Moreover, the People’s 
Party lost its popularity in the next elections and could not affect politics significantly 
within the country (Canovan, 1981). 
 The other phenomenon, namely the Narodniki movement, arose in Russia. As 
Canovan argues (1981), there was no chance for providing dominant political parties 
or organizations in Tsarist Russia. Nevertheless, small groups of people made an effort 
to organize radical movements until the authorities crushed them. The ‘intelligentsia’ 
of Russia utilized the expression ‘Narodnik’ or ‘populist’ in a very narrow sense, 
referring to a peculiar circle in the late 1870s which activated itself for the needs of 
the people in a revolutionary way. According to Canovan (1981), the ‘intelligentsia,’ 
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inspired by Mikhail Bakunin’s and Alexander Herzen’s works, traveled to the Russian 
countryside and made a serious effort to persuade peasants about the necessity of 
change. The ‘intelligentsia’ suggested the peasants should proceed in the direction of 
socialism. In the year 1874, thousands of intellectuals left their studies to convince 
peasants and enter into direct relations to them as teachers and as propagandists (Field, 
1987). 
In contrast to the farmers in the United States, the people of the ‘intelligentsia’, 
most of them in their twenties, sought the solutions for the peasants’ problems in 
Russia. Their original slogan was ‘going to the people’ as they attempted to make the 
freed serfs understand that the bourgeoisie exploits them by wage slavery. Moreover, 
they visited the villages and told the peasants that the land belonged to them, and they 
should rebel against the ruling political regime. Despite the mass pilgrimage of the 
‘intelligentsia,’ the freed serfs were not enthusiastic about the cause highlighted by the 
young intellectuals. In other words, the peasants were not engaged in the issue above, 
but unconcerned, suspicious, and adversary. After the failed attempt of the young 
intellectuals, 770 members of the ‘intelligentsia’ were arrested by the authorities to 
prevent Russian peasants from receiving the messages that might turn the huge masses 
against the narrow political elite (Canovan, 1981).     
2.5. Populism and its conceptualizations 
This subchapter summarizes the different conceptualizations of populism in social 
sciences. This subunit of the thesis does not provide a profound introduction into the 
theoretical background; however, it attempts to briefly characterize the most relevant 
connotations of the phenomenon among scholars. Nevertheless, Chapter 2.6. and 2.8. 
will introduce Cas Mudde’s (2004) and Jagers’ and Walgrave’s (2007) concepts, 
which provide crucial theoretical support of EP and IP, namely thin-centered ideology 
and political communication style, in a more detailed way. The contesting ideas, which 
either reflect on the former or the latter concepts, are also provided in Chapter 2.7. and 
2.8. Finally, the universal characterizations of EP and IP are supplied in Chapter 2.10.  
that intends to explain how EP and IP might contribute to the international literature. 
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First, the most commonly utilized approaches in the research field are presented briefly 
below. 
Nearly half a century ago, scientists perceived that populism was an artificial, 
unnatural, and terrifying phenomenon, which has roots in almost every segment of the 
globe and keeps expanding worldwide (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Recently, populism 
became an exceedingly fruitful in the research field, if not an obsession, among 
scholars. The more attention populism gains in social sciences, the more types of 
conceptual classifications emerge in research papers and theories (Moffitt & Tormey, 
2014). Defining populism is a challenging task, if not impossible, to provide (Arnold, 
2018; Laclau, 2005a). A classic problem in conceptualizing populism is its conceptual 
slippage and practical flexibility (Aslanidis, 2018). Consequently, populism may be 
attached to entirely different (thin) ideologies. Therefore, political actors from the far-
left to the far-right (and everything in between) use it to persuade people (Aslanidis, 
2018). Hence, populism has no core ideological background as political actors with 
contradictory beliefs implement it (Philip & Panizza, 2011), but it occurs in a mixed 
format with other ideologies (Rovira Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2011). Scholars refer to 
populism in different ways, such as an ideology (Mudde, 2007), a political 
communication style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), a political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 
2014), a political logic (Laclau, 2005a), a discourse, (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), and a 
strategy (Hawkins, 2010). Despite the conceptual vagueness, most experts admit that 
populism is a thin or thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004) in which two separated 
groups appear at the same time, namely the antagonist, ‘corrupt’ elite and the 
homogeneous ‘pure’ people (Abromeit, 2017; Abts & Rummens, 2007; Bracciale & 
Martella, 2017; Krämer, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Stanley, 2008).  
On the one hand, this thesis and its core theoretical approach accept that 
populism is a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004) while, on the other, it focuses 
primarily on populism as a PCS (Canovan, 2002; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 
2005a). As already mentioned above, a detailed explanation of the thesis’ theoretical 
background introduces how the former two approaches might support the third one, 
namely operationalizing EP and IP (see Chapter 2.6-2.8. and 2.10.). According to 
prominent scholars, populists make a clear distinction between the ordinary people and 
the antagonist others (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populist style is a useful 
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tool for political actors, at debates for instance, because they can make people feel that 
ordinary citizens are part of the decent silent majority (Benoit & Sheafer, 2006). For 
example, Donald Trump regularly stressed the distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in 
the presidential debates in 2016, while Hillary Clinton disregarded focusing on the 
dichotomy above as cautiously as her political opponent used it (Demeter, 2017).   
Vertical and horizontal oppositions may also appear in PPCS (Hameleers, 
2018). Typical vertical clashes emerge between the people and the ‘Others’ in at least 
four ways. Consequently, PPCS might target the (1) political establishment, (2) the 
experts, (3) the economic elite, and (4) the media (Hameleers, 2018). The style of 
political communication mentioned above stresses the differences between the status 
of the hard-working people and the unreliable elite. One of the horizontal perspectives 
is the exclusionist, which depicts culturally or ethnically different people as the cause 
of the hard-working, honest in-group’s problems (Oesch, 2008). Another horizontal 
perspective is the welfare state chauvinist populism by which populists often 
emphasize that the asylum seeker’s intention is to get financial support for free from 
the common budget, and pull out money from struggling taxpayer’s wallet (De Koster 
et al., 2013). The third type of horizontal populism is in-group superiority, which 
enhances the national culture and habit’s pre-eminence compared to the foreign 
immigrant’s lifestyle and practices that may endanger the ‘superior’ cultural values 
(Hameleers, 2018). In sum, the corrupt elite and the dangerous others deprive 
sovereign people of prosperity, decision, voice, identity, and rights by their interests 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).  
Studies on populist communication often focus on the populist leader (Block 
& Negrine, 2017; Demeter, 2017; Engesser et al., 2017a) and a vast portion of scrutiny 
examines one of the most prominent populist politicians in charge, namely Donald 
Trump (Engesser et al., 2017a; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Some scholars 
claim that populism is based on performance, including a collection of prominent 
people (Bucy et al., 2020; Pal et al., 2017; Piontek & Tadeusz-Ciesielczyk, 2019). On 
the contrary, Twitter ensures a platform that does not demand outstanding performance 
because the political agent has the opportunity to focus solely on written messages.  
In recent years, PPCS emerged in several countries, especially during the final 
stages of the general elections (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Moreover, 
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researchers conclude that populist style is used with higher frequency in political 
outsider campaigns than in the incumbents communication in the United States 
(Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). For decades, Republican and Democratic candidates 
also implemented PPCS in their presidential campaigns in the United States, but they 
enhanced different perspectives for the voters. The Republican candidates tend to 
emphasize that the corrupt political establishment is responsible for ordinary people’s 
suffering, while the Democratic nominees blame mostly the economic elite for causing 
a crisis in ordinary people’s lives (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). 
Contemporarily, social media sites like Twitter have become potent 
communication tools for populist political actors. Therefore, several authors started to 
examine the phenomenon above (Bartlett et al., 2011; Gerbaudo, 2014). Populist 
political actors attempt to utilize Twitter, which was limited to 140 characters, but 
from the 7th of November 2017 the company expanded this to 280 (Perez, 2017), 
except in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages, because it functions as a top-down 
marketing tool. Consequently, it might have boosted the impact of PPCS and parties 
by providing an unmediated channel in which unambiguous criticism of (political) 
elites can be spread (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). Although PPCS has started to 
emerge through Twitter in the last couple of years, studies on how populist political 
actors shape and distribute their topics during crucial periods, like campaigns, have 
remained sparse.    
Presidential elections, especially in the United States, provide an excellent 
opportunity for scholars to analyze candidates communicational strategies (Demeter, 
2017; Enli, 2017). Recently, the researchers of populism also tend to focus on 
presidential campaigns (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). 
Not surprisingly, the 2016 Presidential Campaign in the United States is a popular 
research field in which scholars mostly focus on Donald Trump’s PPCS (McNair, 
2018). Moreover, several scholars analyze the Republican politician’s 
communicational patterns and strategy via social sites, primarily Twitter (Gonawela et 
al., 2018; Wells et al., 2016). In contemporary years, experts have published some 
comparative analyses of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s communication, 
relying on their live debates (Demeter, 2017), their tweets (Enli, 2017), and 
performance (Bucy et al., 2020). As scholars point out, Trump is a populist political 
25 
 
actor (Babones, 2018; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) while Hillary Clinton acts 
like a liberal politician; yet, she utilizes some elements of PPCS in her campaign (Nai 
& Maier, 2018). Despite the scholar’s significant activity on the campaign period 
above, the research field does not place a large focus on the specific analysis of the 
former Democratic nominee’s communicational strategy in terms of PPCS. Although 
Hillary Clinton is not a populist politician, she employs a PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 
2017) in her campaign to adjust to her primary opponent’s populist style. Therefore, 
her tweets imply specific elements of the method above. This thesis also aims to 
investigate Trump’s and Clinton’s communicational patterns via Twitter by utilizing a 
new perspective to divide their tweets into explicit, implicit, and neutral categories.7  
In the last couple of decades, scholars focusing on populism presented their 
studies from broad and different perspectives (Aslanidis, 2018); however, the 
conceptualization of populism is a difficult, if not impossible, task to do (Arnold, 2018; 
Laclau, 2005a; Taggart, 2000). Despite the conceptual vagueness (Canovan, 1999; 
Laclau, 1977), scholars make an effort to provide many aspects that might help to 
understand the features, nature, and the utilization of populism (Moffitt & Tormey, 
2014). Therefore, as discussed above, populism emerges in social sciences as an 
ideology (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; Rovira Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2011), a 
political logic (Laclau, 2005a), a political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), a PCS 
(Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), and an organization/strategy 
(Roberts, 2003; Weyland, 2001). Contemporarily, scholars tend to agree that populism 
has no exact or a well-developed basis, but rather a loose-compliant ideology as its 
attributes are flexible and slippery (Pauwels, 2011; Philip & Panizza, 2011). On the 
contrary, political actors like politicians and parties with different ideologies 
emphasize populist features in their communication, especially in their campaigns 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Kriesi, 2014).  
Although conceptual struggles appear in the research field, most scientists 
agree with the idea that populism is a thin-centered ideology (Abromeit, 2017; Krämer, 
2017; Müller, 2017). As such, it stresses the core concept of the corruptness and 
goodness between the exploiting-culprit political, economic, cultural, or scientific elite 
 
7In this analysis, Neutral Sentences are referred as ‘NS.’ 
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and the homogenous mass of the hard-working, decent or ordinary people. On the one 
hand, appealing to the people is one crucial element in populism (Canovan, 1981). On 
the other hand, the characterization of the antagonist entities is the other vital feature 
to emphasize the difference between good and evil (Hameleers, 2018). Populists depict 
this dichotomy to claim that the group of ‘people’ has every right to take the power 
back from the elite (Canovan, 2005). As Canovan points out (2005), the former group 
is excluded from the privileged circles, namely the elite. Additionally, politicians who 
employ the PPCS do not rely only on populism to stress the dichotomies above, but to 
differentiate themselves from their opponents to keep the distance from the failing 
elite. According to Benoit’s Functional Theory, this blame attribution is an aggressive 
tactic in rhetoric that might persuade supporters to ‘realize’ that the attacking politician 
represents something other than their rivals in public issues (Benoit & Harthcock, 
1999). 
According to scholars (Block & Negrine, 2017; Demeter, 2017; Engesser et al., 
2017b), studies on PPCS and its patterns refer to prominent, populist political agents 
or core topics they use to highlight whether they are in charge. Therefore, presidents, 
prime ministers, party leaders, representatives, ruling, or oppositional politicians, and 
activists are among the entities who are under the scope of experts. Based on the 
international literature, Donald Trump in the United States, (Hawkins & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2018) Vladimir Putin in Russia (Fish, 2017), Geert Wilders in the 
Netherlands (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016), Marine Le Pen in France (Abromeit, 
2017), Alexis Tsipras in Greece (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), Matteo Salvini 
in Italy (Bracciale & Martella, 2017), Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Finchelstein, 2017), 
and Viktor Orbán in Hungary (Csigó & Merkovity, 2016; Finchelstein, 2017; Tóth, 
2020) also represent the main characteristics of populist leaders.8  
The thesis aims to contribute to international literature by the utilization of in-
depth analysis from at least three perspectives. First, the scrutiny makes an effort to 
supply the literature in which scholars examine the blame-shifting tendencies in two 
different periods (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). The thesis focuses solely on Donald 
Trump’s blame-shifting tendencies because Hillary Clinton merely tweets after the 
 
8 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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electoral defeat. Second, it examines Trump’s and Secretary Clinton’s tweets, in terms 
of the thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004) and PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). 
In other words, this study seeks the emergence of PPCS in the Republican and the 
Democratic nominee’s political communication; namely, stressing the dichotomies 
between the antagonist (political) elite and the ordinary citizens during the last stage 
(68 days) of the electoral campaign. Finally, the thesis intends to test and introduce the 
concepts of EP and IP to provide a more detailed and profound analysis of the research 
field above to refine analysis methods. Nevertheless, before the presentation of the 
findings, the following subchapters introduce Mudde’s and Jagers’ and Walgrave’s 
concepts, which, based on their nature, might connect to each other, by a more detailed 
review. 
2.6. Populism as a (thin) ideology 
Without any doubt, one of the most important theoretical perspectives among scholars 
is Cass Mudde’s ideational approach by which he argues that populism is an ideology 
(Mudde, 2004). He claims in his famous study that populism is ‘an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 
2004, p. 543). Mudde emphasizes the homogeneity of the circles above; while the 
former is honest and decent, the latter is dishonest and culprit. In other words, 
according to Mudde’s concept, populists think that the people are authentic, but the 
elite is not. In his argument, Mudde focuses on a vital contradiction between the two 
groups by stressing the moral feature of populism (Mudde, 2017). Populism 
presupposes that the ruling elite was once part of the people, but it does not listen to 
the people’s voice anymore and betrays them. Therefore, the elite does not serve the 
people but abuses its power and creates a (relative) deprivation for the vast masses. 
Mudde claims that the ideational perspective has been influential in most of the studies 
related to populism. He also relies on Laclau’s examination (Laclau, 1977) in which 
the Argentine philosopher observed that the ideological feature of populism is a vital 
element of the phenomenon. Note that Mudde also acknowledges (Mudde, 2017) 
Laclau’s influential discursive approach (Laclau, 1977) that argues that the specific 
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element of populism, namely the people, is an empty content; therefore, it can be filled 
with different messages. 
Moreover, Mudde claims that populism consists of four features: (1) ideology, 
(2) the people, (3) the elite, and (4) general will (volonté général). Mudde accepts that 
populism is one of the thin-centered or thin ideologies, which does not reach the same 
level of refinement and consistency as the thick (or full) ones, such as Marxism or 
liberalism (Mudde, 2017). He cites Michael Freeden, who claims that thin ideologies 
have ‘a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden, 
1998, p. 750). Besides, Mudde highlights Freeden’s idea: thin ideologies do not 
provide answers or alternative solutions for core questions and problems affecting 
social or political issues (Freeden, 2003). Mudde also argues that populism might 
connect to several ‘other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism, 
or socialism’ and it ‘is moralistic rather than programmatic’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). 
Mudde concludes in one of his theoretical studies (Mudde, 2017) that determining 
populism as a thin or thick (full) ideology is not a primary task in the research field. 
However, the essential opposition between the elite and the people is the core feature 
of populism.   
Mudde emphasizes the vital role of the people in populism, who seem to be 
uncharacterized and contentless; therefore, they might be, according to Laclau, ‘empty 
signifiers’ (Laclau, 2005b, p. 43) . In contrast, Mudde claims (2017) that the ‘purity’ 
of the people fills the empty shell and provides the opportunity to stress the moral 
differences between the ‘ordinary’ masses and the ‘evil’ elite by the utilization of the 
Manichean friend or foe aspect (Mudde, 2004). 
The antagonist agent of the moral struggle, according to Mudde, is primarily 
the elite, which does not care about the people but abuses power. Who should listen to 
the people’s voice if not the elite who might have certain tools to help them, and what 
should happen if they leave the masses demands unheard and unanswered? As Mudde 
states, populists do not want to co-operate with the elite but intend to end its reign, 
without any compromise (Mudde, 2004). Nevertheless, specific minorities like 
immigrants and asylum seekers might also be excluded from the pure mass mostly on 
ethnic criteria. The latter feature of populism emerges when other hosting (thin) 
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ideologies, such as nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and nativism,9 fuel the political 
context (Mudde, 2017). 
As Mudde claims, the general will of the people magnets two fundamental 
features: special interests and common sense. The former is attached only to the elite, 
which focuses on maintaining its wealth and power; therefore, it paves the way for 
antagonism, whereas the latter is the list of common issues which need to be taken care 
of. However, the concept of the volonté général presupposes the abstract homogeneity 
of the people depicting them as a collective, imagined community (Anderson, 1983), 
which has the very same common problems (Mudde, 2004). Populists, who claim that 
they are the authentic members of the people, attempt to be the voice, the helper, and 
the problem-solver of the masses. 
Mudde also demonstrates the advantages of his ideational approach by stressing 
its (1) distinguishability, (2) categorize-ability, (3) travel-ability, and (4) versatility. 
First, Mudde claims that the ideational approach supplies the distinguishability 
between populism and non-populism. For instance, according to elitism, the elite are 
pure, while populism opposes that idea by enhancing the corruptness of the group. 
Pluralism depicts the people as a group which is fragmented into several circles, 
whereas populist highlight that people shape one homogeneous mass (Mudde, 2004).  
Mudde claims that by transforming populism into an adjective (populist), it 
might help to categorize and characterize the ideal-based particularities of the left-
wing and right-wing alternates of the phenomenon. While the former subtype often 
implements some features or forms of socialism, the latter might connect to, for 
example, nationalism. Mudde also argues (2017) that several variations of the 
phenomenon exist, including agrarian, authoritarian, civic, Latin American, 
presidential, reactionary, Republican, and xenophobic populism.10 All of them have 
the core attribution of the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy, but implementing at least one 
extra and relevant feature of the political/ideological context/guidelines (Mudde, 
2017).  
 
9 The list of possible and relevant hosting (thin) ideologies is non-exhaustive. 
10 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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According to Mudde, the travel-ability of the ideational approach reflects on the 
problematic feature of populism rooting in its dissimilar attributions based on periods 
and territories. Mudde participated in specific studies (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2013), which examined cross-regional cases, including ten scholars and eight 
investigations (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). In other words, the ideational 
perspective might be applicable when populism is analyzed or measured in diverse 
countries.      
 The versatility of the ideational approach creates opportunities for scholars to 
analyze populism not only on the sender’s, but also on the receiver’s side. 
Consequently, voters’ attitudes, whether they are committed to the populist ideology, 
might be scrutinized for seeking the region-specific subtopics by which citizens might 
be influenced to vote for populist politicians, parties, and join to movements. In sum, 
both sides of the political communication could be under the scholar’s radar by 
implementing the ideational perspective (Mudde, 2017).      
 In a nutshell, Mudde considers populism as an ideology; however, he states 
that it is a thin one by emphasizing that its only core feature originates from the 
articulated dichotomy between the ‘good people’ and the ‘corrupt elite.’ Therefore, it 
is not such a well-developed ideology as, for instance, a full one such as ‘Marxism’ is; 
however, the conceptual slipperiness allows populism to be an applicable tool for 
political agents with other hosting (thin) ideologies (Mudde, 2017).  
2.7. The criticism of Mudde’s ideational approach  
While Cass Mudde’s theoretical perspective, which defines populism as a (thin) 
ideology, is shared by many scholars, it is also severely contested by others. This 
subchapter relies mostly on Paris Aslanidis’ study (2016), in which he summarizes the 
focal points of the criticism on Mudde’s ideational approach. He also suggests the 
discursive aspect, as a feasible perspective of the analysis related to populism.  
 Referring to John Gerring’s study (1997), Aslanidis suggests that populism 
lacks a unique feature of the full or thick ideologies, namely coherence. A plausible 
explanation might be, as already discussed above, that populism is a phenomenon 
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emerging in the broadest range of the political spectrum: from the far-left to the far-
right. Moreover, according to Aslanidis, there is no Populist International, 
fundamental programmatic papers on populism, grand visions for solving universal 
social, economic or ecological problems, prominent icons, and the permanent 
historical emergence of populism. These features might be part of a coherent 
ideological perspective. Aslanidis, relying on Michael Freeden’s work (1996),  claims 
in his study that ideologies have a three-layered structure ‘containing core, adjacent 
and peripheral concepts, conditioned by means of elaborate proximities and weights 
idiosyncratic to each ideological variant’ (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 90). Populism, with its 
restricted core and narrow political perspective, does not have a concise concept like 
full ideologies do. It also lacks (1) internal integration, (2) a rich core attached to 
political approaches, (3) the ability to provide political concepts, (4) the provision of 
answers for political questions, (5) extensive ideational scope, (6) cohesive ideological 
background, and (7) unification among ideologists; all elements which might be vital 
parts of the thick conceptualizations (Aslanidis, 2016).  
 Why does the debate around dropping the concept label of the ideology matter 
in the case of populism? According to Aslanidis, the source of the problem is 
‘degreeism’ (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 92), which emerges in textual analyses where scholars 
try to investigate to what extent the political agents utilize populist discourse or, as 
related to this thesis, the discursive part of PPCS.  
 As Aslanidis states (2016), accounting for the ideational approach, or more 
precisely, the ideological aspect brings forth a dichotomous characterization. The ‘take 
it or leave it nature’ (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 92) of the category arises when scholars 
implement the ideological approach in their analyses. Following the ideational logic 
means that a politician is either populist or not. There is nothing in between. However, 
Aslanidis claims that if scholars employ Laclau’s discursive approach, the extents of 
populism can be measured. He also goes further by emphasizing several studies 
focusing on the degree of populism: ‘Yet there has recently been a surge of quantitative 
research which, on the contrary, clearly acknowledges degrees of populism. Works 
such as Jagers and Walgrave (2007), Hawkins (2009), Deegan-Krause and Haughton 
(2009), Reungoat (2010), Pauwels (2011), Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), Gemenis et 
al. (2012), March (2012), Vasilopoulou et al. (2014), Rooduijn et al. (2014), Bernhard 
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et al. (2015), Pauwels and Rooduijn (2015) and Aslanidis (2015) have distilled the 
necessary dimensions of populism and operationalized them using various 
methodologies of text analysis to arrive at interesting conclusions illustrating variation 
across the unit of analysis (political parties, leaders, etc.).’ Therefore, focusing on the 
degrees of the discursive elements provides the opportunity to analyze to what extent 
political agents implement the features above in their communication.  
 Despite the fact that Mudde’s ideational concept is contested, this thesis does 
not drop the theoretical background of the thin ideology; however, the study and the 
new concepts presented below do not accept that populism is a thick one. The 
dissertation implements the fundamental piece of Mudde’s approach, namely the 
investigation of the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. Also, it utilizes the moral aspects of 
thin ideology in the discussion. The current and the subsequent subchapters aim to 
introduce why the discursive approach of the PPCS is essential for this textual analysis: 
‘As many analysts have pointed out (e.g. Hawkins, 2009; Rooduijn et al., 2014), 
formal discursive elements are implicit in Mudde’s (2004) ideological definition’ 
(Aslanidis, 2016, p. 98).  Consequently, the ideational approach and the discursive 
feature of PCS might shape a theoretical background by which the operationalization 
of EP and IP might be supported.  They might provide the degrees of populism among 
the analyzed agents by focusing on discursive elements to explore to what extent do 
two sharply different politicians employ them.  
As Aslanidis claims (2018), Jagers and Walgrave (2007) focused on the degree 
of populism in their study by which the concept of PCS was operationalized. The 
theoretical concept of this thesis, namely EP and IP, is primarily attached to the aspect 
of PCS. The contribution of EP and IP to the approach above will be introduced in 
Chapter 2.10. Before the profound introduction of EP and IP emerges, it is essential to 
supply the concept of PCS, which is a fundamental theoretical basis of EP and IP 
above. 
2.8. Political communication style and its ties to the thin concept 
First, this subchapter provides the characterization of PPCS by mostly relying on 
Jagers’ and Walgrave’s study (2007). Second, other scholars’ outstanding 
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contributions to the definition are also supplied here. Third, the subchapter will briefly 
introduce how the thin ideology and PPCS might connect. Finally, the summarized 
criticism on the discursive part of PPCS ends this subchapter. 
As Jagers and Walgrave argue (2007), PPCS has three significant elements: (1) 
reference to the people, (2) stressing the harmful role of the corrupt elite, and (3) 
excluding some particular, dangerous groups from the society to keep the relevant 
territory ‘safe’ for ordinary citizens. As they point out: ‘We will use the thin definition, 
only relying on the first element of merely referring to the people, as an operational 
definition. The thick definition comes close to the classic concept and consists of a 
combination of the three elements...’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). They stress 
that the thin concept is based exclusively on the people, and, in contrast, the thick 
approach consists of all the three elements above. Additionally, they claim that the 
only central feature of PPCS is referring to the people. According to Jagers and 
Walgrave (2007), without appealing to the monolithic and homogeneous circles, the 
PCS cannot be considered populist.  
Additionally, the authors above took into consideration four types of populism: 
(1) complete populism, (2) excluding populism, (3) anti-elitist populism, and (4) 
empty populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). The first type contains references to all 
three key elements; the second stresses the dichotomies between the ‘decent’ people 
and other minorities that risks the inhabitant’s culture, welfare, and security 
(Hameleers, 2018); the third blames the elite, which does not listen to the citizens’ 
voice (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), and the last one focuses solely on the people (Bobba 
& Roncarolo, 2018). 
However, at least one question emerges if one takes into account Jagers’ and 
Walgrave’s theoretical perspective. What happens if the PPCS lacks one antagonist 
element but implies the other two features? The theoretical background of the thesis 
assumes that appealing to the people and highlighting the role of the anti-
establishment’s destructive presence and activity might appear in PPCS alone. 
However, stressing the differences between the ‘decent’ homogenous masses and the 
‘threatening’ specific minorities (e.g., asylum seekers) is also part of EP. To strengthen 
the theoretical concept, the thesis also relies on Mudde, who theorizes that populism, 
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as a thin-centered ideology, separates society into the groups of ordinary people and 
the corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004).   
Based on the literature review, the fundamental elements of PPCS might be:  
• actualization (Krämer, 2014),  
• antagonism (Arnold, 2018),  
• blaming the enemy (Laclau, 2005a),  
• emotionalization (Bos et al., 2011),  
• emphasizing negative pieces of information (Caiani & Graziano, 2016),  
• informality (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014),  
• people-centrism (Bracciale & Martella, 2017),  
• simplification (Moghadam, 2018),  
• stressing the idea of ‘Zeitgeist vision’ (Mouffe, 2005),  
• taboo-breaking (Krämer, 2014), 
• vulgarism (Bracciale & Martella, 2017).  
Interestingly, politicians who do not utilize or exploit populist ideology still 
might apply the elements of PPCS in their communication (Bracciale & Martella, 
2017). The exploration of PPCS in politicians’ communication who are not considered 
primarily as populists, supports the allegation that populism has the attribute of a 
chameleon that adjusts to the situations, to the circumstances and to the political 
spheres (Taggart, 2000).  
Moreover, scholars observed specific, pragmatic adjustments in the PCS of 
populist politicians on Twitter when the current political situation demands the 
relevant shifts in communication (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). For instance, 
blaming the enemies with higher frequency, attacking them from different 
perspectives, or shifting the focus of targeting messages from one opponent to another 
might be vital adjustments in PPCS.  
 It is important to note that the three elements of PPCS emphasized by Jagers 
and Walgrave (2007), also emerged in other scholars’ studies:   
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i. the emphasis of people’s independence and sovereignty (Bracciale & Martella, 
2017; Canovan, 1981; Canovan, 2002; Kazin, 1995; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; 
Mudde, 2004; Rovira Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2011; Taggart, 2000), 
ii. targeting the elite by attacking it (Aslanidis, 2018; Bonikowski & Gidron, 
2016; Canovan, 1999; Hameleers, 2018; Taggart, 2000), 
iii. exclusionism or, in other words, ‘ostracizing’ specific groups (Hameleers, 
2018; Mudde, 2004).  
Referring to people’s sovereignty highlights that politics should serve the general 
will (volonté général) of decent citizens (Mudde, 2004). As such, politics and 
politicians should work as servants of the people, not as masters of them. The populist 
actors tend to emphasize their closeness to the people by using a simple, easy-to-
interpret form of communication to make the masses feel that they are equivalent 
entities (Caiani & Graziano, 2016). In PPCS, political agents stress that they represent 
the people directly by lacking insufficient intermediaries (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). 
Moreover, PPCS provides a promise that the hard-working citizens will be as glorious 
and thriving in the future as they were once in the past (Finchelstein, 2017), and 
enhance the ‘attempt to construct what has been lost by the present’ (Taggart, 2000, p. 
95). 
 Anti-elitism and anti-establishment attributes are fundamental tools both in 
populist ideology and PCS for the sake of making a clear distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). On the one hand, ‘us’ represents the decent 
people who are suffering from declining incomes and disappearing prosperity 
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). On the other hand, the group of 
‘them’ acts on behalf of the minor (political) elite, huge economic corporations, or 
specific segments of the media that abuse their power and influence (Canovan, 1981; 
Hameleers, 2018; Taggart, 2000). In general, the critical aspect of anti-elitism 
manifests in the infinite distance between the people and the elite (Pauwels, 2011). 
According to populists, there is a wide range of antagonist actors (Aalberg et al., 2016). 
First and foremost, politicians are the primary enemies who do not have concerns about 
the voters; they only want to maintain or obtain power (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). 
Populists stress that they will not co-operate with the elite, which is a morally corrupt 
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group, and there is no opportunity for compromises (Mudde, 2017) between ‘us’ and 
‘them.’   
Furthermore, according to agents who utilize PPCS, institutions like state 
administration, jurisdiction, and law enforcement that should protect the citizens are 
corrupt, ineffective, and they are interconnected. As specific populists claim, mass 
corporations, banks, trade unions, and brokers exploit citizens financially by taking 
advantage of their naive trust, and collect their saved incomes to gain even bigger 
profits for the wealthy minorities but not for the ordinary people (Ramiro, 2016; 
Rooduijn, 2018). According to populists, the media might mislead people by hiding 
the truth, or telling fake or modified stories of reality (Pauwels, 2014). Additionally, 
scholars and other prominent experts engaged with destructive and false oppositional 
aspects might also mislead ordinary citizens  (Engesser et al., 2017a; Hameleers, 
2018).  
    The concept of ‘ostracizing others’ (Mudde, 2004) relies on horizontal PPCS 
(Hameleers, 2018), especially in right-wing populist communication (Oesch, 2008). In 
the opinion of right-wing populists, asylum seekers, immigrants, isolated minorities, 
or people who want to exploit the welfare state’s financial support are among the 
groups which threaten ordinary citizens’ prosperity, culture, and safety. The features 
of ‘ostracizing others’ might support the welfare state chauvinist perspective, by which 
‘hard-working’ taxpayers might feel that (unemployed) others are benefitting from 
their labor. In other words, according to populists, the ‘others’ attempt to live from 
financial supports provided by the working people’s fees (De Koster et al., 2013). On 
the contrary, left-wing populists utilize oppositions stressing that small, extreme-rich 
groups make a significant profit while the vast masses are suffering from destitution 
(Ramiro, 2016). The groups mentioned above are stigmatized, and the dichotomy 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes more spectacular by stressing the danger that 
emerges with the collective enemy (Cranmer, 2011).  
 As scholars suggest (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), there are a few problems with 
the discursive part of PPCS. First, as Pauwels argues (2011), coding bias and doubtful 
reliability might be considerable limitations for qualitative content analyses. Second, 
there is no comprehensive agreement on what type of contents should be analyzed 
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from debates to party manifestos, public speeches, Facebook posts, or tweets.11 Third, 
quantitative methods also have limitations as specific populist-like keywords might 
not connect to the context of PPCS. Finally, content analyses mostly do not focus on 
visual, aesthetic, performative, or transgressive nonverbal elements (Bucy et al., 2020) 
by which political actors might affect the voters’ decisions (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).  
The dissertation endeavors to expand the concept of PPCS by setting the 
categories of EP and IP. The first category demands the implementation of two key 
factors’ (a) people and the elite or (b) people and dangerous others presence explicitly 
mentioned in the very same coding unit. In contrast, the second, which is IP, requires 
the presence of one crucial feature and the indirect suggestion to the other. It is 
important to note that the ‘thick definition’ in which all the three actors are emerging, 
is part of EP but not the IP.  
For the sake of avoiding conceptual vagueness as far as it is possible, a 
summary related to the deductive characterizations of PPCS, and the vital attributes of 
thin populist ideology were provided above. The detailed and specific description of 
EP and IP will be introduced in Chapter 2.10. At this stage of the dissertation, a brief 
introduction of the possible effects of PPCS’s blame attributions on negative emotions 
like anger and fear is also supplied in the subsequent chapter. 
2.9. Blame attributions and negative emotions in populist political 
communication style 
The utilization of blame attributions in which negative emotions are affected might be 
a vital tool in the PPCS. In other words, the examined style is supported by an 
‘emotionalized blame attribution’ (Hameleers et al., 2017, p. 872). This 
communicational style can be understood as a framing technique in which populists 
make a serious effort to focus on their audience’s negative emotions. As Entman 
argues (1993) in his famous research, there are four essential functions in framing, 
namely defining the problem, causal interpretation, moral assessment, ‘and/or a 
treatment recommendation’ (Hameleers et al., 2017, p. 872).  
 
11 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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In the PPCS, the primary framing technique that relies on the blame attribution 
is the casual interpretation. The antagonist outgroups like the political elite, the 
economic moguls, the media, the experts, isolated minorities, immigrants, asylum 
seekers are blamed for several reasons by the politicians who utilize PPCS. Corruption, 
disregarding people’s interests, exploiting ordinary citizen’s work, harming familiar 
people’s budget, destroying general welfare, threatening the inhabitants’ culture or 
safety, and misleading the innocent persons by providing ‘fake news’ are among the 
fundamental reasons that support PPCS. The theoretical part of the dissertation also 
takes into account the characterization of the blaming tweets of the two presidential 
candidates to support an in-depth analysis relating to the PPCS. Yet, we must first look 
at the basic summary of the relevant literature that relies on the examinations of 
targeting negative emotions in PPCS is supplied below.   
 Focusing on the emphasis of the political elite’s responsibility in democratic 
systems is a crucial part of political communication (Gomez & Wilson, 2008; Malhotra 
& Kuo, 2008). The most relevant part of negative framing is the casual attribution in 
PPCS (Hameleers et al., 2017). From the politicians’ perspective, it is essential to make 
people understand why they are a better choice than their prominent rivals. Therefore, 
they tend to make a distinction between themselves and the ‘others.’ As Benoit and 
Harthcock point out (1999) in their Functional Theory, there are three elemental ways 
by which the politicians might keep the distance from their opponents: (1) attack, (2) 
defense, and (3) acclaim. As a scrutiny, which examines PPCS, the thesis primarily 
focuses on attacking (blaming) aspects. The elements above provide the opportunity 
for a communicator who utilizes the PPCS to define themself as the only person who 
is fit for a specific role. Hence, causal and blaming attributions maintain another vital 
difference that must be emphasized by the politicians. This dissimilarity appears 
between the exploited ‘good’ people and the ‘culprit’ out-groups, which is the core 
element of PPCS.  
Despite the conceptual struggles and the vagueness of defining populism 
universally, most scholars agree in contemporary years that populism is based on 
stressing the dichotomy between the blameless people and the evil others (Canovan, 
1999; Taggart, 2000). Blaming the enemy might affect citizens’ negative emotions 
and, therefore, can strengthen the idea that the corrupt elites or outgroups are 
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responsible for crises, recessions, disappearing prosperity, the feeling of being 
unsecured, neglected, and unheard (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Taggart, 2000). There 
are two circles with strictly deviating attribution in the example above. The former 
consists of decent inhabitants who always suffer from being exploited, while the latter 
takes advantage of its situation, abuses power, and does not focus on serving the people 
(Mudde, 2004). In other words, the latter causes the former’s fundamental problems 
and struggles. However, what kind of negative feelings do politicians want to affect 
by utilizing the PPCS? What labels might be appropriate to achieve the blame 
attribution’s essential goal, which is to persuade people not to vote for the culprit 
political elite and ignore the media’s messages? 
Based on international literature, fear and anger are the most prominent 
negative emotions in the ‘Populist Blame-Game’ (Hameleers et al., 2017, p. 876). As 
Gadarian points out (2010), emotionally charged pieces of information have different 
effects on citizens opinions in contrast to information that lacks emotional messages. 
The PPCS often focuses on simple but emotionally charged words in which the actor 
might attack and blame the so-called enemy. Anger and fear might have different 
effects on people’s emotions (Ruzza & Fella, 2011); however, these effects might also 
connect.  
On the one hand, blame attributions emphasize that the culprit elite functions 
as a dishonest and corrupt entity. Moreover, blame attribution refers to the ignorance 
of the fundamental purpose of the elite, namely serving the people. As populists state, 
political elites should work to create a livable sphere by providing affordable and fair 
circumstances for citizens. Instead, they care selfishly with their interests to acquire 
and maintain their political power. Populists also blame the media by highlighting that 
they construct false information and poison ordinary people’s minds to maximize their 
profit by reaching the broadest audience. In other words, if the elite undervalue 
informing the people honestly, it then focuses on misleading them. Leading and 
keeping inhabitants informed should be for the people and not for the elite. Therefore, 
citizens might feel that the elite deprives them of their fundamental rights and 
abandons ordinary citizens. Moreover, according to populists, the elite blocks hard-
working people’s desires, namely enjoying the fruit of their labor in prosperity. In line 
with international literature, anger provides the perception of certainty and 
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controllability (Hameleers et al., 2017). Therefore, it might bring attention to people’s 
dependency on the will of others (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
On the other hand, blame attributions suggest that the culprit elite or outgroup 
threaten the future of the people (Mudde, 2004). The blame attributions vital features, 
like danger and threat, might have a considerable effect on citizens’ emotions. In 
contrast to anger, fear is used to bring attention to uncertainty about the danger that 
might risk decent inhabitants’ welfare, culture, and security (Hameleers et al., 2017). 
The deprivation of stability in people’s lives might be a fundamental factor that can 
catalyze fear. The blame might indicate that the corrupt elite failed to represent the 
people’s collective will (volonté général) to provide a predictable and stable life for 
them (Mols & Jetten, 2014). Fear predicts uncontrollability in which chaos might 
appear and spread all over the inhabitant’s country. As specific populists declare, the 
nationwide threat might originate from politicians’ incapability of protecting the 
country (Tóth et al., 2019). 
Consequently, dangerous and foreign people with different cultures and 
languages can invade the territory and insult the inhabitants. The appraisal tendencies 
of the fear might attract the need for a charismatic and popular leader who challenges 
the status quo (Laclau, 1977), and elaborate national security precautions to avoid the 
‘existing’ threat. Therefore, populist politicians highlight that the former or the current 
establishment is not capable of providing security and stopping chaos. In contrast, 
populists stress that they prevent people from danger, and tend to promise that they 
purify the ordinary citizens’ lives from the culprit and dangerous outgroups accused 
of exploiting and depriving the people of prosperity, or risking the nation’s inner 
stability (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Stavrakakis et al., 2017).  
In sum, entities who utilize one of the core elements of PPCS, namely affecting 
negative emotions, make a serious effort to distinguish themselves from the culprit 
elite. As international scholars claim, populist politicians might employ blame 
attribution more than the old-fashioned or mainstream politicians do (Vasilopoulou et 
al., 2014). Populists suggest that they are morally different from their opponents 
because they are trustworthy. Along with this, populists introduce themselves as the 
humble servants of the nation. As such, they promise the reconstruction of the country, 
which was a great and glorious land once. They pledge to provide significant, 
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predictable growth in the economy, and most importantly, in contrast to the corrupt 
elites, always listen to people’s voices and keep in mind the nation’s desires first.          
2.10. The conceptualization of Explicit and Implicit Populist Political 
Communication Style 
This subchapter aims to introduce the concept of EP and IP. This theoretical and 
methodological contribution accepts Jagers’ and Walgrave’s perspective (2007), by 
which they suggest that populism is a PCS. They also argue (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) 
that the content of the discourse is the most important part of the analyses. The concept 
relies on the existing international literature in which scholars highlight that the pivotal 
definitional elements of populism might be fragmented, clustered, or isolated from 
each other in the coding units (Engesser et al., 2017a). Therefore, in certain instances, 
direct dichotomies do not appear in every populist-like message; however, specific 
features might emerge alone. The reasons for the above observation might be (1) 
reducing the complexity of ideology to make it an easy-to-understand message, (2) to 
keep the thin populist ideology suitable for people with differing political attitudes, (3) 
avoiding pure PPCS to make it harder for political opponents or experts to label 
communicators as populists (Engesser et al., 2017a). Nevertheless, the thesis also 
attempts to detect the fragmented elements of PPCS using this concept. It also provides 
listed characterizations on EP and IP, which are adjusted to the specifications of the 
American political situation from the 1st of September 2016 to the 1st of May 2017, 
to indicate the theoretical approach (see subchapter 3.4. and 3.6.).  
Appealing to the people is one of the critical aspects of PPCS, as Jagers and 
Walgrave (2007, p. 323) state: ‘Without reference to the people, populism is simply 
unthinkable. In all available definitions appealing to the people is a minimal and 
necessary condition.’ Populism is a thin centered ideology that often stresses the 
harmful activity of the elite or other minorities. For instance, how the political elite 
abuses its power over ordinary people is revealed by emphasizing that it (the elite) let 
refugees threaten the culture and general welfare of the inhabitants through their 
traditions, receive extra financial benefits, and occupy the homeland (Hameleers, 
2018). Moreover, in specific PPCS, the economic elite might have an interest in 
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immigration for specific reasons, like destabilizing the country, increasing financial 
income, and expanding political influence (Tóth, 2020).  
First, this subchapter operationalizes EP and IP to provide support in 
understanding this concept. EP appears, for instance, when Donald Trump directly 
refers to the elite or specific out-groups, like immigrants, who abuse power, exploit 
people, mislead the citizens, and threaten the inhabitants’ security. A relevant instance 
is provided below:  
‘Thank you NH! We will end illegal immigration, stop the drugs, deport all 
criminal aliens & save American lives!’ Date: 2016-11-04. 
 
The central idea of EP relies on the concept that the antagonistic actors and the 
people have to appear in the very same coding unit. In other words, if the homogeneous 
‘good’ masses and the ‘culprit’ out-groups occur in the same coding unit, EP is present. 
Matrix 1 provides possible scenarios to supply an overview of EP messages. It is 
important to notice that the category of EP does not demand the specific characteristic 
or identity of the enemy but the apparent presence of the antagonistic agent. As the 
tweet above shows, Trump lacks the precise definition of the ‘illegal immigration’ and 
‘all criminal aliens’ but still stresses the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy. When an exact 
identity of the enemy occurs (e.g., Hillary Clinton), and the dichotomy appears in the 
message, the coding unit also falls under the category of EP.  
Matrix 1. Scenarios in Explicit Populist Political Communication Style 
 S I  S II S III S IV S V S VI S VII S VIII12 
‘Corrupt’ Elite ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   
‘Dangerous’ Minorities ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
‘Good’ People ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓     
Explicit Populism ✓ ✓ ✓      
 
 The operationalization of EP and IP might refine the research methods of textual 
investigations. EP, on the one hand, shows the PPCS in a pure and unambiguous form. 
As presented above, the conditions of EP are strict and rigid; therefore, it is much 
 
12 The abbreviation of ‘S’ refers to ‘Scenario.’   
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easier for coders to categorize the coding units. One might think that this concept can 
be equated with thick populism, which consists of the three elements of (1) referring 
to the people, (2) anti-elitism, and (3) homogeneity/exclusion (Jagers & Walgrave 
2007). However, it is between the thin and thick definitions. As such, only one type of 
apparent dichotomies (e.g., people versus elite, or people versus 
minorities/immigrants) is required to categorize a message as EP, and there is no need 
to implement the third element, which is either attacking the elite or showing hostile 
attitude towards immigrants or other specific minorities. In other words, EP provides 
a bridge between the thin and thick definitions.  
At this point, it might be useful to note another perspective (Aslanidis, 2018), 
suggesting that full populism consists of people-centrism and anti-elitism. According 
to the aspect above, the two elements have to appear in the very same coding unit to 
label it as a full-populist frame. Yet, the thesis’s theoretical concept still relies on the 
thick and thin concept (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) to position EP between the two. EP 
might implement the ‘people versus the elite’ or ‘the people versus minorities’ 
dichotomies to suggest an extra understanding of textual analyses. Consequently, by 
the utilization of EP, researchers might have an opportunity to measure which 
antagonist agents appear more frequently in different PPCS: the elite or the 
‘dangerous’ minorities.      
IP emerges in the analyzed sentences if Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton blame 
the elite or other out-groups, but without direct reference to the people. Additionally, 
IP also emerges if the communicator mentions a severe threat related to ordinary 
people but does not define the specific source of the danger. IP is a flexible method by 
which texts with different languages and (political) contexts might be perceived and 
measured by considering a visible and concealed part of PPCS at the same time. 
Nevertheless, IP supports the in-depth analysis of the PPCS; consequently, it helps to 
detect populist messages more efficiently. Moreover, IP might be a tool to measure 
whether specific political actors focus on the general will by enhancing the sovereignty 
of the people, or the enemy by stressing the harmful role of the elite or the ‘dangerous 
others’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3; Engesser et al., 2017a, p. 1111). In other 
words, IP might support the measuring of whether people-centrism or antagonism is 
the more dominant feature of the scrutinized PPCS. 
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IP might be perceived from at least two perspectives. First, even though the 
political agents tend to speak or write about only the people who suffer from relative 
deprivation (Hameleers, 2019), or being under risk from an invisible, common threat, 
this thesis still suggests that those messages are not necessarily parts of empty 
populism. For instance, Donald Trump utilizes IP as it follows: 
‘Instead of driving jobs and wealth away, AMERICA will become the world’s 
great magnet for INNOVATION & JOB CREATION.’ Date: 2017-01-03. 
 
IP might support realizing how the causes and sources of the deprivation or 
risks connect hiddenly to the messages in which the people, in this case, ‘AMERICA,’ 
appear, but the ‘enemy’ does not. In the tweet above, the antagonist actor does not 
emerge, and it is not characterized. The receiver of the message does not know who 
brings ‘jobs and wealth away’ because there is no explanation. Donald Trump suggests 
that a severe economic deprivation is in progress, that affects people’s household 
incomes. The persons, committees, companies, or parties who might be responsible 
for the threatening situation are not mentioned, referred to, or named. In short, the 
minimal necessary feature, namely the collective group of people, occur explicitly in 
the content with the emphasis of a common problem. However, there is no reference 
to the agent, not even in a vague way, who is responsible for the destructive processes.   
A specific instance might demonstrate how IP works from another perspective:  
‘The failing @nytimes writes total fiction concerning me. They have gotten it 
wrong for two years, and now are making up stories & sources!’ Date: 2017-02-06. 
 
In this message, there is no direct reference to the people; therefore, it does not 
make sense to characterize it as an instance of EP. However, the message above 
implies that, by lying about somebody (e.g., the leader), the media also lie to the people 
because they are not writing truthful accounts. The receivers of the message are the 
people, not only the person who is being referenced. In other words, the people are 
present in IP messages but in an unseen way. Additionally, according to Kurt 
Weyland’s political-strategic approach in the research field of populism (2017),  the 
personalistic leader, who is Donald Trump in this case, represents the general will of 
the people. If the media attack the person who embodies the ‘the will of the people’ 
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and fight against ‘the enemy of the people,’ they also attack the huge masses.   
Therefore, IP supports the minimum concept of populism, that of appealing to the 
people, as stated by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), by searching for them in messages 
in which, at first glance, they seem to be missing. The authors above argue that if a 
message lacks reference to the people, but anti-establishment rhetoric still arises, the 
coding unit does not fit the PPCS (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). As they state (Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007, pp. 334-335): ‘If discourse does not refer to the population yet 
fiercely criticises the establishment and at the same time stigmatises popular 
categories, it cannot be considered as populism since the required appeal to the people 
is missing (the size of the bubble will be small or even non-existent).’ In contrast, the 
thesis endeavors to show, by operationalizing IP, that despite the absence of explicit 
references to the people in specific texts, they might be the invisible part of individual 
coding units. Thus, IP is a possible unit for measuring the PPCS. In sum, the political 
agents might focus explicitly on either the people or the enemy in IP messages; 
however, another entity is still part of the coding unit in a concealed way. 
At this point, it might be practical to mention that several international studies 
focus on different features of PPCS, such as people-centrism (Rooduijn et al., 2014), 
anti-elitism (Aslanidis, 2018), popular sovereignty (Bernhard et al., 2015), blame-
shifting (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014), exclusivity (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), or claim 
for democracy (Reungoat, 2010). For instance, one of the recent textual analyses labels 
a coding unit as a ‘partial populist frame’ (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 1255) if either people-
centrism or anti-elitism appears in it. Nevertheless, the differences between Aslanidis’ 
partial populist frame and IP are at least twofold. First, the above-mentioned frame 
avoids implementing specific minorities or out-groups, which are often depicted as 
dangerous circles in PPCS (Engesser et al., 2017a, p. 1112), while IP takes them into 
account. Second, IP suggests that despite one of the missing elements of the 
dichotomies, the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ agents are still present but in an unrevealed way.   
Many relevant contesting questions might rise at the operationalization of IP. One 
of the most plausible questions might refer to differences and similarities between 
negative political campaigns and IP. According to the literature, a concise definition 
of a negative campaign might be: ‘…to what extent competing candidates attack their 
rivals instead of promoting their own programme’ (Gerstlé & Nai, 2019, p. 411). 
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Therefore, there is a specific segment of IP, which might have very similar features to 
negative political campaigns: attacking the political rival. If the communicator targets 
the prominent political opponent solely by PPCS and fails to mention the people, the 
differences between this specific segment of IP and the negative campaign are 
minimal, and they might also overlap. As Gerstlé and Nai suggested (2019, p. 416): 
‘…negative campaigns are more likely to contain fear appeals (Crigler et al., 2006)’, 
and populist communication seems to go hand in hand with the use of more negative 
and offensive messages (Nai, 2018a). From a theoretical standpoint, conceptual 
equivalences and overlaps undoubtedly exist between, for instance, the more 
‘aggressive’ components of populist communication (e.g. the use of a brash rhetoric 
and the lack of respect towards political adversaries) and the use of a negative tone 
and political attacks.’ However, IP messages where the media, experts, or business 
interests are directly attacked, primarily on a moral aspect (Mudde, 2017), do not fit 
the definition above. Gertslé’s and Nai’s definition (2019) contradicts this by (1) 
praising the masses and (2) suggesting a hidden enemy are not the unambiguous 
elements of negative campaigns. Gerstlé and Nai also suggested (2019) that negative 
campaigns do not focus on evoking and praising the ‘people’ directly, but on attacking 
the rival. On the other hand, according to them (Gerstlé & Nai, 2019), PPCS 
implements the (1) people, (2) anti-elitism, and (3) informal tone.  
In a nutshell, future textual research with differing languages can adopt the method 
above to find the invisible components of PPCS and explore the deeper layers of 
coding units. Even though the majority of the words in the populist topic dictionary 
might attract a populist context and spread populist messages, there are certain 
instances in which these words arise in a neutral or a non-populist setting. In other 
words, the NS appears in texts in which populist-like words emerge, but neither the 
EP nor IP dichotomy occurs in the analyzed sentence. 
Finally, the core statement of the thesis is supplied below to summarize the 
fundamental idea of this study: The concept of Explicit Populism, which might be 
between the thin and thick political communication style, and Implicit Populism, which 
attempts to explore fragmented dichotomies between the ‘good’ people and ‘culprit’ 
others, also function as methodological refinements in textual analyses by focusing on 
the content of the discourse.  
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2.11. Measuring populist political communication with text analysis – emerging 
methods 
In the last decade and a half, a considerable portion of studies have appeared in the 
research field of populism that focus on measuring populist communication. Despite 
the many attempts for providing results relating to populist semantic text analysis, 
Aslanidis points out (Aslanidis, 2018) that there is no universal research method in 
which perfect reliability and validation can be supplied. Therefore, he argues in his 
paper, impeccable reliability and validity scores are impossible to provide (Aslanidis, 
2018). In semantic text analyses, the core idea of the investigations relies on the 
construction of a social dichotomy between the ordinary citizens and the culprit others. 
In line with the concept above, scholars who examine PPCS via text analyses make an 
effort to collect references to the people and the dangerous outgroup(s). The following 
paragraphs intend to briefly summarize the possible methods that might support text 
analyses in which researchers investigate PPCS.  
 In order to avoid human coder’s bias, scholars tend to utilize quantitative 
methods. The benefits of quantifying populism are three-fold. First, the quantification 
helps to ignore the researchers and coders individual decisions and prejudices. Second, 
the interpretation of the results can be shifted from dichotomous (populist or non-
populist) findings to weighted outcomes (more or less populist). Finally, the usage of 
quantitative methods provides the opportunity to examine large databases, which 
would be challenging to determine for human coders. It is essential to mention what 
type of data the scholars are analyzing. Researchers might focus on public speeches at 
campaigns (rallies), inauguration speeches, debates, party manifestos, tweets, 
Facebook posts, interviews, press releases, conferences, party magazines, and party 
newspapers13 (Aslanidis, 2018; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Demeter, 2017; 
Rooduijn et al., 2014).  
 In the fundamental quantitative methods, scholars apply dictionaries in which 
keywords are referring to the people and the antagonist outgroups. The process of 
setting up the dictionaries can be at least three-fold. First, the researchers might create 
their dictionaries based on the literature review to operationalize the fundamental 
 
13 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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definition of populism (Aslanidis, 2018). In other words, they provide dictionaries 
deductively. Second, which is the inductive approach, scholars supply word lists using 
the software, and they choose the words that might be an appropriate part of the PPCS. 
Finally, academics might use both methods simultaneously if they have broad enough 
knowledge about common keywords from the literature of populist semantic text 
analyses. 
Additionally, they intend to employ the relevant populist words from the 
dataset they examined. For obvious reasons, the more specific to the political situation 
and its vocabulary utilized by scholars who study populists, the higher the reliability 
which can be provided mostly by the second (inductive) or the third (mixed) 
approaches. After the construction of the dictionaries, scholars utilize the relevant 
program in order to quantify the emergence of populist-like words. Scholars tend to 
use the dictionary-based method on large samples; therefore, they can measure to what 
extent different texts are populists. The limitation of the dictionary-based process is 
the disregard of the manual reading and interpretation. Therefore, several hidden 
populist references can be ignored by decontextualization. Besides, populism in 
different cultures with different languages might utilize divergent words and 
expressions. Consequently, the proportion of dictionary words might be deviating. For 
instance, in particular scientific papers, researchers use twenty-eight (Pauwels, 2011), 
thirty-six (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016), and ‘about two-hundred-and-thirty’ words 
(Aslanidis, 2018, p. 1247; Bruter & Harrison, 2011).    
 Rigorous quantitative text analyses focus on the proportion of specific populist 
words emerging in the examined data but disregard qualitative perspectives. 
Therefore, some notable limitations occur in quantitative methods that might avoid 
both researcher’s bias and contextual specifications as well. In thematic text analysis, 
scholars divide the relevant data into coding units like paragraphs, Facebook posts, 
tweets, (core) sentences, and clauses. Before the qualitative examination starts, 
researchers establish coding frames. The coding frames might guide persons who code 
the text by utilizing the pertinent criteria. The more detailed the coding frames are, the 
more challenging to interpret and employ them for the coders. Consequently, specific 
training sessions are needed to make coders understand the characterizations of the 
codes. Moreover, demo coding sessions can also be useful in which coders might 
49 
 
practice and ask their questions about the coding process. Although the qualitative 
semantic investigation might support in-depth analysis, it still has some core 
limitations. First, as mentioned above, scholar’s and coder’s bias might affect the 
outcomes. Second, the manual coding process is appropriate in small or medium-sized 
datasets because manual coding takes a very long time, and the larger the analyzed 
sample is, the higher the chance that coders make mistakes. Finally, the training 
sessions are remarkable elements for providing reliable outcomes. On the one hand, 
the well-detailed and repeated training sessions might increase reliability and validity, 
on the other hand, the lack of well-constructed code attribution and disregarding of the 
explanation of the coding process via specific instances might severely decline the 
reliability and validity of the results.  
 In order to provide a reliable text analysis in the research field of populism, 
some scholars take into account the ways that the core elements of PPCS emerge 
(Aslanidis, 2018). They focus on whether the features mentioned above appear 
together in the same coding unit, or they occur solely in the investigated texts. This 
method supports providing results where specific populist attributions of the data can 
be explored.  
To what extent do specific agents utilize people-centrism or anti-elitism in their 
PPCS? Which one is dominant in the research? Are the two vital attributions emerge 
together in the analyzed sample? These are the fundamental questions that might also 
appear in thematic text analyses. Aslanidis (2018) argues in his research that clause-
based semantic analysis, where scholars employ the examination method above, 
provides a more detailed, in-depth insight into the PPCS. Applying a complete 
dictionary is an impossible task, primarily if researchers investigate an extensive 
database. 
Nevertheless, seeking the occurrences of people-centrism, anti-elitism, or, 
additionally, specific dangerous minorities, by taking into account apparent 
dichotomies, opens a new opportunity for scholars. First, researchers might supply 
weighted results of the sole appearances and the stressed dichotomy. Second, the 
investigation might go further in terms of manually analyzing and interpreting the 
contexts in which the direct comparisons are perceived. Hence, the contexts referring 
to any results, such as stressing people’s sovereignty, highlighting the role of 
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antagonist elite/out-groups, and comparing them, might support the fundamental 
characterizations of the contextual relationships. As a result, a more detailed 
explanation can be provided to understand what contexts may attract the people-
centrism surrounded by (hidden) antagonism. Stressing the ordinary citizen’s essential 
right to have prosperity, safety, a leadership that listens to them, media in which proper 
and honest news is delivered can be among the desires depicted in PPCS. In contrast, 
the culprit out-group that deprives the decent citizens of welfare, security, new public 
services, but exploits them financially, morally, and mislead them using false 
information might be part of the coding frames.  
In sum, scholars are struggling with defining populism in order to contribute 
semantic text analyses. However, most of them agree with vital theoretical 
conceptualizations (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004) and their ground-breaking 
implications (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) in which populism emerges as a menacing 
phenomenon of the bad, evil, corrupt, or dangerous out-group that takes advantage of 
the good, ordinary, innocent, and blameless people. As stressed above, defining 
populism is almost an impossible mission. Providing an utterly reliable and valid text 
analysis by measuring PPCS is also an unachievable exercise. Although scholars make 
a serious effort by using various computer-assisted quantitative, qualitative, and 
mixed-methods to measure populist communication by supplying as many ultimate 
outcomes as possible, the limitations of the procedures above prevent scholars from 
delivering universal results. Different situations magnet deviated findings (for 
instance, the weights of the results) and discussions (interpreting the results within 
unique circumstances). Despite the conceptual and methodological limitations, the 
core dichotomy in PPCS still unfolds, namely speaking to the citizens in the name of 
the people and targeting the culprit others.    
The thesis applies a mixed-method analysis in which a dictionary-based and 
computer-assisted study are combined with the manual coding process to provide as 
reliable and valid a result as possible to support the discussion and interpretation of 
PPCS in the examined sample. This scrutiny also takes into account the sole 
appearances of people-centrism or the culprit out-group and seeks the possible 
occurrence of the explicit-direct dichotomy between the elements above to make 
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distinctions between EP and IP. Thus, the characterization of the mixed-method 
analysis is introduced below. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The former main chapter briefly presented the relevant literature on mass media and 
some instances on the presidential campaigns in the United States. Afterward, the 
theoretical background of populism was established from a broad perspective. Then, 
two significant approaches in the research field, namely the (thin) ideology and 
political communication style were characterized. Nevertheless, the contesting ideas 
and concepts were also launched. Additionally, the operationalization of EP and IP 
was proposed in the second chapter. Finally, a summary on the textual analyses’ 
methodology ended the second main chapter.   
3.1. Measuring topics in Donald Trump’s tweets 
This section of the research focuses on @realDonaldTrump’s tweets and hashtags, but 
not his retweets, by utilizing mixed methods. In the quantitative, computer-assisted 
approach, 738 tweets in P1 and 798 in P2 were analyzed by MAXQDA 2018. The total 
number of unique words in P1 was 2,230 (the entire sample with word duplications 
was 7,311 in this period), while the frequency of the individual words was 2,618 (7,879 
words total) in P2. The thesis also analyzed the near correlation of the topics to 
quantify which topics emerged together in the tweets. The near correlation method 
showed how many topics were in two paragraphs. If one topic belonged to ‘Enemy,’ 
and the other was connected to ‘Election’ in two paragraphs next to each other, the 
number of correlations between the two topics was equal to one. The thesis applied the 
two-paragraph-method because tweets and hashtags occurred in two different 
paragraphs within the same message. Consequently, this scrutiny made an effort to 
keep the computer-assisted analysis working with a lower margin of error. The number 
of the entire correlation in the ‘near topic method’ was 4,230. 
The examination aimed to find similar patterns in @realDonaldTrump tweets 
to characterize specific topics in his messages. After cleaning the irrelevant and 
general language units, the thesis focused on the explicit, targeting words that support 
the characterizations of the categories. As a result, a list of specific words, which may 
support the results, is provided (Aslanidis, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Pauwels, 
53 
 
2011; Ribera Payá, 2019). Similarly to previous quantitative research (Pauwels, 2011; 
Ribera Payá, 2019), a list of specific individual words was supplied, and a topic 
dictionary shows the weights of issues quantitatively from the sample (see Table 1). 
The table below relies on both periods’ results. The table is not separated because 
Donald Trump did not complete his Twitter communication in P2 with another 
category. In other words, he still focused on the same six main topics that emerged in 
P1.  
Table 1. Topic Dictionary in @realDonaldTrump tweets between Period One and 
Period Two  
DICTIONARY  
ECONOMY:  Business, companies, deals, healthcare, job, jobs, Obamacare, tax, taxes 
 
ELECTION: #Americafirst, debate, debates, #debatenight, #draintheswamp, election #maga, 
# makeamericagreatagain, movement, polls, rally, vpdebate 
 
ENEMY: #Bigleaguethruth, Clinton, CNN, crooked, #crookedhillary, her, Hillary, 
#hillaryclinton, isis, media, NYTimes, Obama, she, terrorists 
 
FOREIGN POLICY:  Border, China, from, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Mexico, North, Russia, 
Russian, Syria, world  
 
NOMINATIONS & POLICIES: Congratulations, court, general, healthcare, judge, 
Obamacare, order, repeal, replace, Republicans, secretary, security, tax, taxes  
 
OTHER:  Crowd, debate, #debatenight, debates, enjoy, Florida, interviewed, join, live, 




 The Topic Dictionary consists of words that gain the minimum frequency of 
eight and the share of 0.05% from the database. Moreover, populist words in a specific 
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Populist Dictionary are also collected (see Table 2) by utilizing a computer-assisted 
method to examine the occurrences of the two core segments of the PPCS, namely the 
people and antagonist entities. The thesis’s populist dictionaries (see Table 2 and 3) 
were created by deductive and inductive methods. Similar to Pauwels (2011), the 
methodology by which the dictionary was created operationalized Mudde’s (2004) 
sufficient dimensions: antagonism and people-centrism. Besides, Jagers’ and 
Walgrave’s (2007) exclusivity feature, which might relate to ‘dangerous minorities,’ 
was also added to the keyword selection process. Law and order, which might be an 
essential topic in PPCS (Pauwels, 2011) identifies words such as ‘drug’ and ‘illegal.’ 
The negative xenophobic identity might connect to ‘terrorists’ and ‘ISIS’ (Bruter & 
Harrison, 2011).  
The moral aspect of populism (Mudde, 2017) detects words such as ‘bad,’ 
‘biased,’ ‘failed,’ ‘failing,’ ‘lie,’ ‘lies,’ ‘dishonest,’ to name a few. ‘Immigration’ 
connects to the migrational context, while economic issues identify ‘tax’ (Pauwels, 
2011). Resisting might also be an appropriate attribution of PPCS, a feature that 
identifies words such as ‘stop’ (Tóth, 2020). Referring to the negative identity of the 
elite might consist of words such as ‘system,’ ‘Clinton,’ ‘Obama,’ ‘dems,’ ‘media,’ 
‘CNN,’ and so on (Bruter & Harrison, 2011). The implementation of words such as 
‘incredible’ and ‘disaster’ might be severely contested; however, Harrison and Bruter 
(2011) also utilized similar expressions such as ‘nonsense’ and ‘chaos’ in their study, 
while Pauwels (2011) took into account ‘absurd.’ 
  It is important to notice that reading the texts and identifying potentially 
relevant populist terms inductively is also a feasible method to refine the dictionaries 
(Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). Due to the reading, hashtags and words such as 
‘crooked,’ ‘fake,’ ‘repeal,’ ‘replace,’ ‘rigged,’ ‘weak,’ and ‘worse’ appeared in the 
dictionary. Seeking words that might refer to the people was based on data collection, 
which ‘incorporates references to any ‘group[s] of people having explicit constant 
features in common’ (Reungoat, 2010, p. 311).  
The minimum necessary criterion in listing the populist words was the same as 
in Topic Dictionary. The words were automatically listed by MAXQDA 2018, and the 
scrutiny found a significant number of targeting words. In this research, targeting 
words mean specific unique words which may support topics characterizations. For 
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instance, ‘crooked’ refers to Hillary Clinton; as it strengthens the antagonist character 
of the Democratic nominee. As such, the targeting word mentioned above attaches 
Secretary Clinton to the topic of ‘Enemy.’  
Table 2. Populist Dictionary in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets between Period One 
and Period Two  
Antagonism People 
Bad, badly, biased, #bigleaguetruth, CNN, 
Clinton, crooked, #crookedhillary, dems, 
democrats, disaster,  
dishonest, #draintheswamp, drug, 
failed, failing, fake, Hillary, #hillaryclinton, 
horrible, illegal, immigration, incredible, 
ISIS, lie, lies, media, nbcnews, NYTimes, 
Obama, Obamacare, politics, repeal, 
replace, rigged, stop, system, 
tax, terrible, terrorists, weak, worse, wrong  
Alabama, America, #Americafirst, 
American, Americans, Arizona, 
Carolina, Charlotte, Cleveland, 
country, crowd, Florida, Georgia, 
Hampshire, Iowa, jobs, #imwithyou, 
Michigan, #maga, 
#makeamericagreatagain, 
movement, national, Nevada, Ohio, 
Orlando, people, Pennsylvania, 
supporters, together, US14 
  
 
On the one hand, the computer-assisted method helped to provide results in 
terms of quantifying tweets in which PPCS appeared. On the other hand, manual 
reading was essential to understand the context, as a couple of general words like ‘she’ 
could also refer to specific topics, like the ‘Enemy.’ In this case, the results support 
that ‘she’ referred almost exactly to Hillary Clinton 56 times out of 58 in P1 as the 
primarily targeted person by @realDonaldTrump. 
In order to establish the main topics of Donald Trump’s tweets, the analysis 
also utilized an inductive, qualitative approach. After listing specific words, which 
could refer to particular categories, six main topics appeared, namely ‘Economy,’ 
‘Election,’ ‘Enemy,’ ‘Foreign Policy,’ ‘Nominations & Policies,’ and ‘Other.’ The 
investigation also examined the specific targeting words and listed them with the 
 
14 In some cases, the word ‘US’ refers to the United States, in other contexts, it might connect to an 
imagined collective community. 
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software. The minimum share of the targeting words in the relevant corpus was 0.33%. 
To support the characterizations of the topics, trained coders examined the categories 
above on a random sample of 10 percent. After the coding process, the intercoder 
reliability by using Krippendorff’s Alpha was calculated (Freelon, 2013).  
To acquire more reliable results, coders were trained by emphasizing that every 
main category has its own specific words. For instance, ‘join’ correlates to public 
events, which is part of ‘Other,’ or ‘vote’ belongs to the ‘Election.’ If the word ‘join’ 
emerges in the tweets, it automatically labels the topic as ‘Other’. However, coding is 
not essential in several cases as a couple of expressions and word combinations may 
be part of two or more categories. For instance, the tweets in which ‘Mexico’ is 
mentioned may belong to even three topics, namely ‘Economy,’ ‘Enemy,’ and 
‘Foreign Policy’, but not necessarily, only if the context supports it. In order to 
demonstrate the complexity of coding, a concrete example is provided. As 
@realDonaldTrump tweeted on the 27th of January 2017:  
‘Mexico has taken advantage of the U.S. for long enough. Massive trade 
deficits & little help on the very weak border must change, NOW!’  Date: 2017-01-27. 
In the example mentioned above, ‘Mexico’ was part of the three topics above.  
In order to provide a spectacular comparison between the occurrence of Donald Trump 
and his opponent, Hillary Clinton, the examination also utilized a specific lexical 
search within MAXQDA 2018. To quantify the number of co-occurrences for the sake 
of supplying a fundamental contrast between Trump’s and Clinton’s appearances, the 
investigation sought the word couples referring to the two candidates based on the 
highest frequencies presented in Table 4 (see Chapter 4.1.). Additionally, the research 
method implied the word combinations of ‘Donald Trump’ and ‘Hillary Clinton’ for 
the sake of supporting the in-depth analysis. The latter results can be found in Table 7 
(see Chapter 4.1.). The next subchapter presents the detailed features of topics in 
Trump’s tweets.  
3.2. Emerging Topics in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets 
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According to international scholars, the ‘Topic’ dimension supports the main argument 
of the examined messages, also including tweets (Bentivegna & Marchetti, 2016). In 
this analysis, the examined tweets are divided into six main topics. The key aspects of 
Donald Trump’s tweets can be listed as follows: ‘Economy,’ ‘Election,’ ‘Enemy,’ 
‘Foreign Policy,’ ‘Nominations & Policies,’ and ‘Other.’ The specific subcategories 
in the following chapters will also be introduced below. In the analyzed database, 
tweets are graded according to whether topic words appear in Donald Trump’s 
messages. The specific words above can be found in the Topic Dictionary (see Table 
1).  Despite the usefulness of the computer-assisted method in categorization, every 
tweet from @realDonaldTrump was read manually and graded, relying on topic 
characterizations, to support detailed, in-depth analysis.  
This section has been included for several reasons. First, it illustrates how the 
former Republican nominee utilized communication strategy in the campaign period 
and the following 173 days as a President-elect and the President of the United States. 
Second, it demonstrates what the core issues were in Trump’s tweeting universe. 
Third, it shows how the topics were correlating in the two periods. Finally, it supports 
the description of the possible change in the tweeting patterns, more precisely in 
emerging categories, in which Donald Trump shifted the weight of themes from one 
set of  specific issues to another in P2.  
In the following sections, the topics characteristics are provided in detailed 
chapters in which the vital attributes of the six main categories are also introduced. To 
strengthen the features of the main topics, coders, who also examined a random sample 
of ten percent in the database, were trained at specific sessions. The supportive 
outcomes of intercoder reliability (illustrated below) show that topic characteristics 
might be acceptable to utilize them in ‘Results’ and ‘Discussion’ sections.  
3.2.1. Economy 
Donald Trump’s tweets implied the ‘Economy’ in at least two ways. On the one hand, 
he promised new jobs for American people and a tax reform program, which might 
indicate that big corporations stay within the United States. On the other hand, 
@realDonaldTrump blamed his predecessor and his actual political challenger, namely 
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Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, for generating and possibly maintaining Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act – in short, Obamacare – which is, according to 
him,   
‘...a total disaster.’ Date: 2016-11-03. 
Consequently, Trump stressed the necessity of severe change in the healthcare 
system by using his ‘Repeal and Replace’ slogan referring to Obamacare. From 
Trump’s perspective, Obamacare’s premiums were too expensive; moreover, he 
highlighted that the nation loses massive amounts on the legislation above. Therefore, 
the reform created by the former President is a failed one. The Republican nominee 
enhanced the insufficiencies of the current healthcare system by setting up the hashtag 
of #ObamacareFail in his tweets.  
Buying American products was one of the essential programs in Donald 
Trump’s plans referring to the country’s financial resources. By emphasizing a 
protectionist attitude, the Republican candidate brought attention to the ‘Buy 
American and Hire American’ aspect; a proposal which suggested that the United 
States’ financial situation will be stable, and unemployment will decrease even in the 
short term. Nonetheless, in his tweets, he kept stressing the failure of the former 
establishment’s economic policy. Trump pointed out:  
‘The U.S. recorded its slowest economic growth in five years (2016). GDP up 
only 1.6%. Trade deficits hurt the economy very badly.’ Date :2017-04-26. 
Blaming the incompetent political opponents and emphasizing the lack of 
success in Barack Obama’s administration provided an opportunity for Trump to keep 
a distance from failed politicians and highlight extensive differences between him and 
the inexpert representatives. Distinguishing by attack is one of the three core elements 
(acclaim, attack, defense) of Functional Theory, in which scholars bring attention to 
the key elements of aggressive rhetoric in political communication (Benoit et al., 
2003). The Republican politician chose to attack his primary opponent, namely Hillary 
Clinton, by accounting for economic issues to demonstrate the mandatory connection 
between financial deficits that have severe adverse effects on the lives of ordinary 
Americans. Appointing those responsible for ineffective (Obamacare) regulations 
made by the government, which make crucial cuts from the budget of the United 
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States, might be an essential element of @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter communication 
because the issue of health care system affects broad social communities within the 
country. 
Trump did not focus only on political actors when he shared his concerns about 
business and economy; the private sector, which also has a crucial role in the United 
States productivity, was also included. Consequently, Trump indicated in his 
‘Economy’ rhetoric, that a significant number of (American) companies produce their 
goods in cheap foreign countries like Mexico and China, and then they sell their items 
to the United States. In this progress, the corporations realize an enormous profit, but 
the American nation suffers from severe trading deficits because of the financial 
exploitation indicated by the companies. Moreover, China and Mexico also gain 
remarkable incomes while the United States’ stagnant ‘Economy’ does not have the 
opportunity to reach an outstanding growth in terms of wealth because of the 
ineffective trading deals.   
3.2.2. Election 
Three major subcategories appear in Donald Trump’s ‘Election’ tweets, namely 
‘mobilizing supporters,’ ‘emphasizing the fundamental slogans,’ and ‘persuading 
people.’  
  Updating voters about the nominee’s campaign activities is part of the function 
dimension, which refers to the primary purpose in the examined messages (Jungherr, 
2015). Mobilizing voters and getting supporters to participate in the actions during the 
campaign stage is a large research area where scholars find that social media has a 
considerable role (Stein, 2009). Moreover, Gibson argues (2015) that political 
communication via social sites may produce ‘citizen-initiated’ campaigns ‘in which 
digitally registered supporters who are not necessarily members make use of online 
tools created by the party or candidate team to campaign both online and offline on its 
behalf’ (Gibson, 2015, p. 187). Keeping followers informed about the candidate’s 




Similarly, Donald Trump consequently utilized mobilization and informing his 
followers about his location. In the last months of the election, he did not only share 
the place of his public speeches but invited people to join the rallies nationwide. He 
shared hyperlinks that conveyed people to available tickets for the events above or 
provided links where the online broadcasts and records of the public speeches were 
obtainable for users. Trump tended to send positive feedback about the rallies 
afterward. The characteristics of the positive feedback consisted of being grateful, 
praising the ‘beautiful’ crowd, and encouraging voter’s activity at the 2016 Elections.  
The emphasis of brief political messages, namely slogans, might be part of 
propaganda. Simplification supports the PPCS by utilizing easy-to-interpret core 
messages (Caiani & Graziano, 2016). Consequently, slogans have precise and 
straightforward meanings, and political actors use them to make promises and 
influence supporter’s emotions in order or encourage their participation in actions 
(Cwalina & Falkowski, 2013). The abbreviated form of the Republican candidate’s 
primary campaign message was ‘MAGA’ which referred to the original slogan, 
namely ‘Make America Great Again.’ @realDonaldTrump utilized both hashtags, 
which are hyperlinks that help to index tweets for the social site and keep visible the 
messages labeled with the tags above for Twitter users.  
The slogan and abbreviation sound like an up-to-date message which 
contribute to persuading people of at least two core messages. First, the American 
nation has every opportunity to acquire results that provide prosperity again. From 
Trump’s perspective, a definition of greatness could be that the country must become 
a global central power in the economy. This achievement can be reached by and for 
the American citizens. Trump’s promise also implemented the possible prosperity that 
contemporarily the country has lacked, except for the very few who already reached 
financial security. Second, the word ‘Again’ suggested that the United States used to 
be a great place in which general welfare could have been reached, but nowadays, the 
nation is in a relatively bad position compared to a couple of decades after the Second 
World War. 
Furthermore, a hidden, problematic trend appeared in the slogan above. The 
slogan suggested that something wrong was happening to America during the 
contemporary years. If the United States used to be a great, moreover a leader country 
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in terms of ‘Economy’ and prosperity, then it has been sucked into a stagnant position. 
Consequently, there must be responsible political actors, namely the failed 
establishment, which played a critical part in ignoring the future of the country. ‘Make 
America Great Again’ is a slogan that perfectly connects to one of the fundamental 
populist ideas: bringing back glorious times for the nation which had been destroyed 
by the elite (Finchelstein, 2017; Taggart, 2000). 
Whereas ineffective former administrations did not reach vital results that may 
provide the greatness of the nation, Trump brought attention to the necessity of change 
by using ‘#DrainTheSwamp.’ The phrase above was also part of ‘Enemy,’ but it is 
important to note that it occurs primarily in the last stage of the campaign. Getting rid 
of the former and current political actors who are already failed politicians was one of 
the underlying messages of ‘#DrainTheSwamp.’ Donald Trump ensured voters that 
his ambition to become the President of the United States was for the people. In other 
words, as Trump suggested, the citizen’s primary interest was to vote for him. The 
usage of #AmericaFirst and #ImWithYou were the two slogans that might have made 
Twitter followers feel that the Republican nominee expresses their support both in 
formal and informal ways. The nation’s common concern, first and foremost, was to 
elect a new, morally, and politically clean challenger who looks at the United States’ 
situation as a primary task to handle. On the other hand, Trump made his followers 
feel that he will take care of them by creating #ImWithYou.  
Interestingly, mobilizing and hashtag slogans connected directly and actively 
to each other in Donald Trump’s tweets in the campaign stage. Before the second 
presidential debate, the Republican nominee asks his supporters to join a fact-check 
action (Jamieson, 2016), which is called ‘Big League Truth.’ Donald Trump 
encouraged people to use social media to combat the ‘rigged’ mainstream media and 
check the facts on Hillary Clinton during the debates. To join the fact-checking 
movement, Trump asked his followers to sign up on his website through their e-mail 
address, Twitter account, and their phone numbers. After the registration, the system 
sent e-mails to the users in which the message referred to Trump’s official 
(@realDonaldTrump) and his communication team’s Twitter accounts 
(@TeamTrump). The e-mails encouraged supporters to re-tweet and like tweets and 
Facebook posts in which #BigLeagueTruth appeared (Jamieson, 2016). By setting up 
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the #BigLeagueTruth hashtag via Twitter, the Republican politician also mobilized his 
followers on the web. First, @realDonaldTrump tweeted his core messages to the 
engaged supporters. Second, the committed followers made tweets visible for a wider 
audience. The second step may have gained extra support from uncertain or shifting 
voters in the very critical stage of the campaign.  
Donald Trump tended to reflect on the results of the election via Twitter, even 
if those were temporary. The Republican politician stressed his popularity and success 
during the campaign as it follows:  
‘Big news to share in New Hampshire tonight! Polls looking great! See you 
soon.’ Date: 2016-11-08.  
 
@realDonaldTrump intended to persuade voters that he had a serious chance 
to win the elections. In the campaign stage, Trump shared concrete results about his 
popularity if it showed that he had the lead against Hillary Clinton. One may think that 
as a President-elect, and as the President of the United States, Donald Trump ignored 
statistics referring to his popularity, but the analyzed database supports a different 
picture. On the one hand, @realDonaldTrump tweeted about the ‘phony election polls’ 
that were created and emphasized by the culprit out-group that disrespected him. On 
the other hand, he mentioned temporary ‘approval polls’ which showed his acceptance 
nationwide. In sum, @realDonaldTrump referred to the election; however, he also kept 
his followers up to date about his current popularity, referring to his approval statistics.    
3.2.3. Enemy 
Blaming rivals, establishments, candidates, the media, experts, foreign countries, 
immigrants, and generally emphasizing the danger that may threaten the nation is a 
widely-used communication pattern in PPCS (Hameleers, 2018). In this subchapter, 
based on the investigation below, the ‘Enemy’ is the most complex, detailed, and 
developed category in Donald Trump’s tweets. Therefore, six subcategories were 
created under the ‘Enemy’ topic deductively as it follows: 
1) Antipathetic Countries, 
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2) Democrats and Other Home Affairs’ Opponents, 
3) Fake News (Media), 
4) Hillary Clinton, 
5) Moderate Generalization, 
6) Terror Organizations/Attacks. 
3.2.3.1. Antipathetic Countries 
Donald Trump mostly referred to specific countries like China, Iran, Mexico, and 
North Korea, at least in two ways. First, he stressed the vital trade deficits that China 
and Mexico caused for the United States’ economic and financial status. Trump 
consequently highlighted that China and Mexico made a massive profit by producing 
goods for a relatively low price and then selling them to the United States. Exploiting 
Chinese and Mexican low-cost blue-collar workers has had a recessive impact on the 
American economy, in which ordinary people desire proper jobs, but did not have the 
opportunity of working because big corporations moved their factories to the territories 
above. Therefore, the unemployment rate was increasing within the country and 
annoyed citizens who may boost the nation’s economy by their hard-working attitude. 
 Second, Trump brought attention to the nuclear threat that Iran and North 
Korea represented for the Earth, but first and foremost for the United States. Hence, 
the atomic powers above emerged as pure enemies. The Republican politician thought 
that the United States, more specifically Barack Obama, kept Iran alive. As Trump 
stated:  
 
‘Iran was on its last legs and ready to collapse until the U.S. came along and 
gave it a life-line in the form of the Iran Deal: $150 billion.’ Date: 2017-02-02. 
 
The nuclear danger was one key aspect which put Iran in the ‘Enemy’ topic. 
Besides this, the massive financial cost strengthened the negative characteristics of 
Iran in @realDonaldTrump’s messages. North Korea appeared as a small, problematic 
country, which meant a problem for the U.S. Interestingly, if Trump made comments 
on the communist state, he also mentioned China’s role in the issue of North Korea 
64 
 
with significant frequency (nine times out of thirteen). The President hinted that China 
had the opportunity and the necessary background to help in an unpleasant and 
dangerous problem represented by North Korea. As Trump claims: 
 
‘I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea. If 
they are unable to do so, the U.S., with its allies, will! U.S.A.’ Date: 2017-04-13. 
 
On the one hand, Trump demonstrated his hopes on China’s interference in the 
issue above, on the other hand, he suggested implicitly that the United States and its 
allies will contribute strict regulations or possible military strikes on the antagonist 
land if China was incapable of stabilizing the situation in the region. 
3.2.3.2. Democrats and Other Home Affairs’ Opponents 
Besides Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump focused mostly on two opponents in the 
analyzed sample, namely Barack Obama and the other members of the Democratic 
Party.  
In @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter communication, Barack Obama, who was the 
President of the United States between 2009 and 2017, was one of the main characters 
to blame during the two examined periods. On the one hand, referring to Obamacare 
was part of the Republican politician’s attacks, but on the other, more perspectives 
also may have emerged in the adversarial tweets.  
‘The weak illegal immigration policies of the Obama Admin. Allowed bad MS 
13 gangs to form in cities across U.S. We are removing them fast!’ Date: 2017-04-18. 
The Republican politician drew attention to the many mistakes his predecessor 
had made to persuade the citizens about the failure of the previous establishment and 
his challenger political opponents who are almost the same as the former President. In 
Trump’s tweets, inconsistent foreign affairs politics, weak immigration policy, 
spending massive amounts in ineffective ways, spying on political rivals (primarily on 
Donald Trump himself), and lying to the people were also the fundamental 
characteristics of Obama and his former administration.    
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Moreover, the winner of the 2016 election utilized a much more general 
expression as he made references to the ‘Dems.’ In order to stress the incompetency 
of the rival political force, Trump intended to keep the image of the ‘Enemy’ as 
universal as he could by using ‘Dems.’ The President-Elect, and then the President, 
pointed out that the targeted political opponents did not accept his victory after the 
election. According to the new Republican President, the Democratic Party acted as 
an unfair political opponent. As such, according to Trump, there were crucial, internal 
and moral crises within the Democratic Party, vital problems that were mentioned by 
other prominent foreign leaders like the Russian President.  
 
‘Vladimir Putin said today about Hillary and Dems: ‘‘In my opinion, it is 
humiliating. One must be able to lose with dignity.’’ So true!’ Date: 2016-12-24. 
 
Besides, Donald Trump highlighted that the ‘failing’ and ‘demoralized 
Democrats spent a severe amount of money on the presidential election, and they kept 
investing significant amounts into the Congressional elections. Emphasizing the 
dominance of campaign investments by political opponents was a crucial factor in the 
Republican politician’s tweets. The international researchers suggested that Hillary 
Clinton outspent Donald Trump by more than two to one in the campaign (Voth, 2017). 
The Democratic nominee spent more than one billion dollars during the election; 
however, she was not able to win against the Republican candidate. Therefore, 
@realDonaldTrump sent tweets in which the facts referring to high campaign costs by 
the oppositional political force could be checked easily by almost any American 
citizen. 
3.2.3.3. Fake News (Media) 
The media might also be an antagonist actor in PPCS; therefore, populists tend to 
emphasize their critical role in misleading ordinary people (Hameleers, 2018). One of 
the leading opponents blamed in Donald Trump’s Twitter communication was the 
‘Fake News (Media).’ Similarly, the subcategory of ‘Democrats and Other Home 
Affairs’ Opponents’ @realDonaldTrump simultaneously utilized the aforementioned 
general words and word combinations, but he also targeted media channels in a 
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specific, exact way. Moreover, he stressed that the media’s antagonist role did not 
affect him detrimentally, but the nation: 
‘The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, 
@CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!’ Date: 2017-02-17. 
 
 In the analyzed data, Donald Trump reflected on the emerging news in the 
media in which he was being accused of having problematic ties with Russia. He 
denied the alleged connection between him and any specific interests in terms of 
foreign interference in the 2016 Presidential Elections. Lying about the new 
President’s possible relations to Russia (or to any alien government), creating 
conspiracy theories about him, questioning the Republican politician’s capability in 
making decisions, and disregard for his popularity referred directly to Donald Trump. 
The aforementioned factors altogether constituted the characterization of the ‘Fake 
News (Media)’ subcategory. Additionally, Trump also brought attention to ‘crooked’ 
rivals who tried to discredit the new leader’s victory by utilizing false news or, more 
precisely, fake, embarrassing stories that may have confused his supporters. The 
Republican leader highlighted that the media function as a tool that may have 
destabilized his authority by spreading ambiguous information about him.  
In contrast, from the new leader’s perception, there was one proper and decent 
medium that worked by the ‘right’ method, namely Fox News. As such, the medium 
mentioned above appeared not in a hostile way in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets, but as 
a channel in which honest and objective work proceeded to unmask the antagonist 
opponents like failing politicians and deceiving media channels which may have co-
operated spectacularly.   
3.2.3.4. Hillary Clinton 
Focusing on and blaming the prominent political rivals in electoral campaigns, 
especially at the official debates, are essential and necessary tactics in contemporary 
politics to control the narrative (Demeter, 2017). Consequently, the Democratic first 
nominee, namely Hillary Clinton, was the primary antagonist political opponent in 
Donald Trump’s tweets.  
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 The Republican candidate referred to his competitor in various ways: ‘Clinton,’ 
‘Crooked,’ ‘Crooked Hillary,’ ‘Hillary Clinton,’ ‘Hillary,’ ‘she,’ and 
‘#CrookedHillary.’ By stressing the dishonesty of his electoral rival, Donald Trump 
put his rival into a situation that may have discredited her. The fraudster political 
opponent appeared as a dishonest person in Trump’s tweets. Therefore, the fact-
checking movement of setting up the hashtag #BigLeagueTruth was a consequent 
product of the challenger Republican politician to emphasize that Clinton was just one 
of the liar actors of the ‘rigged’ system in which the United States’ citizens cannot 
trust anymore.  
Trump also demonstrated Hillary Clinton’s mistakes both from decades 
previous and the last couple of months, like voting for invading Iraq, being responsible 
for the chaos in the Middle East, irresponsibly treatment of classified e-mails, and 
ignoring the provision of jobs for the American people. In contrast, Trump stressed 
that he was the only person who could provide jobs for the people: 
‘I have created tens of thousands of jobs and will bring back great American 
prosperity. Hillary has only created jobs at the FBI and DOJ!’ Date: 2016-10-02. 
Not only was the past under the scope in @realDonaldTrump’s communication 
when he tweeted about his rival, but the future also. The Republican politician brought 
attention to the present in which Hillary Clinton makes promises that should have been  
done in that time when she was part of the administration. Furthermore, Trump drew 
attention to his opponent’s Machiavellian attitude to achieving power. For instance, 
Trump tweeted about a possible alliance between Hillary Clinton and the former 
beauty queen, Alicia Machado: 
‘Did Crooked Hillary help disgusting (check out sex tape and past) Alicia M 
become a U.S. citizen so she could use her in the debate?’ Date: 2016-09-30. 
 The tweet above received significant attention via the social site, as 17,819 re-
tweets, 18,000 responses, and 35,458 likes emerged after the Republican nominee 
posted his message (Marx, 2017). It refers to the former Miss Universe (1996), namely 
Alicia Machado, who is originally from Venezuela and criticized Donald Trump for 
his prior hostile behavior. According to Machado, Donald Trump made rude 
comments towards her because she gained weight after the Miss Universe. Moreover, 
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Machado stated that Trump also humiliated her regarding her Latin-American origin. 
@realDonaldTrump focused on Machado because she spoke for Secretary Clinton, 
and the Democratic candidate quoted the insults at the first presidential debate that the 
former Miss Universe attributed to the Republican nominee (Barbaro & Twohey, 
2016). Hence, Trump reacted via Twitter to highlight that Machado was only a puppet 
for Hillary Clinton, who provided citizenship in exchange for blaming the Republican 
challenger. 
 The opponent’s private life also might play a role in the PPCS (Stanyer, 2012). 
Hence, intimidation was appearing in Trump’s tweets referring to Secretary Clinton’s 
health condition. First, the Republican politician mentions that Clinton’s coughing 
attack was a trending topic among the voters. Second, and most importantly, he 
suggested, that his primary political opponent was a person who 
 ‘...is unfit to serve.’ Date: 2016-11-03. 
 Nevertheless, there was one character who showed a strong and fit image of a 
decent man; a leader who can rule and govern the American nation towards the right 
direction and reforms, namely Donald Trump. 
3.2.3.5. Moderate Generalization 
The subcategory of ‘Moderate Generalization’ appeared in specific tweets in which 
Donald Trump mentioned universal, unnamed, and unknown entities, groups, or 
interests that might harm the present and the future of the American Nation. Single 
words and word combinations like ‘bad people,’ ‘danger,’ ‘dangerous people,’ ‘evil,’ 
and ‘threat’ regularly emerged in the Republican leader’s tweets in order to appeal to 
emotions of fear by a populist indicator, namely the adverse effect (Alvares & 
Dahlgren, 2016). PPCS and the ideology also consist of ‘ostracizing others,’ an 
indicator based on the narrative which maintains the exclusion of dangerous entities 
from the heterogeneous group of ordinary people (Mudde, 2004). Extensive and 
conventional references predicted danger as they occur in the following tweet: 
 ‘The judge opens up our country to potential terrorists and others that do not 




 The tweet above did not show a precise, but rather a universal image of the 
problematic situations. Neither the ‘judge’ nor the ‘terrorists’ are defined. Moreover, 
‘bad people’ are the most widespread expression in the tweet above. On the one hand, 
the leader stressed a vague danger that haunted the United States and the person who 
was responsible for that threat. On the other, he did not specify the exact name of the 
magistrate, nor characterized the origin of the terrorists. The utilization of widespread 
expressions referring to problematic actors but lacking the specifications of the villains 
and opponents provided Trump an almost limitless opportunity to defend his 
communicational strategy. The leader may have referred to the tweets in which he had 
highlighted the vital problems and hazards that may affect the United States harmfully. 
On the contrary, he would not target the opponent directly to avoid losing his 
popularity among his supporters if the media brought attention to his specific adversary 
tweets referring to exact individuals or groups of people with different ethnicities, 
origins, and faiths. Nonetheless, @realDonaldTrump tweeted in a particular and 
detailed way if he genuinely focused on terror attacks and organizations (see the next 
subchapter).     
3.2.3.6. Terror Organisations/Attacks 
However, as presented in the former subchapter, terror attacks provided an opportunity 
for the Republican leader to express his thoughts in a universal style; the analysis 
showed that terrorist groups and attacks were indicated through tweeting mostly by 
utilizing more specific characterizations. The Republican leader used involved 
actualization in which he exploited particular events (like the terror attacks in Brussels 
and Paris) to strengthen his political stereotypes and support his inductive reasoning 
(Krämer, 2017). Specific locations affected by terror attacks, the religious 
characteristic(s) of the aggressor(s), the origin(s) of the striker(s), or the exact name of 
the terrorist group(s) also appeared in the analyzed data. 
‘A new radical Islamic terrorist has just attacked in Louvre Museum in Paris. 




Donald Trump tweeted about terrorism as a radical Islamic phenomenon five 
occasions out of thirty-two. Furthermore, he mentioned the Islamic State as ‘ISIS,’ 
thirteen times. Also, he stressed ‘Palestinian’ terror attacks, emphasized the possible 
connection between Iran and terrorism, and utilized common expressions like 
‘terrorist’ as well. In this analysis, the category of ‘Terror Organisations/Attacks’ 
consisted of at least one specific or concrete expression that refers to terrorism. The 
identification of specific terror organizations, designating the act of ‘terrorism’ or 
‘terror’ at the minimum are sufficient criterion to label a tweet with the category above.   
3.2.4. Foreign Policy 
The mixed-method analysis suggested that the category and subcategory of ‘Foreign 
Policy’ and ‘Antipathetic Countries’ have specific correlations. Although Donald 
Trump tended to tweet about foreign countries in an adversary style, there were 
individual tweets in which some territories appear as allies or at least neutral partners 
of the United States.   
‘I look very much forward to meeting Prime Minister Theresa May in 
Washington in the Spring. Britain, a longtime U.S. ally, is very special!’ Date: 2017-
03-23. 
 
 In the categorization process, labeling the tweets was based on a pure 
perspective. Every tweet in which foreign countries explicitly occurred belongs to the 
‘Foreign Policy’ topic. Nonetheless, messages referring to alien territories also might 
be part of other categories. The ‘Topic relation matrix’ supports (see Table 6) that 
Foreign Affairs had a considerable correlation besides ‘Antipathetic Countries.’ For 
the sake of drawing a more specific picture of Donald Trump’s tweets relating to 
Foreign Affairs, it is crucial to characterize the fundamental concepts which constitute 
his communication in the latter analyzed topic.  
As mentioned in the ‘Antipathetic Countries’ subcategory, the Republican 
politician brought attention to the danger(s) that few countries might have represented, 
including nuclear hazard situations, terrorism, financial deficits, destabilizing the 
election system, and last but not least, immigration issues. Therefore, ‘Foreign Policy’ 
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had two significant elements (see Table 6) which support the construction of the topic 
above, namely, ‘Economy’ and ‘Election.’  
However, several possible ‘threats’ emerged in the analyzed data, and other 
perceived characterizations appeared in the examined tweets. First, the emphasis on 
creating acceptable co-operations and relationships was a vital perspective both on 
universal and specific issues. Trump alleged that good relations between the United 
States and Russia relied on shared interests, whereas domestic political opponents did 
not support the two nations oncoming. Although China emerged in specific tweets as 
an antagonist and economically harmful country from Trump’s perspective, there was 
at least one case in which it might have acted as a powerful ally, namely solving the 
problematic nuclear issue in North Korea. At this point, one might ask whether the 
‘Foreign Policy’ could be an appropriate segment of the ‘Enemy.’ If this examination 
aimed to analyze P1 solely, the idea above would be reasonable, because Trump 
mostly focused on ‘Antipathetic Countries’ in P1 and tweeted in an adversary style 
about them in ‘Foreign Policy.’ In contrast, as the tweet above showed, in P2, 
diplomatic and business meetings were also remarkable parts of ‘Foreign Policy.’   
Second, mistakes that were made by political opponents in Foreign Affairs 
supported Trump’s communication at least from two aspects. On the one hand, he 
consequently blamed the former administrations, including the President (Barack 
Obama), the Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton), and the whole Democratic Party for 
the wars in the Middle East and for the increasing crime rates indicated as resulting 
from criminals who entered into the country as illegal immigrants. On the other hand, 
he provided a ‘solution’ for the situations mentioned above. However, his promises 
did not include precise methods, with one exception; building the wall on the Southern 
border in order to keep dangerous foreign villains out of the country. Consequently, 
further plans and possible regulations also turned up in the tweets. Trump promised 
that he will make big corporations come back from abroad to the United States and 
produce within the country. Besides, the Republican politician suggested punishments 
for traitor officials who co-operated with foreign countries. Furthermore, he planned 
to ban dangerous foreign people who came from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Sudan, 
Somalia, Syria, and Yemen (Collingwood et al., 2018).  
Third, the President tended to tweet about friendly meetings with prominent 
politicians. Successful meetings, negotiations, and working dinners were written in a 
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very optimistic tone. The diplomatic events, whether they were useful or not, also 
constituted the fourth main topic. 
Finally, Trump highlighted one friendly country in which the situation 
demanded the support of the current President of the United States, namely Israel, with 
a remarkable frequency (f=7). He stressed the disrespectful treatment by the United 
Nations, which disdained Israel. In contrast, the Republican politician ensured Israel 
his and America’s support in order to keep peace and security within the territory in 
question.         
3.2.5. Nominations & Policies 
The fifth main category consists of planned or ratified internal regulations which might 
have affected domestic issues in terms of Home Affairs, nominations, national security 
policy, agreements with big corporations, and making inquiries about immigration, 
hacking, and wiretapping within the United States.  
 
‘Despite the long delays by the Democrats in finally approving Dr. Tom Price, 
the repeal and replacement of ObamaCare is moving fast!’ Date: 2017-02-17. 
 
In this main topic, one of the core legislations that emerges periodically is 
Obamacare. The former President’s healthcare reform occurred as a specter in the 
tweets, which must be changed by the new administration. Trump tended to declare 
that the Affordable Care Act was expensive for the American Nation. In order to save 
money for the people, Trump claimed that the legislation above must be ceased.  
Moreover, he stated that healthcare was falling apart, and there was only one way to 
save it by repealing and replacing the deteriorative reform, which was an already-failed 
product of the former, incompetent establishment.  
 Informing his Twitter followers about the new, evolving administration, was 
one of the key features of the Republican leader’s tweeting patterns in ‘Nominations 
& Policies.’ Although the nominated and accepted politicians’ identities emerged in a 
straightforward style among the analyzed messages, the President tweeted 
occasionally that there were excellent opportunities by allowing his regulations to 
convey the country to greatness. On the one hand, he presented his planned bills like 
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there were sure, ratified legislations. On the other, Trump tweeted about the same rules 
as mere possibilities, which would help to reach the ultimate goal: ‘Make America 
Great Again.’   
 Donald Trump also shared the results of successful business negotiations. 
Furthermore, he referred to the productive meetings above as a result of his presidency. 
Moreover, he made an effort to persuade his followers that he fulfilled his promises 
by creating tax reforms and new jobs for the people by putting the pressure on specific 
corporations, whereas the former establishments failed in taking care of the hard-
working citizens. 
  In this main topic, judges, courts, orders, the well-known politicians (Barack 
Obama, Hillary Clinton, Mike Pence) and other influential individuals emerged. 
Signing laws like ‘Executive Order Concerning Extreme Vetting’ needed to be 
published for the supporters. Additionally, Donald Trump attempted to persuade the 
citizens. He spotlighted that the ban of people from seven Islamic countries was not 
an exclusionist, Islamophobic act, but a necessary regulation for the sake of security. 
Besides, he tweeted not only about the planned or ratified bills, but also the reactions 
they induced in the political sphere, the jurisdiction, and the media.  
As Bracciale and Martella argue: ‘firstly ‘‘Champion of the people’’, a style 
geared towards defending the people against the elite, which mainly covers political 
issues, position-taking, simple and informal; and secondly ‘‘Man on the street’’, 
characterised by a more vulgar language exploiting anxieties, fears, news and local 
policies’(Bracciale & Martella, 2017, p. 1323). Likewise, regarding domestic and 
located problems within the country constituted @realDoanldTrump’s communication 
via Twitter. The President kept stressing that his colleagues’ main task was to maintain 
safety for the decent citizens. In contrast, he also pointed out that if the mayors, the 
representatives, and senators are incapable of defending the people, he has every right 
and resource to interfere. The emphasis of his opportunities for interference suggested 
that the President of the United States is the Supreme leader who always concerned 
himself with the inhabitants; therefore, he did not let politicians ignore one of the 
voter’s fundamental desires, namely security. Bringing attention to his active and 
energetic attitude characterized the image of a fast-acting, self-confident person even 
in times when the slow bureaucratic procedures in law enforcement might have slowed 
down the fight against criminals in crime-infected territories. Acting as a strong leader 
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was a tool that strengthened his authoritarianism, the part of the populist ideology that 
helped to contraposition Donald Trump and the powerless political elite (Bracciale & 
Martella, 2017). The former suggested that he brings attention to the citizen’s desires, 
while the latter did nothing but exploited the blameless masses.   
3.2.6. Other 
Current affairs and reactions to them were also significant segments of 
@realDonaldTrump tweets. Based on the literature review, contemporary issues that 
refer to non-political events such as television shows, interviews, and sports events are 
among the essential elements of topic indicators in the PPCS (Bentivegna & Marchetti, 
2016). Therefore, and not surprisingly, interviews and private meetings also emerged 
in Donald Trump’s tweets during the two analyzed periods. Conversations with 
journalists on Fox Network, negotiations with inner and foreign political/business 
partners were also frequent topics in his Twitter communication. Moreover, rallies also 
emerged in the campaign stage as public events. To sum the category of ‘Other’ up, 
tweets were labeled as the topic above if the leader attended a private or public event, 
praised the crowd which participated in the regional gatherings, and made comments 
on universal happenings like catastrophes. 
 ‘My wife, Melania, will be interviewed tonight at 8:00 pm by Anderson Cooper 
on @CNN. I have no doubt she will do very well. Enjoy!’ Date: 2016-11-03. 
 Similar to ‘Election,’ the Republican politician informed his followers of the 
forthcoming and latest events in which he participated, or his accompaniment took 
apart. Hence, there was a significant correlation between events during the electorate 
campaign and the above-examined category; however, other particular happenings like 
meeting the former President (Barack Obama) or hosting the 2017 Super Bowl 
Champion New England Patriots at the White House. 
 Interestingly, Donald Trump feedbacked to his supporters with a significant 
frequency. As the quantitative analysis shows, the word ‘thank’ unfolded 210 times in 
the two periods altogether. In other words, acknowledgment was a crucial factor of the 
Republican leader’s tweeting strategy. As a populist political actor, Trump praised the 
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movement, the crowd, the people, and the citizens of America who supported him to 
shift the way of old-school politics into a new, clean, and straightforward direction 
(Block & Negrine, 2017). 
 Finally, specific tragedies like deaths caused by terror attacks or by 
military strikes and becoming homeless or needy by ecologic catastrophes like 
hurricanes, tornados, and storms also constituted the topic of ‘Other’ in the analyzed 
database. Donald Trump commemorated the injuries/victims of terrorists and 
American veterans in his tweets, despite the tragic events that happened recently 
(bombings in New York and New Jersey in 2016) or bygone years. @realDonaldTump 
expressed his best wishes, ensured people that he supports them also in difficult times, 
and made people feel that they will not be forgotten. According to Eatwell and 
Goodwin (2018), being forgotten and unheard are remarkable indicators that support 
PPCS by which it can emphasize that even though the elite was once part of the people, 
it does not listen to the masses’ voice anymore; therefore, there is a need for a leader 
who considers the general will.       
3.3. Measuring explicit and implicit populist political communication style in 
Donald Trump’s tweets 
The results in the last months of the presidential campaign phase were weighted to 
support further analysis in the comparison between Donald Trump’s and Hillary 
Clinton’s tweets. Therefore, the scrutiny also took into account the portion of tweets 
(n=1,595) provided by the Democratic candidate. Thus, the relevant ratio referring to 
the two politicians’ tweets in P1 was 738:1,595 in favor of Clinton. Hence, the results 
provided the weighted outcomes in terms of quantifying the populist words. In other 
words, the proportions of the relevant results in P1 were divided by 1,595/738. Despite 
the supportive nature of the weighted results, the analysis introduces and interprets 
them in Chapter 8. 
It is important to note that Chapter 5 focused on only the outcomes that 
characterize Donald Trump’s tweets without a peculiar comparison between his and 
Hillary Clinton’s PPCS. Also, the examination tried to contrast P1 with P2 in the 
Republican leader’s tweets in terms of possible perceived patterns in his PPCS. 
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Besides, it is essential to notice that the hashtag of ‘#BigLeagueTruth’ referred to the 
fight against Hillary Clinton and the fake media that supported her. Therefore, if the 
hashtag above appeared, the measurement is twofold. In other words, the presence of 
‘#BigLeagueTruth’ in specific tweets provided one hit for the antagonist Democratic 
candidate and another for the misleading media.  
 Based on the Populist Dictionary in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets (see Table 
2), the implied method intended to list the tweets in which possible populist words and 
dichotomies emerged. A random sample was collected from the tweets (ten percent) 
in both periods. Therefore, trained persons coded 225 tweets considering EP and IP. 
The numbers of decisions are 140 in P1 and 85 in P2. Intercoder reliability was 
analyzed and validated by Krippendorff’s Alpha. After the validation, the results 
provided the agreements, disagreements, and reliability in reference to P1, P2, and the 
entire analyzed sample (see Table 8). To seek a supportive answer for RQ 7, this 
analysis aimed to check quantitatively and qualitatively whether the Republican leader 
mentioned specific, isolated groups like women, young people, ethnic minorities, 
asylum seekers, veterans, and people in need in EP tweets. This part of the study also 
examined whether Donald Trump appealed to the people universally. In order to 
characterize IP tweets, a mixed-method was utilized for exploring the portions and 
ratios between people-centrism and antagonism in IP tweets during the whole period 
and separately in P1 and P2. For the sake of exploring Donald Trump’s blame 
attribution, antagonist words15 were chosen from the Populist Dictionary that might 
have functioned as negative labels to affect voters’ negative emotions. Again, the 
keyword-in-context method was utilized in which the following words emerged from 
P1: ‘bad,’ ‘crooked,’ ‘#crookedhillary,’ ‘draintheswamp,’ ‘disaster,’ ‘failed,’ ‘failing,’ 
‘never,’ and ‘rigged.’ Based on the computer-assisted method, a different set of words 
appears in P2: ‘bad,’ ‘dishonest,’ ‘failing,’ ‘fake,’ ‘never,’ ‘sad,’ and ‘terrible.’ To 
supply an in-depth analysis, P1 and P2 were compared to provide supportive results 
about the negative labels used by Donald Trump.  
Before the fourth chapter presents the most relevant results, there is a crucial 
need for making an important note on the findings. MAXQDA 2018 calculated 
 
15In this case, the minimum necessary frequency was eight, while the minimum share was 0,5% from 
the entire database. 
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intercoder agreements twice while Krippendropff’s Alpha took them into account only 
once. Coder 1 and Coder 2 made 225-225 individual decisions. The software counted 
and listed the agreements and disagreements twice. Hence, the results can be divided 
into two. Still, the outcomes were presented as the computer-assisted method supplied 
them.   
After the fundamental introduction of the analyzed data and the employed 
method, the study presents the relevant characteristics of EP and IP in the following 
subchapter. 
3.4. The characteristics of explicit and implicit populist political communication 
style in Donald Trump’s tweets 
Trained coders marked tweets with the code of EP if the following dichotomies 
directly and explicitly emerged when Donald Trump blamed Hillary Clinton, Barack 
Obama, the Democrats, other inner or foreign political rivals, the media, antipathetic 
countries, ‘dangerous’ groups, and other prominent antagonist entities. Note that the 
following dichotomies must be written explicitly in the tweets to demonstrate the 
emergence of EP. If Donald Trump highlighted the opposition between the antagonist 
elite (or minorities) and the people in the same tweet explicitly, the coding unit is part 
of the EP. The characterization of the EP is the following: 
1) stressing that Secretary Clinton disregards ordinary peoples’ interests, 
2) highlighting that Hillary Clinton is a crooked person, who does not intend 
to provide prosperity for the Nation, 
3) bringing attention to the Democratic candidate’s lies by which the voters 
are misled, 
4) demonstrating that Clinton insults Trump’s supporters or every citizen of 
the United States by utilizing an adversary and disrespectful 
communicational style, 
5) emphasizing that Barack Obama’s decisions have severe effects on the 
country’s economy and inner security, 
6) tweeting about the harmful effects of the Affordable Care Act 
(Obamacare), that puts the nation’s economy into a disastrous position, 
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7) focusing on Democratic politicians who do not care for people of the 
United States, but for their interests, 
8) pointing out that Republicans do not co-operate in terms of providing a 
better future for the country, 
9) writing about the rigged system in which failed politicians and the fake 
news media exploit, disregard, and control hard-working people, 
10) utilizing the hashtags of #CrookedHillary, #DrainTheSwamp in contexts 
referring to the inhabitants who deserve better and honest leadership, 
11) calling attention to the media (CNN, NBC, CBS, New York Times, and 
Washington Post) which creates false information or fake news about the 
President’s or his ally’s possible ties to Russia, to mislead people, 
12)  making a point of the trade deficits caused by the NAFTA Agreement, that 
makes the United States’ economy stagnant or decline,  
13)  stressing that antagonist nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea threaten 
the nation and the entire world, 
14) highlighting that terrorists or terror organizations, especially ISIS, are 
dangerous globally, 
15) emphasizing the threat that hazardous people mean for the United States; 
therefore, they must be banned from the country, 
16)  characterizing illegal immigrants’ harmful activities that risk the security 
and welfare of the people by selling drugs or committing other crimes, 
participating in voter frauds, and taking advantage of the financial support 
system.    
IP appears in the analyzed sentences if Donald Trump blamed Hillary Clinton, 
Barack Obama, and their political allies, the media, and other antagonist entities but 
with the lack of direct reference to the people. In other words, if antagonist actors 
appear in the analyzed tweet, but there is no direct reference to the people they still 
part of IP messages. For instance, statements stressing that ‘fake news media’ create 
false allegations about Trump might lack reference to the people. Although the media, 
according to Trump, lie about him, he also suggests that media lies to the people. Thus, 
from the perspective of the method utilized in the dissertation, implicit and hidden 
references to the people can be perceived. However, IP tweets might lack any explicit 
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appearance of the antagonist agents like ‘Hillary Clinton,’ ‘Obama,’ ‘fake news 
media,’ antipathetic countries, or any direct references to them. Nevertheless, they 
might still be the hidden source of the threats affecting the ‘people,’ ‘voters,’ ‘US,’ 
‘country,’ ‘crowd,’ ‘Americans,’ ‘together,’ specific states like ‘Alabama,’ ‘Arizona,’ 
‘Carolina,’ ‘Florida,’ ‘Georgia,’ ‘Iowa,’ ‘Michigan,’ ‘Nevada,’ ‘Ohio,’ 
‘Pennsylvania,’ peculiar cities like ‘Charlotte,’ ‘Cleveland,’ and ‘Orlando.’ Trained 
coders made decisions about sentences in which the code of IP might be apparent 
because clear, direct, specific, and explicit dichotomies are not perceived: 
1) stressing Secretary Clinton’s dishonest attitude, 
2) emphasizing that Hillary Clinton is a ‘crooked’ person, 
3) highlighting that Obamacare is an economic ‘disaster,’ 
4) bringing attention to Barack Obama’s ‘weak inner’ and foreign policies, 
5) calling the political establishment and fake news media as a ‘rigged system,’ 
6) focusing on Democrats who failed at the elections, 
7) stressing that the former security system allowed some entities to hack the 
presidential race or the democratic institutes of the country, 
8) blaming Republicans who do not support Donald Trump, 
9) referring to media and correspondents as the elements of ‘fake news media,’ 
10) make people remember that an uncharacterized ‘danger’ is coming from 
foreign territories; therefore, deportations and bans are needed, 
11)  highlighting the harmful activities of ‘bad people,’ without mentioning the 
‘good’ citizens of the United States 
12) tweeting about criminals, in some cases without specific characterizations, who 
are making a significant profit of illegal activities,  
13)  bringing attention to ‘losing jobs’ and opportunities to work within the United 
States, 
14)  emphasizing that the country had been a place of prosperity and there is a need 
for new leadership that will ‘Make America Great Again’ or in an abbreviated 
form ‘#MAGA,’ 
15) stressing that Donald Trump believes that the nation’s cause is the primary 
issue to handle, so he utilizes the hashtag of ‘#Americafirst,’      
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16) the lack of direct, specific dichotomies if the Republican nominee tweets the 
hashtag of ‘#DrainTheSwamp.’  
It is important to note that the word ‘we’ lacks the populist dictionaries because 
the methodology of the thesis considers the word above from a hybrid perspective. On 
the one hand, the expression above is way too universal, which might have referred to 
Trump and his staff, the Republican candidate’s supporters, and the people of the 
United States. On the other hand, trained persons coded tweets as EP messages if ‘we’ 
emerged as a reference to ordinary citizens with the direct dichotomy of the antagonist 
out-group. In this light, ‘we’ could also be part of IP and NS codes. 
3.5. Measuring explicit and implicit populist political communication style in 
Hillary Clinton’s tweets 
The following segment of the methodology still employed a mixed-method analysis. 
In order to provide quantitative results, the study used the same software. Again, the 
database consisted of all tweets but not the re-tweets from @Hillary Clinton from the 
1st of September 2016 to the 8th of November 2016. The relevant part of the thesis 
focused on written texts but disregarded other multimedia content like photos, gifs, 
videos, and shared hyperlinks.  
Hillary Clinton tweeted 1,595 times during the analyzed period. To provide a 
list of tweets in which the PPCS appeared, populist words, which might have referred 
to antagonist actors and the people from the cleaned database, were collected. The 
minimal necessary frequency of the populist words was eight. The proportion above 
provided a 0.06% share of the entire sample. The Populist Dictionary referring to 
Hillary Clinton is presented in Table 3. Comparable to subchapter 3.1., the populist 
dictionary below was provided by the operationalization of anti-elitism and people-
centrism (Mudde, 2004); however, an inductive method was utilized as well. 
‘Ostracizing others’ was not appropriate in Hillary Clinton’s tweets, with the exception 
of one suggested exclusion (see subchapter 6.1.5.). Words such as ‘Donald,’ ‘Trump,’ 
‘Mike,’ ‘Pence,’ ‘Putin,’ and ‘Republicans’ were parts of the elite, while the category 
of the people consisted of broad or fragmented ‘good’ groups of the nation. At first 
glance, the clustered segments did not represent the homogeneous masses, which is 
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one of the main features of PPCS. However, if one ‘unites’ all of the fragmented 
groups targeted by Clinton, it becomes apparent that she tried to gain trust in the 
majority. The moral aspect of PPCS (Mudde, 2017) magnetized ‘lied’ and ‘wrong,’ 
while resisting and negative identity dimensions consisted of words such as ‘against,’ 
‘reject,’ and ‘stop’ (Bruter and Harrison, 2011). The inductive reading and searching 
progress supported that ‘fighting’ also became part of the resisting feature. 
‘Dangerous’ identifies the repressive authoritarianism, while the group of 
‘immigrants’ was an element of positive populism (Tóth and Demeter, 2019) because 
Secretary Clinton depicted them as the future victims of Trump’s aggressive policies 
that might lead to bans and deportations. Words such as ‘hate,’ ‘he,’ ‘his,’ ‘him,’ and 
‘unfit’ were implemented by the inductive approach (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016).      
Table 3. Populist Dictionary in @HillaryClinton’s tweets  
Antagonism People 
Against, dangerous, Donald, hate, he, his,  
him, fighting, immigrants, lied, Mike, 
Never, Pence, Putin, reject, Republicans,  
stop, Trump, Trump’s, unfit, wrong 
African, America, American, 
Americans, Carolina, color, country, 
class, family, families, Florida, 
friends, girls, immigrants, Latinos, 
men, middle, million, millions, 
nation, national, North, Ohio, 
people, state, states, student, US,16 
voters, women, working 
  
 
During the analysis, trained coders examined a random sample of ten percent 
(211 hits) from the tweets. The coders’ decision relied on the codebooks where the 
characterizations of EP and IP were introduced (see below). It is important to note that 
if a group emerged explicitly more than once in a tweet, the scrutiny recorded them 
with weighted occurrences regardless of whether the groups had specific attributes. 
Therefore, for instance, the study took the appearance of females into account with the 
frequency of three if Secretary Clinton referred to women three times in the very same 
 
16 In some cases, the word ‘US’ refers to the United States, in other contexts, it might connect to an 
imagined collective community. 
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tweet. In the qualitative coding sessions, two trained persons decided whether the 
relevant tweet was part of explicit, implicit, or neutral categories in terms of PPCS. 
After the coding process, intercoder reliability was supplied (Freelon, 2013). For 
supporting in-depth analysis, the reliability was separated into agreements and 
disagreements in all categories. Nonetheless, the sections, which focus on the results 
and discussion, primarily focused on the outcomes that connected to EP and IP but not 
to NS. Additionally, this part of the dissertation tried to seek direct connectedness 
between blaming words (Hameleers et al., 2017) that might have affected negative 
emotions, and the antagonist elite. Therefore, a keyword-in-text analysis was utilized 
by which the software listed specific, in this case negative, words and the expressions 
surrounding them. The measured context may vary, extend or stretch, by the scholar’s 
own decision, but this research chose the distance of four words which meant that the 
software provided four words before and after the specific, selected expression. 
Finally, tweet’s PPCS were analyzed where intercoder agreements were perceived.  
3.6. The characteristics of explicit and implicit populist political 
communication style in Hillary Clinton’s tweets 
First and foremost, it is essential to point out that universal characterization of EP and 
IP is almost impossible to provide. Politician’s communication style, the antagonist 
opponents, blame attributions for out-groups, the targeted voters, the political and 
public circumstances might be different also within the same elections. The problem 
in conceptualization also appears in the differences of the analyzed texts that might 
originate from divergent agents, cultures, and languages. However, there can be a 
concept that might be a further step in the direction of a more supportive and reliable 
method, in terms of measuring PPCS, namely the direct explicit-implicit dichotomy. 
The co-occurrences of the two key factors and their investigations in the PPCS might 
be a supportive method in further analyses. Obviously, as in social sciences, there are 
specific limitations also within the EP dichotomy concept that relies on the definition 
struggles of the ‘people’ and the ‘enemy.’17 There is no universal concept or definition 
for the elements discussed above because the interpretations can be divergent, and the 
 
17 See the limitations in subchapter 5.6. and 6.3. 
83 
 
analyzed political and public situations might also show specific attributions 
(Aslanidis, 2018). Consequently, no universal method can be provided for the 
measuring of PPCS. 
As referred above, appealing to people is one of the critical factors in PPCS 
(Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populism is a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004) that 
often stresses the harmful activity of the elite or other out-groups like migrants. For 
instance, according to specific populists, the political elite abuses power by 
emphasizing the threat that migrants pose for inhabitants culture and general welfare 
by bringing in their alien traditions, occupying the homeland, and receiving financial 
support provided by, and for the ‘ordinary’ citizens (Tóth et al., 2019). Moreover, in 
PPCS, the economic elite may have an interest in immigration for reasons like 
destabilizing the country, increasing its financial income, and expanding political 
influence (Hameleers, 2018). 
On the contrary, specific politicians, like Donald Trump, used exclusionist 
style based on deporting and exiling illegal migrants. However, the relevant section of 
the study primarily focused on the task of whether Donald Trump and his allies 
appeared explicitly or implicitly as antagonist political agents in Hillary Clinton’s 
tweets. Did Secretary Clinton stress a direct comparison between Donald Trump and 
particular masses like ordinary citizens, voters, or immigrants in the same tweet? Were 
there attractive contrasts between the aggressive, exclusionist, inexperienced and 
disrespectful challenger and the people who will suffer from the Republican 
politician’s adverse decisions if he wins the election? 
First, this unit of the methodology characterizes the explicit and implicit 
dichotomies to provide a supportive description to introduce and test the concept of 
EP and IP. EP appears in the analyzed tweets in which the Democratic candidate 
referred to her Republican opponent as an antagonistic person who was a hostile 
communicator, and, on the other hand, the ‘people’ also emerged in the very same 
coding unit. Coders marked tweets with the code of EP if the following dichotomies 
directly and explicitly emerged when Clinton blamed Donald Trump, Mike Pence, who 
was the vice-presidential candidate of the Republican party, or any political or business 
ally of the primary Republican nominee. It is important to note that the following 
dichotomies must be written explicitly in the tweets to demonstrate the emergence of 
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EP. If Secretary Clinton opposed the antagonist elite and the people explicitly in the 
same tweet, the coding unit is part of EP. The characterization of the Explicit Populist 
PCS is the following: 
a) Stressing the xenophobic communication of the Republican candidate in which 
people from other nations (like Mexico) appear as illegal immigrants who must 
be excluded or deported from the United States to their homelands, 
b) emphasizing Trump’s racist speeches or actions in the past and the present, for 
instance, putting minorities like Latinos, African Americans, and Arabians at 
any disadvantage because of their heritage, 
c) pinpointing that the Republican nominee looks at Muslims as a security threat 
for the United States, 
d) highlighting the disrespectful and hostile way of communication if Donald 
Trump tweeted about women by insulting them verbally, 
e) the direct emphasis of harms that ordinary people may suffer by the new, 
challenging political elite, for instance, the possible emerging deficits for 
American people by electing a political outsider, namely Donald Trump, 
f) alleging that Trump avoided paying taxes in the United States or other specific 
countries, 
g) exploiting hard-working, blue-collar people by salary and wage frauds, 
h) highlighting that Trump wants distinct groups like women, Afro-Americans, 
and young people not to vote on the 8th of November, 
i) raising taxes by Trump, which defend rich entities’ interests but deflate 
ordinary citizen’s incomes and household budgets, 
j) spotlighting that the Republican nominee has no experience in politics; 
therefore, co-operations and negotiations will work out neither in Home nor in 
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Foreign Affairs which may lead to an unpredictable situation in American 
lives,   
k) calling attention to Trump’s hostile ignorance referring to the community of 
LGBTQ,  
l) stressing that Donald Trump does not respect democracy in terms of ignoring 
the acceptance of a possible defeat after the election, or disregarding the 
opportunities for immigrants to succeed within the United States, 
m) declaring that Trump breaks the law and consequently derogates the American 
Nation. 
 
IP appears in the analyzed sentences if Hillary Clinton blamed either Donald 
Trump and his allies but lacked direct reference to the ‘people,’ the ‘voters,’ to ‘US,’ 
to ‘the country,’ ‘the nation,’ ‘Americans,’ ‘the middle class,’ ‘blue-collar,’ ‘the 
workers,’ ‘women,’ ‘students,’ ‘young people,’ those with different origins and 
religions, specific minorities, and to ‘the United States.’ IP might also occur if specific 
antagonist agents like ‘Trump,’ ‘Mike Pence,’ or any exact reference to them is 
missing from the coding unit, but there is a vague hint to them, while the collective 
community of the sovereign people emerges in the tweet. It is essential to note that 
Implicit PPCS relies on (1) the suggested threats when Hillary Clinton appealed to the 
people (2) or on the antagonist invocation of the culprit out-group(s), which might 
have threatened the masses, without the direct references to the citizens. Trained 
persons coded sentences with the code of IP in which apparent, explicit, and specific 
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dichotomies were not visible but antagonism and hidden threats occurred in a 
suggested way: 
a) breaking the law for instance, avoiding paying taxes in general but not 
mentioning especially where exactly Trump should have paid his fees, 
b) bringing attention to the Republican nominee’s hostile style, but lacking 
concrete examples, 
c) stressing the insufficiencies of the oppositional candidate, like 
incompetence in leading, misconceptions of his campaign rhetoric and 
being driven by foreign, namely, Russian interests, 
d) declaring that Hillary Clinton and her political allies have experiences in 
terms of security policy and leading, while Donald Trump does not, 
e) the emphasis of false promises made by Donald Trump and his political 
supporters, 
f) referring to lies or denials caused by Donald Trump and Mike Pence. 
 
The hybrid analysis method appears again when ‘we’ emerges. Thus, although the 
scrutiny disregards the word above in terms of supplying the Populist Dictionaries, it 
still takes into account the word of ‘we’ if it appears in the relevant coding unit. For 
instance, if ‘we’ referred to appealing to the everyday people and the culprit outgroup 
also emerged in the same tweet, trained persons coded the relevant text-unit as ‘EP.’ 
In line with the idea above, ‘we’ might also have occurred as an IP or NS tweet.  
 ‘Neutral Sentences’ are texts in which populist-like words emerged, but neither 








4. RESULTS AND ADDRESSING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The former chapter supplied the most significant characterizations of the methodology. 
The mixed-method analysis focused on the emerging topic’s features in Donald 
Trump’s tweets and the essential attributions of EP and IP in both leaders’ Twitter 
communication. This chapter introduces the thesis’ research questions. The focal point 
of this dissertation is Donald Trump’s PPCS; therefore, nine research questions 
connect to his tweets. Nevertheless, four research questions emerge in Hilary Clinton’s 
tweets, which function as another part of the comparative study.   
4.1. Topics in Donald Trump’s tweets 
First, the research presents the frequencies of six different categories in the analyzed 
text to estimate how Donald Trump distributed his topics in his tweets. The most 
frequent category (see Table 4) is the ‘Enemy’ in the entire sample (RQ 1). Although 
the electoral race was finished on the 8th of November 2016, the ‘Election’ was the 
second most used topic by Donald Trump during the whole period. The third regular 
topic was ‘Other’ as it took slightly more than one-fifth of the entire sample. The 
categories above dominated the analyzed segments of the corpus, as they represented 
almost eight tweets out of ten (79.2%) in the entire sample. As the analysis showed, 
‘Economy’ turned up 415 times in the summarized results while ‘Foreign Policy’ and 
‘Nominations and Policies’ acquired the frequencies of 242 and 203. Therefore, the 
fourth, the fifth, and the sixth topic’s aggregated share of the complete topic system 
was 20.7%. The intercoder reliability’s range in the coded segments shifted from 
88.6% to 98.5 %. 
Second, the scrutiny provided the frequencies of topics separately in the two 
periods (Table 4). Based on the results above, the most significant difference appeared 
in ‘Election’ as it had a 34.9% share in the campaign phase’s tweets, but it reduced to 
11.4% after Donald Trump’s victory. Still, ‘Election’ had a higher frequency in P2 
than ‘Foreign Policy’ and ‘Nominations & Policies’ in the same period. ‘Economy’ 
appeared 84 times in P1 while in the second phase, it emerged with 331 occasions. 
‘Foreign Policy’ was one of the most underrepresented topics in @realDonaldTrump’s 
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Twitter communication (38 occurrences), as well as the ‘Nominations & Policies’ (37 
occasions) during the campaign’s last stage. On the other hand, neither the frequency 
nor the rate changed significantly in ‘Enemy’ during the two phases. In the first period, 
734 segments belonged to the topic above, and after the election, 699 segments of 
tweets were written in a hostile way by Donald Trump. The investigation perceived 
some remarkable increases in ‘Economy,’ ‘Foreign Policy,’ and ‘Nominations & 
Policies’ in P2. As an illustration, the frequency of economic issues increased by more 
than four times in the second examined stage. 
Table 4. Topic frequency and share 





P1  734 746 496 84 38 37 2135 
Share of P1 34,38% 34,94% 23,23% 3,93% 1,78% 1,73% 100% 
P2  699 229 373 331 204 166 2002 
Share of P2 34,92% 11,44% 18,63% 16,53% 10,19% 8,29% 100,00% 
SUM 1433 975 869 415 242 203 4137 
Total share 34,64% 23,57% 21,01% 10,03% 5,85% 4,91% 100% 
 
Third, based on the quantitative method, the examination supplied the shares 
of topics (see Figure 1) relying on the Topic Dictionary (see Table 1) to support the 
categories frequency independently of human coders decisions. ‘Other,’ which 
included subcategories such as (1) acknowledgments, (2) public/exclusive events, and 
(3) commemorations, was on the top of the list followed by ‘Enemy,’ and ‘Election.’ 
Interestingly, the remaining three topics, which had crucial differences in terms of 
proportions compared to the top three categories, gained very similar shares of the total 
sample (9-11%). 
Fourth, the results showed the word frequencies in Trump’s tweets in P1 and 
P2. ‘Will,’ ‘great,’ ‘I,’ and ‘thank’ are on the top of the list, but more specific words 
also emerge regularly in Trump’s Twitter communication. The term ‘maga’ refers to 
the crucial electoral phrase ‘Make America Great Again’ and is regularly used in the 
last months of the campaign and after the electoral victory as well. On the other hand, 
the hashtag ‘draintheswamp’ referred to change the current political establishment, but 
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it did not appear after the election, while it was the eighth-most popular term 
(frequency of 83) in the last stage of the campaign (see Table 5). The results supported 
that ‘Hillary’ was the most frequently used word in P1 that connected to the topic of 
‘Enemy.’ On the other hand, ‘fake’ emerged 49 times in P2. The word above 
dominated the topic of ‘Enemy’ in P2 as Donald Trump shifted his focus from his 
primary political opponent to the media (RQ 2). 
Figure 1. Share of topics in the entire analyzed sample based on Topic 
Dictionary18 
 
In order to seek differences or similarities in Donald Trump’s Twitter 
communication, the thesis also analyzed the two periods separately in terms of 
quantifying targeting words. The top 30 words were listed from the two databases and 
observed that twelve words matched in the periods (Table 5, words with a ‘*’ sign).  
 
18 Figures and diagrams were made by Infogram.com. 
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Table 5. Word frequencies in Period One and Period Two 
Word Length Freq. % Rank Word Length Freq. % Rank 
thank* 5 152 2,08 1 will* 4 201 2,55 1 
will* 4 147 2,01 2 I* 1 179 2,22 2 
I* 1 147 2,01 2 great* 5 154 1,95 3 
Hillary 7 117 1,60 3 Today 5 68 0,86 4 
donaldjtrump 12 109 1,49 4 people* 6 62 0,79 5 
great* 5 100 1,37 5 thank* 5 58 0,74 6 
Clinton 7 89 1,22 6 Big 3 56 0,71 7 
maga 4 87 1,19 7 News 4 51 0,65 8 
draintheswamp 13 83 1,14 8 Fake 4 49 0,62 9 
join 4 76 1,04 9 Media 5 49 0,62 9 
debate 6 72 0,98 10 Election , 46 0,58 10 
schedule 8 70 0,96 11 jobs 4 46 0,58 10 
she 3 58 0,79 12 make* 4 44 0,56 11 
crooked 7 57 0,78 13 he 2 43 0,55 12 
vote 4 56 0,77 14 now* 3 41 0,52 13 
bigleaguetruth 14 54 0,74 15 country 7 40 0,51 14 
america* 7 53 0,72 16 time* 4 40 0,51 14 
facebook 8 53 0,72 16 again* 5 39 0,49 15 
again* 5 50 0,68 17 america* 7 39 0,49 15 
make* 4 50 0,68 17 new* 3 39 0,49 15 
donaldtrump 11 48 0,66 18 should 6 36 0,46 16 
americafirst 12 46 0,63 19 states 6 34 0,43 17 
people* 6 43 0,59 20 president 9 33 0,42 18 
new* 3 39 0,53 21 Russia 6 33 0,42 18 
watch 5 38 0,52 22 bad 3 32 0,41 19 
now* 3 37 0,51 23 american 8 29 0,37 20 
ohio 4 37 0,51 23 back 4 29 0,37 20 
time* 4 36 0,49 24 democrats 9 29 0,37 20 
tomorrow 8 36 0,49 24 trump* 5 29 0,37 20 
florida 7 35 0,48 25 win 3 29 0,37 20 
her 3 31 0,42 26 nytimes 7 27 0,34 30 
Nevada 6 31 0,42 26 
     
poll 4 31 0,42 26 
     
trump* 5 31 0,42 26 




In both lists, ‘will,’ ‘I,’ ‘thank,’ and ‘great’ are among in the top 10 most 
frequently used phrases. The presence of the targeting words from the campaign stage 
significantly decreased after Trump’s victory, as ‘draintheswamp,’ ‘maga,’ 
‘bigleaguetruth,’ ‘Hillary,’ ‘Clinton,’ ‘americafirst’ and ‘crooked’ were not consistent 
with P2 anymore. The cumulative results showed that the targeting words emerged 
533 times (7.3% share of P1 and 3.51% of the entire corpus) in P1 while in P2, only 
52 hits arose (0.7% of the second period and 0.34% of the total sample).    
To examine changes and differences between the targeted-populist PCS of the 
two periods used by @realDonaldTrump, the scrutiny supplied the following 
outcomes relying on the Populist Dictionary (see Table 2) in P1 and P2 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Antagonism and people-centrism in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets in the 
entire sample and P1 and P2 separately 
 
The campaign stage was more intensive in terms of utilization of populist-like 
words (RQ 3) than the six-month-long phase which followed the electoral victory. As 
the computer-assisted results supported, blaming the antagonist entities was more 
frequent than highlighting the vital role of the ‘ordinary’ people in Donald Trump’s 
tweets (RQ 4). However, the portions of antagonism-people comparison are almost the 
same in both periods; approximately 52-53% and 48-47% in favor of antagonism.  
92 
 
The scrutiny also examined the correlations between the topics (see Table 6). 
The total number of matches was 4,230 during the two periods. The highest 
relationship emerged between ‘Enemy’ and ‘Election’ with its 7.5% proportion (RQ 
5). There were very similar co-occurrences between ‘Economy-Election’ (5.6%), 
‘Economy-Foreign Policy’ (5.2%), and ‘Nominations & Policies-Election’ (4.7%). 
The differences were also small between the following topics that had a significantly 
lower frequency of matches: ‘Economy-Other,’ ‘Economy-Enemy’ with 2.3%, and 
2.2%, respectively. The least connected topics in the analyzed database were ‘Enemy’ 
and ‘Other’ with only 16 occurrences.  
Table 6. Topic relation matrix of the two analyzed periods 
Topic Enemy Election Other Economy Foreign  
Pol. 
Nom. & Pol. SUM 
Enemy 0 316 16 96 85 67 580 
Election 316 0 127 237 193 200 1,073 
Other 16 127 0 98 62 53 356 
Economy 96 237 98 0 220 217 868 
Foreign Pol. 85 193 62 220 0 128 688 
Nom. & Pol. 67 200 53 217 128 0 665 
SUM 580 1,073 356 868 688 665 4,230 
 
As the outcomes showed, Hillary Clinton was the primary antagonistic 
individual opponent in the analysis; Donald Trump focused on stressing the 
differences between him and his political rival with a remarkable but not severe 
frequency within the same tweets. However, the total portion of the direct, explicit co-
occurrences was 63. 
Table 7. Co-occurrences between Trump and Clinton within the same tweets 
References She Her Hillary Clinton Hillary Clinton 
I  6 3 20 0 7 
Me  3 3 4 1 1 
Donald 0 0 0 0 0 
Trump 1 0 1 9 2 
Donald Trump 0 0 1 0 1 
SUM 63  




4.2. Explicit and implicit populist political communication style in Donald 
Trump’s tweets 
First, this part of the analysis provides the intercoder reliability referring to each period 
and the entire sample. Trained coders’ analysis supplied high reliability, namely α = 
0.831 in P1, α = 0.826 in P2, and α = 0.829 in P1+P2. Therefore, the coding frames 
referring to EP, IP, and NS represented reliable and supportive results. As the results 
and intercoder agreements support, the Republican leader utilized IP with significantly 
higher frequency (RQ 6) in both periods than EP. In P1, the frequencies of intercoder 
agreements in IP were almost three times higher (2.81x) than EP’s (see Table 8). The 
dominance of IP declined in P2, but not significantly, as the agreements almost reached 
a two and a half (2.41x) times higher emergence than EP. Therefore, the entire 
sample’s results also supported the overlap of IP in terms of intercoder agreements. 
Interestingly, there was no significant deviance between EP and NS. The 
former dispensed 22.17% of the total number of agreements, while the latter provides 
an 18.72% share. Both coder’s results supported that Donald Trump utilized IP with a 
higher share in P1 than P2.   
Table 8. Coders’ results in EP, IP and NS tweets in Donald Trump’s tweets 
Code A(P1) A(P2) A(P1+P2) D(P1) D(P2) D(P1+P2) %(P1) %(P2) %(P1+P2)19 
NS 40 36 76 2 2 4 95,24 94,74 95,00 
IP 158 82 240 13 9 22 92,40 90,11 91,60 
EP 56 34 90 11 7 18 83,58 82,93 83,33 
<T> 254 152 406 26 18 44 90,71 89,41 90,22 
 
 As the results suggested, Donald Trump did not appeal to specific segments of 
the people like minorities and isolated circles in the analyzed EP tweets (RQ 7). The 
entire sample showed that the smaller fragments of citizens belonged to specific states 
and cities like Alabama, Arizona, Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Hampshire, Iowa, 
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, Charlotte, Cleveland, and Orlando. The 
 
19 Abbreviations in Table 8: ‘A’=Agreements, ‘D’=Disagreements, ‘T’=Total, ‘%’= Share, ‘EP’ = 
Explicit Populism, ‘IP’=Implicit Populism, ‘NS’= Neutral Sentences, ‘P1’= Period One, ‘P2’=Period 
Two, ‘P1+P2’= Entire Period   
94 
 
groups above did not emerge in Trump’s Explicit Populist dichotomies in which 
antagonist out-groups are also appearing.  
 
Figure 3. Antagonism versus people-centrism in IP tweets during both periods 
and the entire sample (%) 
 
 As Figure 3 supports, the antagonist perspective had higher shares of IP tweets 
in the analysis of people-centrism and antagonism (RQ 8), although there was a 
considerable difference between P1 and P2. The first period’s shares were almost even 
in terms of the ratio between the blameless citizens and the culprit others, but the 
second phase presented the dominance of antagonism over appealing to the people. 
Blame attribution had almost a seven-time-higher (87.25%) share of P2’s PPCS than 
praising people. Figure 4 demonstrates that blame attributions referred to Hillary 
Clinton in nearly half of the analyzed IP tweets, followed by the dishonest media, the 
Other groups (terrorists, antipathetic countries, and general dangers), Barack Obama 
and other political rivals in P1. As Figure 5 shows, Donald Trump focused primarily 
on the media in P2, followed by inner political opponents and other threatening entities 
like terrorists, antipathetic countries, and moderate, general references to dangerous 
out-groups. His predecessor emerged with the second smallest share while his primary 
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rival in P1 (Hillary Clinton) was the last person who occurred in IP antagonist tweets 
related to P2.     
 




 The study showed that there were considerable proportions of words with 
blame attributions that might have affected the following negative emotions, such as 
fear and anger (Hameleers et al., 2017). The results support that the frequency of 
negative labels were 430 in the entire database. P1 consisted of 247 adversary 
references, while in P2, 183 blame attributions emerged. The adversary words had a 
share of 3.11% in P1 while they supplied 2.27% of P2. Therefore, negative words had 
a considerable portion of the analyzed data. As the results supported, the frequencies 
of words above reached a stock that cannot be ignored in scientific research in which 
scholars focus on blame attributions (RQ 9). The keyword-in-context method provided 
that 75 negative blame attributions connected to Hillary Clinton. Donald Trump 
emphasized that his opponent is a ‘crooked’ person, or he referred to her as 
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‘#crookedhillary.’ In P1, the Republican candidate targeted the current President, 
Barack Obama, ten times by emphasizing the harmful effect of the Affordable Care 
Act. In P2, the blame attributions were primarily attached to the media. Therefore, the 
‘fake news’ dominated the negative labels (f=39) followed by ‘failing nytimes’ (f=19),  
‘illegal immigration’ (f=7), ‘bad’ people (f=7), and the ‘dishonest’ media (f=6).    




 In sum, based on the results presented above, Donald Trump shifted the blame 
attribution from Hillary Clinton to another primary opponent in P2, namely the 
dishonest media. In general, IP tweets dominated Donald Trump’s Twitter PPCS, 
while the shares of EP and NS agreements were very close to each other. The 
Republican leader lacked the emphasis of specific groups because he focused on the 
broadest audience to persuade as many voters as possible. In Chapter 5, the scrutiny 
endeavors to interpret and discuss the findings related to Donald Trump. Moreover, a 
comparative discussion on P1 and P2 is also provided.   
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4.3. Explicit and implicit populist political communication style in Hillary 
Clinton’s tweets 
First, based on Krippendorff’s Alpha method, the trained coders’ results supported 
significant reliability in this segment of the analysis (0.7727). The scrutiny discerned 
the highest agreement (see Table 9) in NS, followed by EP, and IP.  Neither explicit 
nor implicit PPCS dominated the analyzed sample; however, the latter emerged with 
a slightly higher frequency (RQ 10). Even though neutral agreements occurred with 
the highest rate, it is apparent from the table below that tweets with PPCS dominated 
(112:67) Secretary Clinton’s tweets.  
Table 9. Intercoder agreements divided into the three core categories 
Code Agreements Disagreements Total Percent 
Neutral 67 4 71 94,37 
EP 54 11 65 83,08 
IP 58 17 75 77,33 
<Total> 179 32 211 84,83 
 
Second, as Figure 6 presents, the shares (%) of the three categories were close 
to each other in both coder’s results. The Democratic candidate’s communication 
supported a balanced style in which all types of categories appeared with minor 
deviations. It is important to note that the shares below (see Figure 6) consisted of 
every coded tweet, including agreements and disagreements.  
Figure 6. Shares of EP, IP, and NS in the analyzed sample separated by the two 




 Third, as Figure 7 supports, Secretary Clinton focused primarily on the general 
group of people if she utilized the PPCS directly and explicitly. Tweets that referred 
to female citizens were in second place, followed by two groups with equal shares, 
namely African American or Latino citizens, and soldiers. The first two groups 
provided more than half of the results presented in the diagram (59%). On the contrary, 
sectors like the middle-class, blue-collar workers, students, and Muslims had a 
cumulative share of 12% altogether from the entire sample. Although the broad 
category of people emerged with the highest frequency in EP tweets individually, the 
results support that the references to specific groups provided almost two-third of the 
analyzed tweets. Therefore, the investigation suggested that the emphasis of specific, 
isolated groups dominated the Democratic nominee’s tweets, but the broadest range of 
the citizens is the most remarkable group that will suffer from the antagonist political 
elite’s adverse decisions (RQ 11). 





 Fourth, the examination provides the results in which IP appears. As discussed 
above in the literature review, there are two vital groups in populism: the excellent 
people and the corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). In order to highlight the essential elements 
of populism preferred by Hillary Clinton, the emergence of the elite and the citizens is 
collected quantitatively. In this analysis, the elite consisted of Donald Trump and his 
Vice President candidate Mike Pence, or both. 
Finally, Secretary Clinton often referred to the citizens by utilizing the words 
presented in the Populist Dictionary (see Table 3). However, as Figure 8 shows, 
antagonism had significant dominance over citizens (RQ 12). The culprit out-group 
emerged with more than five times the frequency (48:9) of the citizens. The latter 
sector was the primarily suffering group in terms of the populist thin ideology’s logic. 
Figure 8. Antagonism versus People in Hillary Clinton’s Implicit PPCS 
 
Furthermore, based on the quantitative analysis, the results supported that 
Donald Trump emerged 30 times while the Republican candidate and his Vice 
President nominee appeared 13 times together, and Mike Pence occurred twice in IP 
tweets. This section presents the outcome, which might support the current 
investigation in terms of the utilization of negative expressions, where the followers’ 
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negative emotions were targeted by Secretary Clinton. The quantitative analysis found 
that seven words, which might also function as negative labels, namely ‘dangerous,’ 
‘fighting,’ ‘hate,’’ lied,’ ‘never,’ ‘reject,’ and ‘stop’ emerge among the phrases in the 
antagonist section of the populist dictionary used by the Democratic nominee with the 
frequency of 115 in the campaign period (RQ 13). Interestingly, the keywords of 
‘Donald’ and ‘Trump’ occurred with a relatively low frequency (27) in the keyword-
in-context analysis. Clinton pinned the labels above less than one-fourth of the times 
within a four-word-distance suggesting a connection between the person and the 
negative expressions. As mentioned above, most of the negative labels did not emerge 
in close references to Trump, or they, in peculiar cases, applied to other entities.  For 
instance, ‘lied’ which is an indicator of a negative label, referred to Donald Trump 
only six times out of ten to the nominee of the Republican Party. Clinton highlighted 
another antagonist political opponent, namely Mike Pence, by using his name and 
‘lied’ in the same tweet. 
Moreover, the computer-assisted method also searched for the following words 
that can mark the politicians mentioned above as dishonest persons: ‘lie,’ ‘lies,’ and 
‘liar.’ The first two words have a frequency of eleven altogether, but the last expression 
had no occurrence in the database. As a result, the Democratic candidate lacked the 
emphasis of a direct, explicit language in which she might have had an opportunity for 
pinpointing short, negative, easy-to-interpret labels to the antagonist Republican 






5. EMERGING TOPICS, EXPLICIT, AND IMPLICIT POPULISM IN 
DONALD TRUMP’S TWEETS IN PERIOD ONE AND PERIOD TWO 
As the results showed in the previous chapter, the ‘Enemy’ was the most typical topic 
in Trump’s tweets during the two periods. In P1, he primarily attacked Hillary Clinton, 
while, in P2, the ‘fake news media’ are the most prominent enemy. As the results 
illustrated, the Republican politician implemented more populist expressions in P1 
than in P2. The PPCS of Trump targeted the enemy firstly, and the people were only 
in second place. The most significantly correlating topics were the ‘Enemy’ and 
‘Election’ in the sample of 4,230 co-occurrences. As the scrutiny supports, IP 
dominated Trump’s tweets, while the shares of EP and NS were similar. People-
centrism referred mostly to the collective community of the voters, but smaller 
fragments of specific states and cities were also present but in a universal way. There 
was slightly more antagonism than people-centrism in IP tweets in P1, while foes 
dominated the coding units in the subsequent phase. Negative words, which might 
have affected voter’s fear and anger, appeared with a considerable frequency in the 
database. 
 Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, utilized a balanced PPCS in her tweets by 
implementing EP and IP with almost the same frequencies. First, and foremost, if one 
considers the cumulative results, she intended to focus on specific fragmented groups 
such as women, African Americans, Latinos, veterans, Muslims, and young people 
during the campaign. Clinton’s IP PCS relied mostly on stressing the pivotal role of 
the hostile challenger, namely Donald Trump. Despite the emergence of specific 
negative words in the relevant sample, Secretary Clinton did not label her opponent 
with negative words with considerable frequencies. This chapter aims to discuss the 
findings in emerging topics and PPCS in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets.  
5.1. Discussion of the key modifications in Donald Trump’s tweets between 
Period One and Period Two 
Based on the supportive nature of the results in @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter 
communication, specific consistency arose in his tweets. During the first examined 
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stage, Donald Trump focused primarily on the theme of ‘Election’ as he encouraged 
American citizens to join his rallies and vote on the 8th of November 2016. 
Advertising his public speeches (including interviews, campaigning at rallies, 
presidential debates, and sharing links which referred to online broadcasts) and 
mobilizing the crowd (joining his movement, participating in the demonstrations, and 
voting on the Election Day) were frequent appeals used by the Republican candidate.  
The emphasis of the antagonist entities was slightly higher in the Republican 
politician’s tweets, rather than relying on ordinary citizens, in the last months of the 
campaign period. The primary ‘Enemy’ during the campaign is Hillary Clinton. A 
likely explanation might connect to the dynamic of the campaign stage: Trump had the 
opportunity to draw a picture of an unreliable opponent, who was unstable from almost 
every perspective. First, as Trump claimed, Secretary Clinton was already a ‘failed’ 
politician who  
‘...deleted 33,000 e-mails after getting a subpoena from U.S. Congress.’ Date: 
2016-11-02. 
According to Trump’s suggestion, such a ‘dishonest’ person should never serve 
the American Nation. @realDonaldTrump used his exploitative language to show that 
his primary opponent was a ‘crooked’ person who was part of the corrupt, lying 
political establishment. As such, Clinton did not have any accurate attribution, which 
is essential for governing the United States. A significant change must be done in 
American politics, but without the incumbent political elite and with the influential 
businessman who is a new person in politics and independent of corrupt games, which 
kept the failing establishment in Washington in charge.  
Second, @realDonaldTrump tweeted often that Hillary Clinton intended to 
increase taxes that may cause severe deficits for the hard-working citizens. A sharp 
cut for ordinary people’s wallets arises if Clinton wins the election. According to his 
promises, Trump did not want to make people pay higher taxes, while he also planned 
to punish the companies which brought their factories out of the States to maximize 
their profit. In other words, the Republican nominee declared that he protects the 
people, at least in two ways: he will not raise fees, but he keeps big corporates in the 
country to provide jobs for the decent inhabitants.  
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Third, Trump stressed that Clinton does not have the physical strength and 
necessary health to rule the United States, while the Republican politician was in 
perfect physical condition. The core idea in the Republican politician’s PPCS was to 
emphasize that his opponent was incapable, a liar, inconsistent, weak, and more 
importantly, a failed representative who planned to increase the political 
establishment’s income by risking the ‘proper’ American inhabitant’s prosperity.  
As the results support, @realDonaldTrump also appealed to the people because 
he often considered his campaign as a movement that could bring about change in the 
current political system. He spotlighted that he wanted to rely on the people, as he 
tweeted:  
‘In order to create a new GOVERNMENT of, by, & for the PEOPLE, I need 
your VOTE!’ Date: 2016-10-22. 
Moreover, Donald Trump employed a classical populist expression, namely 
giving the power back to ordinary citizens. Creating a new government was meant to 
be a different establishment in every sense because Donald Trump had no connection 
to the former administrations. Therefore, he could not be accused of being a politically 
rigged person. As a new phenomenon in American politics, he might have honestly 
promised a different way for the United States, which lacks the old-fashioned, corrupt, 
or ineffective politicians. Trump declared that the former President brought an 
economic disaster to the nation by the reconstructed healthcare system, while Clinton 
was so unaware of Home Affairs that she could not protect classified e-mails. Why 
would a former system and its prominent member serve the people? In other words, 
the antagonist out-group risked people’s prosperity and safety. As Trump suggested, 
only he was the sole person, even among Republicans, who may be capable of fixing 
problems that emerged owing to the failed politicians.  
As the election was over, @realDonaldTrump’s tweeting logic changed in 
terms of defining the ‘Enemy.’ The results did not show crucial differences between 
the frequency of ‘Enemy’ between P1 and P2, but @realDonaldTrump started to tweet 
about the ‘fake news media,’ instead of focusing on Hillary Clinton because media 
accused him and his staff of cooperating with the Russian government during the 
election. Furthermore, @realDonaldTrump tweeted other negative messages about the 
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media referring to manipulated polls, internal problems of the Trump administration, 
declining the change of healthcare system, and ignoring ‘the great danger’ that 
threatens the United States. He consistently denied the claims mentioned above in his 
Twitter communication. In individual tweets, @realDonaldTrump enhanced the 
connection between the media and the Democrats:  
‘Russia talk is FAKE NEWS put out by the Dems, and played up by the media, 
in order to mask the big election defeat and the illegal leaks!’ Date: 2017-02-26. 
He put the two main enemies in one group to keep the distance from them and 
emphasized the possible ties between the culprit out-groups. As mentioned in the 
literature review, populism has a flexible attribution. So does Donald Trump. A new 
period brought different opponents, and the President-elect, later the President of the 
United States, accused them of lying by spreading fake news to the American citizens.  
In P2, certain foreign enemies appeared regularly in his tweets like North 
Korea, Mexico, and China. The tweets connected to ‘Foreign Policy’ issues emerged 
in P2, while P1 almost lacked this topic. As the results supported, ‘Foreign Policy’ and 
‘Enemy’ may correlate in tweets referring to the countries above. The frequency of 
‘Enemy’ did not decrease significantly in P2 (734 hits in P1, 699 in P2), but the topics 
targeted by Donald Trump became more detailed and comprehensive. Antipathetical 
countries, companies that did not want to manufacture products in the United States, 
the ‘dishonest’ media, and the Democrats who  
‘...have nothing going but to obstruct.’ Date: 2017-01-31.  
Moreover, ‘bad’ people were among the several themes that appeared as 
enemies in P2. As the current political or public situation demanded, 
@realDonaldTrump optimized his PPCS. The results supported that diversified topics 
emerged in P2 in terms of specifying the latest antagonist entities.  
In @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter communication, the ‘Election’ magnetized 
the highest number of near correlations (proximity of codes). The results illustrated 
that the strongest co-occurrence appeared between ‘Election’ and ‘Enemy’; however, 
the ‘Election’ was also attached significantly to ‘Economy,’ ‘Foreign Policy,’ and 
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‘Nominations & Policies.’ The outcomes above supported that the antagonist political 
elite, primarily Hillary Clinton, was the main topic of Donald Trump’s actual PPCS.  
Despite the fact that the category of ‘Enemy’ was the most frequently emerging 
topic in the entire analysis, and it reached the highest number of correlations referring 
to election-based tweets, the second smallest portion of correlation appeared between 
the antagonist-adversary messages and the other five main topics. One possible 
explanation of this result suggests that Donald Trump utilized an adversary style of 
political communication in a practical-pragmatist way. First, as a populist politician, 
the Republican leader attacked the rival political elite spectacularly in the most 
intensive period by his PCS, in order to highlight the distance (Bos et al., 2011) 
between him and Secretary Clinton. Besides the strongest co-occurrence with 
‘Election’ and some insignificant correlations with other topics, ‘Enemy’ referred 
mostly to the antagonist actor itself. Second, Donald Trump might have not wanted to 
mix his antagonist PPCS up with different topics in order to make his supporters 
understand that regardless of any other issues, the antagonist political actors were 
harmful. As failed persons in politics, they represented a genuine threat for the 
American Nation; therefore, there was no need for emphasizing any different topics 
with a significant proportion in the election. A straightforward, oversimplified, 
antagonistic communication frame emerged in the analysis in which corrupt political 
opponents wanted to affect and influence the electoral race, and they intended to 
exploit ordinary citizens as they had done it before (Caiani & Graziano, 2016). Despite 
a few insignificant exceptions, the frame above lacked other topics, and it helped to 
produce clear adversary messages for the populist actor whose primary task was to 
bring attention to corrupt and educated political elite (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). 
The findings of this section provided that the correlations are diversified 
between other categories, especially if one takes into account the shares of ‘Economy-
Foreign Policy’ and ‘Economy-Nominations & Policies’ (5.3% and 4.8%). Even 
though the presidential race had been finished in November, the election was still a 
recurrent topic in @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter communication. After the election, 
the President of the United States still reacted to the news and negative allegations 
referring to the campaign. @realDonaldTrump changed the scope in the ‘Enemy’ 
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category to not let the controversial allegations by the media unanswered and to not 
let the public sphere question his legitimate administration. 
5.2. The discussion of PPCS in Period One  
The following subchapters supply a vital characterization of Donald Trump’s PPCS in 
the campaign period. The communication strategy that relied on the fundamental 
populist dichotomy had specific patterns in the Republican nominee’s tweets. This part 
of the thesis aims to introduce Donald Trump’s PPCS by which he attempted to 
persuade the citizens during the 2016 presidential elections. Besides this, references to 
the essential antagonist actors also arose below. In order to provide a supportive in-
depth analysis, the study considers the Explicit, Implicit, and Neutral tweets as the 
method by which some features of the examined data might be described. 
5.2.1. Addressing the relevant people 
Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) argue that challenger politicians tend to utilize PPCS 
intensively in their campaign speeches. Donald Trump fitted the category of the 
challenger because he had never made a serious effort to run for the presidency in the 
United States. In previous studies, scholars point out that Donald Trump and his 
communicational team adjusted the Republican nominee’s rhetoric to specifications of 
PPCS (Engesser et al., 2017b; Hameleers et al., 2018; Pal et al., 2017) and the peculiar 
political situation in the United States. After all, their strategy was a successful one 
because the Republican leader won the electoral race with a remarkable difference 
(306:232 in favor of Trump). In this subchapter, the examination focuses on the appeal 
to the people and the way Donald Trump referred to ‘ordinary’ citizens to exploit one 
of the two vital elements of PPCS, namely the ‘blameless,’ homogenous masses 
(Canovan, 2002). 
As the results above supported, Donald Trump’s communication disregarded 
the appeal to isolated groups like ethnic minorities. Hence, he intended to tweet in the 
name of the sovereign people, and the country, based on the essential PPCS’s features 
(Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Also, the Republican leader focused on other subgroups 
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like people of the specific cities and states. The discussion aims to explain why Donald 
Trump attempted to praise the inhabitants of particular states. 
 
Figure 9. The results of the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States 
(Source: BBC)20 
 
Based on the Populist Dictionary provided by the computer-assisted method, 
there were eleven emerging states in P1’s tweets. Donald Trump and his 
communication team worked out a logical and pragmatic plan in which the Republican 
politician targeted the significant states in terms of electoral votes; thus, he had the 
chance to persuade or win swing states against Hillary Clinton. Therefore, he 
attempted to reach as many supporters as possible by refraining from referencing the 
specific minorities within individual states. Tweeting about this mobilization to make 
inhabitants join the rallies or the elections in particular states was an essential and 
recurrent pattern in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets:   
 




‘Thank you South Carolina! Everyone has to get out and VOTE on 11/8/16. 
#MakeAmericaGreatAgain’ Date: 2016-10-06. 
Being grateful and tweeting about gratitude was fundamental feedback from 
Donald Trump to his supporters. Moreover, in the tweet above, he utilized implicit 
PPCS in which he suggests that the land that had been once a great country but 
deprived by the culprit out-groups will be a wealthy one soon. As the outcome of the 
2016 Presidential Election demonstrated (BBC, 2016), the vital strategy in the 
campaign period worked effectively. As Figure 9 presents, the Republican candidate 
won nine states out of eleven from the territories he focused on primarily in his 
campaign via Twitter. Donald Trump’s PPCS was successful in the following states: 
Alabama (9)21, Arizona (11), Carolina (15+9)22, Florida (29), Georgia (16), Iowa (6), 
Michigan (16), Ohio (18), and Pennsylvania (20). There were only two states in which 
he could not gain victories, namely Hampshire (4) and Nevada (6).23 Moreover, as a 
recent investigation showed, eleven states were considered as competitive or swing 
states during the 2016 Presidential Election (Kenski & Kenski, 2017). The list of 
victorious states presented above consists of six swing states in which Donald Trump 
finally persuaded people, namely Florida, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania. Interestingly, as the computer-assisted method provided, despite the 
critical importance of Texas, the Republican leader referred to the state that offered 38 
electoral votes only four times in P1. One explanation might be that the state above 
was a stable land for Republicans as they won ten elections, including Trump’s victory, 
in a row within the specific territory from 1980 (Daniel & Batheja, 2016).  
In P1, the emergence of antagonism and people-centrism (Aslanidis, 2018) was 
almost equal in @realDonaldTrump’s tweets. A possible explanation for these results 
may be the necessity of balance in targeting the enemy and appeal to the voters.  In the 
campaign phase, the Republican leader perceived that mobilizing supporters, praising 
the people, and being grateful for specific (swing) states were almost as vital as the 
emphasis of the enemy that ruins people’s lives by disregarding hard-working citizens 
 
21 Numbers in the parentheses show the electoral votes in the different states. 





desires. The next subchapter focuses on the appearing antagonist actors in Donald 
Trump’s campaign tweets.   
5.2.2. The primary enemy: Hillary Clinton 
Donald Trump stressed Hillary Clinton’s antagonistic role by employing explicit and 
implicit PPCS in his tweets during the campaign stage. Moreover, he used a unique 
negative label, namely ‘crooked’ to make voters remember the corruption represented 
by his political opponent: 
‘Crooked Hillary colluded w/FBI and DOJ and media is covering up to protect 
her. It’s a #RiggedSystem! Our country deserves better!’ Date: 2016-10-17. 
The blame attribution above relied on several considerable perspectives to 
characterize the Democratic candidate’s failing policy.  
First, Donald Trump presented that Hillary Clinton was an unscrupulous person 
who did not care about the people’s desires but focused on possessing power for the 
mainstream culprit establishment. In this political situation, the blame attribution 
(Tilley & Hobolt, 2011) may have affected voters anger. Focusing on anger might have 
been a major feature of Trump’s PPCS because ‘Trump’s supporters are different from 
other voters in that they score above average on all of the attitudes that are related to 
populism. In the sample, they are the most financially pessimistic and conspiratorial 
minded of all the voters. They also record high levels of mistrust and anger at the 
federal government’ (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 200). Ordinary citizens might have felt 
anger about the exploiting political power, in which Hillary Clinton was a prominent 
actor, who disregarded the recovery of ‘ordinary’ people’s prosperity. As Trump 
suggested implicitly and declared explicitly, the corrupt presidential administration 
was an abusive and exploitative machine which was embedded into the society. There 
was a need for a severe change to give a reasonable alternative by a person who was 
not a member of the ‘rigged system.’  
Second, the Republican leader highlighted the irresponsibility of the 
Democratic candidate. Trump’s tweet on Hillary Clinton’s e-mail scandal showed the 
voters that the liberal politician kept classified documents insecurely on her private e-
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mail address. In other words, according to Trump, Clinton’s unfit to be the next 
President of the Nation. He asked, implicitly, the following questions: How can 
somebody be a Commander-in-Chief who does not even handle the issues of secret 
documents accessible only to authorized people? How can Americans trust in a person 
who is incapable of protecting national security even at a vital level? 
Consequently, the Democratic candidate deprived people of their fundamental 
desire, which was being secured. As Trump declared, his primary political rival was a 
dishonest, untalented, and irresponsible politician. As such, Hillary Clinton was not a 
cautious leader but a greedy member of the failing system (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017) who had only one goal, namely procuring power regardless of 
considering citizens fundamental rights like acquiring wealth, protecting them from 
internal and foreign threats, and creating jobs. Donald Trump suggested that Clinton 
was not a servant of the people, but the one who benefitted from them. 
The Republican challenger pointed out that his rival, the culprit member of the 
failing political establishment (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), had decades to evaluate, 
reconsider, and resolve the problems of the Nation. Instead, she failed in serving the 
country, but created chaos in the Middle East by voting for the Iraqi war. Although the 
war was far away from the United States, it still affected people by the tragic death of 
American soldiers, the physical and mental regeneration of veterans, and catalyzing 
retaliations by terrorists within the invading country’s territory and in many other 
nations worldwide. 
According to the Republican candidate, Hillary Clinton made adversary 
comments about Donald Trump’s supporters, the many Americans who are decent, 
hard-working citizens. Moreover, Trump declared that Clinton insulted every 
American by the utilization of a disrespectful use of language. What precisely did 
Donald Trump refer to in this case? He spotlighted one of the campaign speeches of 
Hillary Clinton at a fund-raiser in Manhattan in which she called ‘half of’ Trump’s 
followers a ‘basket of deplorables’ (Chozick, 2016). Therefore, there was a chance for 
the Republican challenger to contradict the allegations in which Clinton suggested that 
Trump is the only person who utilized disrespectful language. Donald Trump exploited 
the situation by targeting Clinton’s adversary style and stressed how humiliating her 
words were to put the Democratic candidate into the category of ‘impoliteness.’    
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In P1, Donald Trump referred to Hillary Clinton both in explicit and implicit 
ways. There was a fundamental need for enhancing the differences between the 
‘crooked’ politician and the ‘good’ people (Aslanidis, 2018) to make voters ignore the 
culprit oppositional leader. However, Clinton emerged in IP at a higher frequency than 
in EP. As the results support, Trump and his communication team mainly focused on 
the ‘weak,’ ‘failed,’ and ‘cheater ‘ antagonist actor by bringing attention to a simple 
(Bracciale & Martella, 2017), easy-to-interpret and consequent allegation, utilizing 
blame attributions to affect people’s anger (Hameleers et al., 2017). 
@realDonaldTrump’s focal point among negative emotions was mostly anger instead 
of fear. A possible explanation for the allegation above might be that the challenger 
concentrated on the stability of corruption in American politics, a firm and a vital 
attribution of the exploiting establishment which must be ended by him. As Hameleers 
et al. argue (2017), fear mostly refers to uncertain dangers, threats, and deprivations, 
primarily accruing from the near future. 
Moreover, Hameleers et al. conclude in their case study (2017) that fear is the 
core emotion of populist political communication. The supportive results of this 
dissertation differed from the Dutch scholars 2017 estimate of fear’s dominance over 
anger, but the outcomes showed that anger might appear with higher frequency than 
fear in Donald Trump’s PPCS in P1. The political situation diverged between the 
Netherlands and the United States; therefore, the blame attributions weights might 
have been shifted from fear to anger back and forth depending on the politician’s 
pragmatic adjustments. After all, in P1, Trump targeted first and foremost the instance 
of the constant and almost infinite corruption that harms hard-working people’s labor 
(Canovan, 1999) and keeps the culprit processes proceeding. Also, Trump declared the 
unsuccessfulness, untrustworthiness, and weakness of the rival, who was the leading 
cause of the declining prosperity.        
5.2.3. The ineffective predecessor 
Besides the blame placed on Hillary Clinton, the Republican candidate made a serious 
effort to emphasize the failure of Barack Obama by bringing attention to one of his 
outstanding bills. The Affordable Care Act (in other words, Obamacare) is a regulation 
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that might supply healthcare for the citizens in an extended form. However, Donald 
Trump stressed that Obamacare is unaffordable for the American inhabitants:  
‘In addition to those without health coverage- those that have disastrous 
#Obamacare are seeing MASSIVE PREMIUM INCREASES. Repeal & replace!’ Date: 
2016-10-20. 
 
As a businessman, Donald Trump tended to act like a pundit who had considerable 
experience in financial health management. As he was a real estate mogul, there was 
no evidence for his capabilities that might have provided the elaboration of a new 
policy referring to the health care system. The Republican leader drew attention to 
Obama’s regulation mostly implicitly by emphasizing the harmful effects of the 
predecessor’s health care act in P1. As the results of this dissertation supported, there 
was no need in Trump’s PPCS to compare the Democratic President with the ordinary 
citizens, because the issue mentioned above affected almost the entire nation. One of 
the essential hidden dichotomies in IP tweets referring to Obamacare emerged between 
the citizens who paid significant amounts to the insurance companies and the people 
whose incomes were between 100% and 400% the federal poverty level (Frean et al., 
2017). The second group received considerable ‘premium tax credits’ from the United 
States’ budget and it was ‘protected from these increases due to ACA provisions that 
limit their costs to a certain fraction of their incomes’ (Thompson et al., 2018, p. 417). 
Despite that, Trump did not focus on contradiction between the two imagined 
communities but blamed Barack Obama, who put the whole nation into a disastrous 
situation by ratifying Affordable Care Act. Besides, Donald Trump pointed out that 
the Democratic President is one of the key supporters of Hillary Clinton (Holloway, 
2017). According to the populist challenger, the culprit head of the administration 
helped the Democratic nominee to perpetuate the policies that keep the country in a 
stagnant position. In other words, the way of mainstream policies prevented people 
from Making America Great Again.    
5.2.4. A supporter of the main establishment: the media 
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Donald Trump also stressed the role of the media, which are typical antagonist agents 
in PPCS (Pauwels, 2014), in his tweets by utilizing their false function. The 
Republican candidate highlighted that CNN and New York Times or merely the 
‘media’ were supporting his rival during the presidential elections. He alleged that the 
media system was against him and it made a serious effort to keep proceeding the 
culprit political elite’s harmful activities by influencing one of the crucial features of 
the democratic system, the election: 
 
‘This election is being rigged by the media pushing false and unsubstantiated 
charges, and outright lies, in order to elect Crooked Hillary!’ Date: 2016-10-
15. 
 
Seeking ties between the Democratic opponent and other antagonist actors 
characterizes Trump’s PPCS. Although he mentioned that the false allegations were 
spreading by the media system (Van Aelst et al., 2017), the essential scope of the 
message was Hillary Clinton. According to Trump, the two antagonist entities worked 
together for one purpose, which was persuading as many voters as they could by 
misleading the ‘pure’ people. Trump referred to the election as an unfair process in 
which the liar culprit out-groups tried to abuse their financial, political, and technical 
background. Trump implicitly suggested that the sources above originated from the 
hard-working citizens labor, the everyday work they struggled with to maintain livable 
circumstances.  
 There was no significant need for the explicit dichotomy in the references of 
media in P1. A supportive explanation for the sake of discussion might be that Donald 
Trump and his communication staff might have made an effort to create the network 
of the enemies instead of bringing attention to apparent dichotomies (Aslanidis, 2018). 
The more antagonistic out-groups appeared in the campaign, the more heroic Donald 
Trump’s struggle appeared against the entities that abused power. The core message 
might have suggested that a new, politically fresh, and energetic man (Demeter, 2017) 
fought the greedy and liar groups of enemies. The former intended to represent the 
voice of the sovereign people (Panizza, 2005) and attempted to work for them, while 
the latter only focused on their own interests and functioned for realizing the highest 
profits and the more significant political influence to keep the system ‘rigged.’ 
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5.2.5. Other dangerous entities 
Besides the prominent antagonist politicians like Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama and 
their supportive media system, Donald Trump mentioned that other out-groups might 
threaten the people. For instance, terrorists were among the evil entities who could put 
ordinary inhabitant’s lives into danger by bomb attacks and other physical offensives:   
 
‘ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees, and 
@HillaryClinton will allow it to happen here, too! #BigLeagueTruth’ Date: 
2016-10-20. 
 
As the example above suggested, the Republican challenger kept extending the 
culprit and antagonist out-groups’ ‘network.’ Although the former instance lacked the 
alliance between Clinton and the radical terrorist organization, it still suggested that 
Hillary Clinton created the chaotic circumstances in which Islamic State recruited its 
army and obtained instrumental and financial background for its operations. The 
explicit dichotomy was extended as Trump declared that the United States was not the 
only land that could be affected by the terrorists. He emphasized, using his direct EP 
tweet, that Europe was under attack by the hidden criminals who acted like asylum 
seekers in a needy situation to penetrate deeply into the continent for one purpose: 
killing innocent and blameless inhabitants. Moreover, Trump stressed the possibilities 
of the very same dangerous process in the case of Clinton’s victory: the nation’s 
security is at risk, and innocent people will die if a weak leader like Secretary Clinton 
wins the presidential race. Again, he relied on #BigLeagueTruth referring to merely 
the efforts that must be made to sake the unmasking of Clinton’s and the media 
system’s corruption to avoid the disaster, namely letting dangerous immigrants into 
the country. In this case, Trump influenced the fear (Nai & Maier, 2018) of the voters 
in order to mobilize them against the Democratic candidate.  
5.3. Neutral sentences in Period One 
As the examination supported, the Republican nominee utilized words that might have 
been essential tools for PPCS in P1. Despite the emergence of populist-like words, a 
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specific proportion of tweets lacked the antagonist style, the blame attribution, or 
highlighting of the explicit dichotomies between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil.’ Trump 
mostly used NS when he attended to praise his followers or specific states: 
‘Thank you Pennsylvania! Going to New Hampshire now and on to Michigan. 
Watch PA rally here: The big vote tomorrow!’ Date: 2016-11-08. 
 
As mentioned in the former subchapters, sending positive feedback to the 
followers in a grateful way was a crucial element of the Republican challenger’s 
tweets. Moreover, he mobilized (Lahusen, 1996) his fans by encouraging them for 
taking apart in rallies, watching his campaign speeches on the television or via social 
sites, and, most importantly, participating in the elections.  
Besides this, Trump advertised the interviews in which he (or his relatives and 
his political allies) spoke for the nation. He shared the exact dates of the broadcasts 
referring to debates, rallies, conferences, job pre-negotiations, meetings with political 
allies, and he also provided the hyperlinks via the recordings that could have been 
reached for his followers.  
5.4. The discussion of PPCS in Period Two. A comparative approach 
The following subchapters provide a vital comparison between P1 and P2 to seek 
possible similarities and differences in Donald Trump’s PPCS. Therefore, the 
comparison relies on the possible tendencies demonstrated by the Republican leader. 
The subsequent part of the thesis presents a more rooted and detailed insight into 
@realDonaldTrump tweets; therefore, there is a fundamental need for taking into 
account the re-shaping of the political situation emerging with the new position of 
Donald Trump’s political career, namely being in charge as the President of the United 
States. The political situation and the position of the Republican leadership were 
changing, but the underlying dilemma seeks the answer for the next relevant question: 
How did Donald Trump and his advisors adjust practically the communication strategy 
in the new era? 
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5.4.1. Fake news media 
The most considerable difference between the two examined periods was the 
significant decline in appealing to the people in Donald Trump’s tweets. One might 
say that this outcome derives from the possible decreasing number of tweets in P2, but 
as presented above, the second investigated stage consisted of 798 tweets, while the 
first phase provided 738 messages via Twitter. As the results of the computer-assisted 
method supplied, the emergence of the ordinary citizens in Trump’s tweets almost 
disappeared from the database in P2. This outcome may be explained by the fact that 
the Republican candidate won the election; consequently, there was no critical need 
for persuading the voters in the new situation.  
What could be the core task for the primary political leader of the United States in 
terms of political communication? Campaigning for the presidency as a challenger 
demanded a different political communication strategy for maintaining the power as 
an elected principal. Adjusting to the actual situation, therefore, characterized another 
appropriate blame attribution for the Republican politician; in this particular case, 
defending himself by attacking (Benoit et al., 2003). Who was to blame after defeating 
Secretary Clinton? The opposition merely realized the victory of the former celebrity 
and did not have enough time to reorganize itself; thus, it could not compete with 
Donald Trump for a while. 
In contrast, rumors and allegations were also being circulated through the media 
about the possible ties between the Republican leader (or his staff) and the Russian 
government to win against Secretary Clinton in the presidential campaign. This 
dissertation does not seek answers whether Donald Trump had any connection to 
foreign interests that might have affected the elections. However, the first case that 
catalyzed the blame-shifting (van Kessel & Castelein, 2016) in the acting leader’s 
messages was attached to the media, namely the spreading pieces of information about 
Trump’s and his advisors’ commitments to the Russian government.    
Why did the blame attribution of the media (Hameleers, 2018) fit the PPCS if the 
tweets disregarded the people? How can one interpret Trump’s messages as PPCS if 
he intended to defend himself by attack but without stressing significant frequency of 
the dichotomy between the media and the inhabitants? There is a possible explanation 
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for the questions above in which the clarification relied on the broadcasting function 
of the press. Even though the controversial news was referring to Donald Trump 
himself, they still affected people’s opinions. The allegations and speculations about 
Trump’s ties to other foreign interests, whether they were correct or real, might have 
shaped the huge masses’ perspective about the Republican President. Donald Trump 
emphasized that the media system, except for Fox News, was fake, and he suggested 
implicitly that the false allegations about him and his advisors misled the people. 
Therefore, the media did not function properly. In other words, it did not inform the 
citizens but lied to them about the new President of the United States to destabilize the 
trust they have for Donald Trump. Moreover, the loss of confidence might catalyze an 
unstable political situation within the country; consequently, the Republican 
establishment’s political power is at risk.        
‘The failing @nytimes does major FAKE NEWS China story saying ‘‘Mr.Xi has 
not spoken to Mr. Trump since Nov.14’’ We spoke at length yesterday.’ Date: 2017-
02-10. 
 
 Donald Trump mostly utilized negative labels like ‘fake’ and ‘failing’ in his IP 
tweets when he was referring to the media. He highlighted that traditional media were 
unreliable sources that should have not been trusted by the audience. The media were 
the supporters of the culprit political elite in P1, but after the election, the mainstream 
newspapers and television channels were the primary antagonist agents functioning as 
a ‘rigged system.’ As the tweet above supports, the media did not only stress the 
President’s possible ties with foreign governments but also the existence of the 
negotiations between the Republican politician and other prominent leaders. 
Therefore, Donald Trump suggested that the media communicated about him in a very 
disrespectful and ‘dishonest’ way. The media system indirectly supported the 
antagonist political powers by discrediting the ruling establishment. As a result, 
Donald Trump made a serious effort to differentiate himself from the misleading media 
system by utilizing attacks (Benoit & Harthcock, 1999) to defend his credibility and 
maintain his follower’s trust. As the instance above highlighted, among the general 
references to the media system, Donald Trump targeted specific newspapers and 
channels like The New York Times and CNN: 
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‘I thought that @CNN would get better after they failed so badly in their 
support of Hillary Clinton however, since election, they are worse!’ Date: 2016-11-
29. 
The tweet above was among the rare messages in which P1’s most prominent 
antagonist actor, namely Hillary Clinton emerged. Again, the Republican leader 
brought attention to the media’s aid that connects to the former Democratic candidate’s 
campaign. Although the election was over, Trump still tweeted about the moral failure 
of the press. Present continuous is an essential tool in Donald Trump’s tweets because 
the collapse of the media kept proceeding as they create false news about the new 
administration and, first and foremost, about the new President. In other words, 
according to Trump’s tweets, the followers may interpret the mainstream media’s 
activity as a culprit system that misleads the hard-working citizens who deserve to 
know the truth. As mentioned above, Donald Trump also focused on the present by 
the emphasis of the media’s ongoing failure. The label ‘fake’ might have affected the 
follower’s anger because the media system, similarly to the ‘crooked’ politicians, did 
not serve the people; instead, it helped the old culprit elite by destabilizing the fresh 
political leadership. 
Targeting the media is a considerable element of PPCS (Pauwels, 2014). In line 
with the literature, Donald Trump is one of the most prominent leaders who considers 
the media system, except one channel, namely Fox, as antagonist actors (Hameleers, 
2018). As the international research supports, similarly to Donald Trump, the Dutch 
populist politician, Geert Wilders, also intends to attack the media via his Twitter 
communication (Hameleers, 2018). In sum, Donald Trump’s PPCS, which is also 
referring to the press, provided typical attributions that are utilized by other populist 
leaders worldwide.   
5.4.2. Moderate generalization 
Compared to P1, the second analyzed period consisted of a considerable number of 
tweets in which Donald Trump utilized universal suggestions about the threats that 
might have put the country and its inhabitants into a dangerous situation. His 
communication implied the factor of danger or the references to the ordinary people 
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but lacked specific characterizations. There was a notable difference between P1 and 
P2 in terms of EP. On the one hand, Donald Trump employed particular remarks of 
the antagonist out-group in P1 by targeting Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, The New 
York Times, and CNN, but he wrote about universal antagonism with insignificant 
frequency. On the other hand, in P2, the Republican leader started to focus on a 
moderate, universal, and unspecific way of communication by using negative words 
like ‘bad,’ ‘terrible,’ and ‘sad’ in general contexts: 
‘If the ban were announced with a one week notice, the ‘‘bad’’ would rush into 
our country during that week. A lot of bad ‘‘dude’’ out there!’ Date: 2017-01-
30. 
 
Donald Trump kept the category of the antagonist out-group as wide as it was 
possible by lacking specific characterizations in his communications. Despite the 
missing features, the tweet above was still part of EP messages because it brought 
attention to the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. Alternatively, in other words, both 
agents of the dichotomy were apparent in the tweet, no matter how universal the enemy 
was. Thus, the coding unit fell under the category of EP. One might still say that the 
‘enemy’ is vague and blurred in the specific instance the study enhances, which is 
correct from several aspects, but IP might explicitly imply either the antagonist actor(s) 
whose harmful activity will affect the people’s lives severely, or the homogeneous 
‘pure’ mass which needs to ‘be protected.’ In the latter situation, there is neither an 
agent nor an actor that can be part of the antagonism, no matter how empty the 
signifiers are (Laclau, 1977), but an unarticulated danger which cannot emerge 
simultaneously with the people.  
After all, there is no need to present specific features of foreign threats because 
one of the possible goals in Donald Trump’s communication relied on persuading as 
many people as he could to support his ban policy. In this situation, Trump could act 
as a contributor to safety, the one who took care of the nation’s security. In order to 
present the idea above, he made an effort to affect the citizens’ fear by emphasizing 
that dangerous out-groups (Oesch, 2008) were nearby, and they would flood the 
country in some days.  
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The emergence of moderate generalization supported the adjusting nature of 
Trump’s PPCS. In P1, the targeting PPCS was required to differentiate himself from 
the mainstream political establishment, but in P2, he exploited the hidden opportunity 
that occurred in providing an extended picture of the enemy. First, the emphasis on 
protecting the homeland might strengthen his supporters’ trust. Second, Donald Trump 
demonstrated that he intended to create every necessary legislation for the nation. 
Additionally, he suggested that the oppositional political force (including judges and 
attorneys) disregarded the country’s interest by blocking the ratification. Finally, he 
attempted to assure people of his trustworthiness by creating legislation that referred 
to his former promises in the campaign, namely keeping the ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ as far 
from the land he ruled as it was possible. The emphasis on asylum seekers, illegal 
immigration, drug lords, smugglers, and terrorists, was part of the same category in 
Donald Trump’s PPCS when he shifted the labels from specific expressions to 
universal words. Therefore, the possibility of a logical modification appeared to 
support the interpretation of particular and global means of antagonism.  
As mentioned above, the Republican leader employed a detailed, characterized 
category of the enemy in P1, but he completed his PPCS with general assumptions and 
references to the culprit out-groups. One of the possible explanations might be that he 
intended to make people remember that some entities or circles threatened the country. 
The characterizations of the groups above were not as vital as they were in P1 because 
the primary goal was to maintain power by affecting people’s fear. The precise picture 
about the enemy was not essential anymore, but the person who was capable of 
protecting the nation from it/them, and the support he needed for the task might be the 
fundamental perspective in terms of planning the communicational strategy. It is 
essential to mention that there were still some specific references to the enemies like 
‘ISIS’ and ‘Iran #1 in terror’, but generalization completed Trump’s EP and IP 
discourse simultaneously.  
5.4.3. The Democrats 
In line with the ‘Moderate Generalization,’ Donald Trump extended the way he 
tweeted about oppositional actors and forces. In P1, he mostly employed a specific 
approach of language by targeting Secretary Clinton in the first place and Barack 
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Obama in the second among the political rivals. As the results supported, there was a 
significant decline in the mentioning of the former Democratic candidate as it almost 
lacked the complete analysis in P2. However, he still highlighted the Democratic 
Party’s weaknesses in his tweets to present spectacular contradictions between the 
winner, ruling party and the loser, oppositional political group:  
‘Gross negligence by the Democratic National Committee allowed hacking to 
take place. The Republican National Committee had strong defense!’ Date: 2017-01-
07. 
 Adjusting determines the way Donald Trump utilized his PPCS, in terms of 
shifting the blame attributions from one prominent opponent to another. Moreover, his 
attacking style also became somewhat moderate and universal in P2 than it was in P1. 
The perceived modifications took place quickly in the Republican leader’s PPCS; at 
the beginning of September 2016, he focused primarily on the political rivals, but a 
couple of months later, he blamed the media. By the emphasis on the Democratic 
National Committee’s weaknesses and his party’s considerations about security might 
have persuaded people about the legitimacy of their choice on the 8th of November 
2016. Trump employed IP in the tweet above as he declared that the members of the 
Democratic Party did not care about national security. Consequently, they did not 
focus on the ordinary citizen’s safety, but the Republicans had already taken care of 
classified documents protection.  
5.5. Neutral sentences in Period Two 
Similar to P1, the second period’s Neutral Sentences consisted mostly of the 
declaration of positive feedback. As presented above, ‘thank’ was the most utilized 
word in P1 in Donald Trump’s tweets, but it still had a significant frequency in P2 as 
it took the sixth place among the most frequently used expressions: 
‘Unbelievable evening in New Hampshire - THANK YOU! Flying to Grand 
Rapids, Michigan now. Watch NH rally here:’ Date: 2016-11-08. 
However, being grateful did not refer merely to the supporters and fans of 
Trump. He expressed his gratitude to the future business partners that might build 
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factories in the United States and employ American citizens at their corporations. He 
embraced inner political allies and emphasized successful meetings with foreign 
leaders.  
He also stressed the ‘optimism’ emerging at the Wall Street Stock Market and 
the national growth of the economy. The Republican leader tweeted about the positive 
changes like they were derived from his presidency. In order to present the vision, the 
possibility, and the ongoing process of making America Great Again, Donald Trump 
shared the ‘perceived’ positive changes that might support his campaign promise, 
namely bringing prosperity and wealth back to the people.  
5.6. Limitations 
This chapter has specific limitations. The most important limitation lies in the fact that 
it did not provide more specific samples of comparisons related to dichotomies, but 
only one in which Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s frequent appearances within 
the same tweets are collected. However, to benchmark the results against other specific 
word dichotomies, a further in-depth analysis is needed to provide more supportive 
results in the comparison above. It is possible, therefore, that the results referring to 
the co-occurrences of the Republican and Democratic politicians within the same 
tweets induces more questions and further examination.   
Moreover, a few other limitations need to be considered in this part of the study. 
First, to get a more precise in-depth analysis, a further coding process is required on a 
larger sample. Second, this thesis did not take into account Donald Trump’s re-tweets, 
which may draw attention to the Republican politician’s information-sharing patterns. 
Finally, another comparative perspective may support the scrutiny of 
@realDonaldTrump’s political communication strategy on Twitter, namely the 
analysis of the 2020 election in the United States, to investigate whether the incumbent 
deviates in terms of the utilized topics and PPCS. 
Three possible extra limitations might be part of a robust criticism referring to 
this chapter of the dissertation. The first relates to the fact that the concept of IP lacks 
the minimal definition of populism by which the explicit dichotomy between the 
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blameless people and the culprit out-group exploits the citizens through its harmful 
activities and interests. Although the concept of the criticism from the perspective 
above can be understood, this study still tried to demonstrate the hidden dichotomies 
in the coding units. One should consider to whom the media lie and mislead and who 
are suffering from politicians like Hillary Clinton. According to Trump, the media 
made fake news about him and his staff, but he implicitly suggested that the media 
system lied to people, and it misled them with false allegations. Moreover, Secretary 
Clinton should have served the nation for decades, but she focused on herself and the 
mainstream political establishment’s goals. Therefore, the ‘crooked’ person acted 
dishonestly and unfairly to gain an advantage of the American people. 
The second extra core limitation of this unit was the lack of analysis referring to 
audiovisual content that might change the interpretation of different tweets. Therefore, 
further examination is needed to provide an in-depth investigation by extending the 
coding units to characterize the codebook and the description more specifically. 
The third additional limitation originates from the fact that the scrutiny focused 
on the content of the discourse. Therefore, the investigation disregarded specific 
characters such as exclamation marks or words typed in capital letters, which might be 
elements of the aggressive style that might fuel Trump’s PPCS. Further analysis is 
required to explore to what extent do the elements above support PPCS.     
5.7. Conclusion of Chapter 5 – The art of adjusting to specific situations: 
blame-shifting, antagonism, and counter-attacks 
After 2008, Twitter has become an essential tool for politicians to spread campaign 
messages. Interestingly, the frequency of tweets significantly increased in the 2016 
campaign compared to the elections in 2008. According to Solop (2010), Barack 
Obama shared a total of 262 tweets from the 29th of April 2007 to the 5th of November 
2008, which is a 556 day-long period. In contrast, Donald Trump sent 738 tweets from 
the 1st of September 2016 until the 8th of November 2016 (68 days). A possible 
explanation for this result may be that the more users appear on Twitter, the more 
intensively the nominee tweets to control and affect the audience during the most 
dynamic phase of political communication, namely the campaign period. 
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As scholars emphasize, the PPCS fundamentally consists of the antagonist 
elite, the ‘dangerous’ out-groups and ordinary citizens (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). In 
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets, significant quantities appeared from the elements 
discussed above. As a thin ideology (Abromeit, 2017; Mudde, 2007), populism does 
not have roots in any political theory, but it is being used from the far-left to the far-
right and everything between (Aslanidis, 2018). As a right-wing populist (Engesser et 
al., 2017a), Trump also utilized (exclusionary) PPCS in his tweets, and he did it by 
adjusting to the concrete situation(s) or opponent(s). In both periods, he focused mostly 
on vertical populism (Hameleers, 2018) to win against Clinton, who had momentous 
political experience and, additionally, he also responded to the media’s criticism, 
which may have attempted to undermine his power. The circumstances demanded that 
he had to concentrate on his rivals; first, the Democratic candidate to get in charge, 
then the media to maintain the presidency. Donald Trump stressed that his defeat 
brings critical financial problems for the American people because Secretary Clinton 
plans to increase fees. The emphasis of deprivation is another crucial aspect of PPCS 
(Hameleers, 2019), a tool that Donald Trump used to alienate voters from his rival. On 
the other hand, @realDonaldTrump assured his followers that they will have more 
opportunities to work in the country than ever before if they vote for him. 
This thesis also supports the additional reference to Functional Theory, in 
which the authors state that politicians make a serious effort to distinguish themselves 
from opponents and establish preferability by using three types of messages: acclaim, 
attack, and defense (Benoit et al., 2003). After all, @realDonaldTrump most frequently 
emphasized the role of the ‘Enemy’ during the whole period, to make a difference 
between him and his prominent rivals (mostly Hillary Clinton and the media) by 
continually attacking the former and defending by counter-attacks against the latter. 
Moreover, the tactics above might have had forceful impacts on voters, which was 
analyzed by several scholars (Benoit & Dorries, 1996; Benoit & Harthcock, 1999; 
Felknor, 1992; Fisher, 1970; Ryan, 1982). However, Donald Trump tweeted slightly 
more about the ‘Election’ during P1 than P2 about his opponents. In P1, Hillary 
Clinton was the primary target for Trump, and he stressed that the ‘crooked’ cannot 
serve the people of the United States properly. In P2, @realDonaldTrump identified 
the factory-like media as the dishonest, liar enemy, which created fake news about him 
125 
 
to destabilize his administration. The vertical structure of the PPCS did not change in 
P2, nor the number of the ‘Enemy’ topic, but the targeted entity did. The exploitative-
targeting words frequencies decreased in P2 compared to P1 because the political 
campaign’s last stage demanded a higher rate of targeted communication. The 
computer-assisted results showed that the strongest correlation emerged between 
‘Enemy’ and ‘Election,’ and generally, the topic of ‘Election’ gained the most frequent 
co-occurrence with other categories.  
Donald Trump’s PPCS appealed to the people via Twitter, but he rather 
underlined the culprit roles of antagonist entities. As a politically fresh and decent 
person, he was the only candidate among every potential opponent, who was capable 
of draining the swamp and designating the liar media channels, which spread false 
information about him and his legitimate victory. The Republican politician tried to 
win voter’s trust in a straightforward but practical way by contrasting his clean sheet 
in politics to the rigged system’s candidate’s prominent insufficiency, namely that 
‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton was already a failed person.  
Acquiring votes is one thing, but protecting power is another. After Clinton’s 
defeat, according to Trump, the ‘fake news media’ still supported the old-fashioned 
political establishment, but Donald Trump did not hesitate over making American 
people remember that his two essential rivals were dishonest and utterly wrong. In 
contrast, he did not lie to his supporters, and more importantly, he has not made a 
single mistake yet.     
As the computer-assisted method supported, there was a declining frequency of 
PPCS in P2 compared to P1. One possible explanation for this tendency may be that 
even though the frequencies of tweets were almost the same in both periods, the 
dynamics of the situations were different. In P1, there was a significant need to attack 
the prominent person intensively to emphasize that the culprit out-group deprived 
people of the desired prosperity. The emergence of the people and the antagonist actors 
significantly differed in P1 and P2. The campaign made Donald Trump praise the 
people in order to collect electoral votes from the swing states. Moreover, he made a 
clear distinction between Hillary Clinton, other oppositional political leaders, the 
media, and himself to provide the image of a fresh and energetic leader who 
represented the sovereign people’s will (Mudde, 2004). 
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Additionally, he also highlighted one of the vital elements of the PPCS, namely 
stressing the differences between the innocent, suffering people, and the antagonist 
out-group. Trump utilized negative labels first and foremost, to affect citizen’s anger 
and then their fear (Ruzza & Fella, 2011). According to the Republican leader, 
dishonest politicians were supported by the media system. The antagonist elite 
mentioned above destabilized the country, and occasionally the entire world, by 
disregarding their primary task, namely serving the people. This investigation presents 
that the occurrence of people declined significantly in P2 because there was no need 
for collecting votes but maintaining leadership. By stressing the vital role of the corrupt 
media system that produced fake news on Donald Trump, the Republican politician 
suggested implicitly that most of the newspapers and televisions did not inform the 
audience but misguided it.   
 As the results supported, IP dominated Donald Trump’s messages in both 
examined periods. The ratios between the EP and IP did not change significantly in 
the two phases. As a result, Donald Trump’s and his communication team’s strategy 
relied on the idea that one of the core elements of populism had to be emphasized 
intensively. Antagonism and people-centrism define the core idea of populism (Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007), and as the results of this dissertation presented, populist words 
might have magnet EP, but mostly IP, PCS in the analyzed sample.  
The investigation of Donald Trump’s PPCS in the two periods might complete 
international literature. First, as Hameleers et. al (2017) argue that the populist 
discourse and blame attributions attached to affecting fear than anger. Donald Trump’s 
negative labels might dominantly have had an effect on anger; however, he also made 
an effort to influence people’s fear by moderate generalization. Besides this, as 
Aslanidis examines (2018) in his research relying on populist movement’s manifestos 
in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the United States, the political organizations above 
were focusing on primarily people-centrism. Donald Trump utilized a relatively 
balanced PPCS in P1 when he mentioned the two vital elements of populism, but he 
changed the ratio between targeting the culprit out-group(s) and the people by 
increasing the ratio of blame attributions. 
The instances mentioned earlier also supported the adjusting features of the PPCS. 
Donald Trump sought the opportunities to utilize the PPCS against the relevant enemy 
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to acquire and maintain trust and disregard the irrelevant antagonist actor(s) or the 
explicit and direct references to the people at the same time. In a nutshell, the 
circumstances and the actual political situation determined his style. The situation 
changed in Donald Trump’s political career; thus, P2 showed an unbalanced frequency 
between antagonism and people-centrism in favor of the former. The contribution of 
significant adjustments shaped Donald Trump’s PPCS in terms of the usage of EP and 
IP tweets. Persuading dominantly by the utilization of IP tweets was a sufficient factor, 
but direct dichotomies also supported the blame attributions in an easy-to-understand 
way (Tóth & Demeter, 2019). The Republican leader optimized the communication 




6. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT POPULISM IN HILLARY CLINTON’S 
TWEETS IN THE LAST STAGE OF THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN 
The previous chapter attempted to interpret the basic logic behind Donald Trump’s 
PPCS. First, the functions of attacks changed in his tweets; in P1, it was the basic 
feature of depicting Clinton as a ‘failed’ politician, while, in P2, it helped to defend 
himself from the emerging criticism of the ‘fake’ media. Trump utilized anger to 
demonstrate how his opponent disregarded the basic duty of a politician: serving the 
people. On the other hand, mostly in P2, fear referred to hidden dangers that might 
have threatened the United States. One of the most important goals for Trump was to 
differentiate himself from the culprit others. As the explanation of the outcomes 
suggests, Trump and his communication team thought that it was sufficient to focus 
on mostly one element of PPCS, which was the ‘Enemy,’ to acquire and maintain 
power. Whereas P1 was about discrediting the primary foe, in P2, Trump intended to 
protect his credibility by depicting the media as an unscrupulous system.  
The sixth chapter’s goals are threefold. First, it attempts to show that a politician 
who is not considered to be a populist still might employ PPCS. Second, it tries to 
characterize a specific segment of Clinton’s communication strategy: the utilization of 
PPCS against a populist challenger. Finally, this section prepares the thesis for the 
unfolding comparison (see the next main chapter) between the two candidates.        
6.1. Discussion of PPCS in Hillary Clinton’s tweets 
The results supported that Hillary Clinton’s strategy relied on the broadest range of 
human beings, namely the people in her explicit campaign communication in one-third 
of the analyzed tweets. The general references to the citizens appeared in various ways 
like ‘America,’ ‘Americans,’ ‘country,’ ‘men,’ ‘millions,’ and ‘people.’ Similarly to 
populist politicians (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018), the emergence of the 
broadest range of society had the most significant share of Clinton’s tweets. In 
contrast, the Democratic politician’s explicit PPCS still lacked the dominance of the 
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universal group of voters in her tweets as she referred to smaller fragments of the 
nation almost two-third of the relevant results.  
 One might ask how fragmented groups can represent the core feature of 
populism, namely the homogenous masses? An answer to this question might be that 
Hillary Clinton attempted to address specific groups that might have been offended by 
Donald Trump. Therefore, women, Latinos, African Americans, Muslims, war 
veterans, young people, the members of LGBTQ are among the individuals who might 
have had adverse feelings about the Republican candidate. Moreover, when Clinton 
emphasized that Trump used inappropriate and humiliating language, for instance, 
towards women, not only the specific circle above, but their relatives and friends might 
also have been felt insulted. Therefore, these groups and their supportive relatives and 
friends might shape the ‘pure’ majority together, which was offended by Donald 
Trump. In sum, according to Clinton’s tactic, the fragmented groups form one ‘good’ 
mass, which was attacked by the elite. 
6.1.1. Addressing female voters 
Hillary Clinton’s communication strategy relied on a logical theory; first, she tried to 
persuade the most extensive group among fractured circles, namely women. Then she 
focused on other fragmented circles of the nation, which might have supported her. 
One explanation for the constant references to female voters might be that Clinton and 
her communication team realized that Donald Trump’s image was vulnerable in terms 
of his adversary communication on women:  
‘Trump admits he “can’t say” he treats women with respect.’ Date: 2016-09-
30. 
Despite the chance that tweets like above provided an opportunity for attacking 
from one specific direction, Clinton did not highlight the issue above with the most 
dominant frequency in her EP tweets. According to Benoit’s Functional Theory, 
politicians utilize attack to distinguish themselves from their rivals (Benoit et al., 
2003). Indeed, Clinton attempted to put the pressure on Trump, but she also kept the 
distance from him by avoiding the most attractive differences between herself and him, 
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namely highlighting explicitly in the same tweets that she will take care of women 
while the Republican candidate will not.  
 As presented above, the group of women emerged with a considerable share in 
Hillary Clinton’s explicit PPCS; moreover, that circle appeared with the highest 
frequency among specific clusters. Hence, her communication referred to them from 
a complex perspective. First, Clinton highlighted that Trump insulted women by 
making adversary comments on their looks. Second, the Democratic nominee stressed 
that her opponent did not treat women equally compared to men. In other words, 
according to Clinton, Trump (1) did not provide the same salary as he did for his male 
employees, (2) did not intend to give the right to abortion, (3) declared that pregnancy 
was an ‘inconvenience,’ and (4) lacked support for working wives. Finally, as 
Secretary Clinton suggested, Trump aimed to keep women away from the ballots on 
the Election Day.  
It is important to note that Hillary Clinton tended to refer to individual 
precedents that might have supported an opportunity to attack Donald Trump. 
Moreover, she brought into attention the particular instances that could affect female 
voter’s decisions when they chose the next President of the United States. First, the 
topic above can be illustrated briefly by Alicia Machado’s case, and second, it is 
apparent that in the references to the recording in which Trump pointed out that a 
celebrity could abuse his power in terms of taking advantage of women. The 
explanation below introduces the former case first and then proceeds with the latter 
event.  
As presented above, according to Alicia Machado and Hillary Clinton, Donald 
Trump made hostile comments about the former beauty queen’s look. Secretary 
Clinton argued that her opponent talked disrespectfully about Machado when he 
stressed the look of Miss Universe 1996, who allegedly struggled with weight 
problems. Moreover, Machado, who was originated from Venezuela, stated that 
Donald Trump treated and talked about her as a chambermaid or housekeeper because 
of her Hispanic origin (Barbaro & Twohey, 2016). As a consequence, Clinton tweeted 
about the case above as follows:    
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‘To Donald, women like Alicia are only as valuable as his personal opinion 
about their looks.’ Date: 2016-09-30. 
 Despite the appearance of both prominent persons in the tweet above, several 
problems emerged within the practical implementations. First, the tweet suffered from 
severe generalizations and abstraction. The followers need essential background 
information that supports the understanding of the consequences related to the issue 
between Trump and Machado. Second, the lack of explicit-direct characterization and 
explanation might have reduced the chance of endorsement from the people who could 
support a candidate like Clinton to protect the American nation from a man who 
disrespects and disregards women. Third, the Democratic candidate did not clarify the 
meaning of universal references. Alicia Machado fits several groups, which might 
have been felt insulted by Trump and supported by Clinton, such as women who were 
struggling with weight problems, female immigrants originating from Latin-America, 
women who had a Hispanic origin, and former/current celebrities or beauty queens. 
On the one hand, Secretary Clinton tried to keep the targeted group as broad as 
she could by highlighting Machado’s case, on the other hand, neither group might have 
felt emotional commitment because the lack of exact and explicit explanation did not 
support their personal engagement. Additionally, the abstract form of Clinton’s 
discourse disregarded one of the vital elements of PPCS, namely the blame feature 
(Hameleers et al., 2018; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016; Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). She 
did not label Trump with any negative attribute; and consequently, she missed the 
chance for controlling the voter’s mind on the case above but let her Twitter followers 
interpret the tweet freely.  
 The subsequent tweet in which Clinton might have emphasized the 
dichotomies between women and Trump applied the PPCS in a specific way. However, 
it still disregarded the fundamental pieces of information to make people avoid corrupt 
political challengers and choose the other candidate who represented a reliable way of 
life by her decent behavior. As Clinton reminded her followers:  
‘Donald Trump may lie, but the tape doesn’t.’ Date: 2016-09-29. 
 The Democratic candidate referred to the ‘Access Hollywood’ scandal in 
which Donald Trump spoke in a hostile, sexist, and humiliating way about women 
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(Blumell, 2019). As scholars note, the scandal was so powerful that Trump lost 2.9 
million popular votes because of the recording during the last phase of the campaign 
(Benoit, 2017). In the tweet above, Secretary Clinton put the pressure on Trump but 
did not introduce and characterize the circumstances. A couple of days before the 
second debate between Clinton and Trump, the Washington Post shared a video of the 
former businessman in which he had an extremely adversary and shaming 
conversation about women (Benoit, 2017). Despite the attacking tone, Hillary Clinton 
did not specify exactly the name or the issue of the tape to activate her followers. 
Neither the object(s) of the lie nor the content of the recording emerged in the tweet. 
Even though Secretary Clinton attempted to characterize herself as a politician who 
takes care of the women in the United States, she still did not contradict Trump’s ‘lie.’ 
Although one opposition (Trump versus the recording) occurred in the message 
mentioned above, Clinton avoided the direct comparison between the Republican 
politician and herself. 
Additionally, she disregarded the emphasis on the peculiar situation of women. 
Consequently, Clinton did not take notice of drawing a possible hostile picture of 
women’s future if the presidential outcome turns to Trump’s favor. Besides, her tweet 
lacked the alternative in which she assures people that an insult-driven man like Trump 
will never be in charge of the United States. 
6.1.2. War veterans and the case of Humayun Khan 
Similar to the specific group of women, there was a vital precedent in which Hillary 
Clinton attempted to mix her communication strategy up to depict Trump as a hostile, 
exclusionary, and self-interested man. In her tweets referring to military soldiers, 
Clinton focused on implementing the topics of Muslims, war, individual tragedies, 
Trump’s adversary communication, blame, incapability in leadership, and the 
Republican nominee’s xenophobia in the same category. However, first, she claimed: 
‘Not one living president has said they believe Donald Trump has what it takes 




 One possible explanation of the references to the former President’s opinion 
might have been that they acted like reliable pundits about military issues; therefore, 
they could decide as experienced ex-leaders whether Trump fitted to be the primary 
leader of the national army. The incapability of being the Supreme Commander of the 
military characterized Trump as a person who could not provide security for the troops. 
Moreover, he might put the lives of American soldiers in danger by his inexperience 
in military issues. Nevertheless, Clinton suggested implicitly that Donald Trump will 
make decisions on American privates’ lives, but he is incapable of making the right 
calls because he has no idea about leading or at least managing one of the biggest 
armies in the world.   
 There were similarities between Clinton’s tweets in which specific groups of 
women or veterans emerged. Likewise, the Democratic nominee chooses again an 
individual case that might magnet topics like xenophobia and the ban of Muslims 
combined with the subgroup of military soldiers. Hillary Clinton explicitly noted: 
‘We can never forget how Trump disrespects our military families, like the 
Khans.’ Date: 2016-10-27. 
In the tweet above, Clinton wrote about an American soldier, namely Humayun 
Khan (Williams, 2016), who had died at a car bombing attack in the Iraqi war in 2004. 
Khan, who was born in the United Arab Emirates to Pakistani parents, fought in the 
U.S. army. In 2016, his father, Khizr Khan, spoke at the 2016 Democratic National 
Convention and condemned the Republican candidate who formerly had promised 
strict policies and bans that might have adverse and exclusionist effects on Muslims. 
In other words, the Democratic politician argued that Trump treated Muslims as 
outsiders and referred to them as ‘enemies’ (Braunstein, 2019) by emphasizing his 
exclusionist oaths (Hameleers, 2018). Clinton attacked her challenger by applying an 
attractive dichotomy fitting the PPCS. She referred to the Khans as a one-of-our 
family, stressing that they were equal members of American society. 
Moreover, she spotlighted that Trump’s promises were morally and ethically 
disrespectful. Despite his Muslim origin, Humayun Khan was a war hero of the United 
States, whose family was severely damaged by their son’s death. Besides this, 
according to Clinton, Trump still did not take into account the Khan’s sacrifice because 
he kept stressing his xenophobic way of communication in his campaign. The EP tweet 
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above still lacked the cause or the explanation of the disrespectful behavior of Trump; 
however, it brought attention to the fundamental dichotomies between the two vital 
entities in populism by referring to the antagonist, intolerant, and challenger political 
elite and the suffering people.          
6.1.3. Taking into account the ethnic minorities 
As the analysis supported, quotes from ordinary people appeared in Hillary Clinton’s 
tweets. However, this topic lacked a re-current particular example in which common 
persons, or in other words ordinary citizens, continuously and persistently represented 
a specific division of the United States. Nevertheless, Hillary Clinton suggested that 
her opponent’s companies made bad decisions against isolated minorities like African 
Americans and Latinos. As Secretary Clinton pointed out:   
‘FACT: Donald Trump’s company systematically denied housing to people of 
color dating back to the 1960s and 70s.’ Date: 2016-10-25. 
 
Even though Clinton highlighted that minorities had no chance to live in houses 
and flats constructed and operated by the Republican candidate’s corporations, she did 
not immediately focus on Donald Trump. Indeed, the tweet above fitted the 
fundamental dichotomy of populism (Aslanidis, 2018) in which huge masses were 
suffering from the elite’s exploitation. On the contrary, the main antagonist actor of 
the tweet mentioned above was not Donald Trump but his companies. In this case, the 
message above relied on economic populism or in other words on ‘antieconomic elites 
populism’ (Hameleers, 2018, p. 2175) demonstrating the profit-maximizing entities 
role (Rooduijn, 2018) who threaten the hard-working citizens’ vital interest (Ramiro, 
2016), namely to provide or rent real estate in which they can live. However, there was 
another further aspect of the PPCS above, which was the racist perspective. Clinton 
stated that Trump’s companies consequently disregarded minorities claims for 
accommodation. Again, the Democratic nominee lacked the emphasis of Trump’s 
distracting promises or possible harmful policy in the future, and she referred to him 
as a real estate mogul but not a politician who might abuse power if he wins the election 
against the favor of isolated ethnic minorities.  
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On the other hand, Clinton drew attention to the exclusionist PPCS as it referred 
to Latinos emerging in Donald Trump’s communication:  
‘When pressed about Trump insulting and demonizing Latinos and immigrants, 
Mike Pence had a...telling response.’ Date: 2016-10-05. 
 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, in his live speeches Donald Trump 
often promised that he would deport illegal immigrants who exploit the United States’ 
financial support, risk national security, and sell drugs nationwide (Hooghe & 
Dassonneville, 2018). Indeed, he suggested that most of the illegal immigrants come 
from the South, and if they cross the border, they threaten the ordinary people’s 
everyday lives. Therefore, Trump promised one of the most prominent physical 
obstacles in United States history (Klingner, 2018) to avoid the danger and stop ‘evil’ 
people, namely with the ‘badly needed wall.’ However, Hillary Clinton brought 
attention to her rival’s adverse attitude which insulted people with Latin-American 
origins; she still missed putting the pressure on the Republican challenger by 
characterizing and rejecting Trump’s stereotypical, fear-driven communication on 
specific minorities. Instead, she brought into play Mike Pence but lacked at least a 
minimal definition of his antagonist role. Even through the explicit form of PPCS, 
Clinton did not introduce how or why Trump humiliated Latino immigrants. She 
disregarded explanation or the denial of the Republican candidate’s theory referring to 
health care in which he stressed that illegal immigrants, especially Latinos, crush the 
financial support of the American industry. She neither protected the demonized 
minorities who were mostly people in need nor rejected Trump’s allegations, which 
suggested an extended stereotypical picture of Latinos related to drug-dealing and 
seeking financial support. Moreover, according to Trump, illegal immigrants kept the 
United States’ economy in a stagnant position by exploiting the system.          
6.1.4. The missing populist communicational tools in Clinton’s tweets 
As researchers argue, relying on emotions, especially on anger and fear 
(Hameleers et al., 2017) is a vital tool of the populist’s campaign PCS: ‘Scholars have 
shown that emotionally charged frames, such as those promoting fear and moral 
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judgment, have a high degree of salience and tend to be more stable over the campaign 
period... (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 1598).’ Although Clinton criticized Trump, 
she avoided the possible ingredients of PPCS, namely verbal radicalism (Sinha, 2018) 
and vulgarism (Mastropaolo, 2008), two features that might have supported PPCS to 
reach ordinary people (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). She did not utilize basic, taboo-
breaking, and simple labels that might influence the citizens emotions either (Bos et 
al., 2011). In contrast, Donald Trump referred to Clinton as a ‘crooked’ person in his 
campaign who was too dishonest to be the next President of the United States. 
Notwithstanding, Clinton suggested in her IP tweets that voters should choose a 
predictable, politically correct leader instead of ‘fear’ and ‘anger.’ Although she 
commented on the emotions above, which are essential parts of PPCS (Caiani & 
Graziano, 2016), she still kept the distance from them, and moreover, she did not 
emphasize often and explicitly the terrifying nature of her opponent. 
As presented in the former chapters, based on the Populist Dictionary, there 
were significant portions of adversary words that might have functioned as negative 
labels pinned to Donald Trump in Hillary Clinton’s Twitter communication. In 
contrast, words that might have fitted the blaming and direct PPCS like ‘bad,’ ‘cheat,’ 
‘cheater,’ ‘corrupt,’ ‘evil,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘liar,’ ‘lie,’ ‘lies,’ ‘racist,’ ‘sexist,’ and ‘stupid’ did 
not reach the minimum criteria of the Populist Dictionary (share of 0.06% equals the 
frequency of 8) or were absent from the entire database. Words that might have 
functioned as essential labels (Ribera Payá, 2019) in PPCS  like ‘corrupt’ and ‘liar’ 
did not even occur in the Democratic politician’s tweets. Interestingly, based on the 
quantitative analysis, the frequency of ‘lied’ was ten, but Secretary Clinton did not 
target Donald Trump with significant dominance as she blamed Mike Pence in forty 
percentages of the relevant messages.   
The results supported that even though Clinton blamed her opponent, 
vulgarism and negative emotions were still lacking in her tweets to keep a significant 
distance from Donald Trump. As a result, she attempted to communicate as an expert 
in politics (Demeter, 2017). As such, Clinton demonstrated the incapability and 
inexpertness of Donald Trump. Notwithstanding, Clinton did not explain briefly why 
her rival was unfit to be the next President of the United States to persuade people that 
she could be the one and only candidate for the Presidency. In sum, the Democratic 
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Politician was capable of adjusting in some ways to the primary, antagonistic, and 
populist opponent, but avoided becoming an entirely populist communicator. On the 
one hand, Clinton indicated that she was ready to fight; on the other, she kept the 
distance from her challenger in terms of making severe impressions on feelings and 
emotions by hate speeches (in this case, hate tweets) and pinning negative labels to 
Trump. The essential function of attacking, which was distinguishing herself from 
Trump (Benoit & Harthcock, 1999), prevailed in Secretary Clinton’s tweets, but it was 
not used as an exploiting way of communication. 
6.1.5. Suggested exclusionism 
It is essential to mention that Hillary did not use a language relying on 
ostracizing others (Mudde, 2004), but she brought attention to the exclusionist 
discourse in which Donald Trump wanted to ban specific groups like Latinos and 
Muslims from the United States. In her tweets, Hillary Clinton did not focus on the 
disqualification of isolated minorities but claimed that her opponent had severe plans 
about bans and deportations related to immigrants, Muslims, refugees, or any foreign 
people who were in need and sought for a better life in the United States. In other 
words, the Democratic candidate suggested that Trump was the one who wanted to 
deprive people of the chance to provide acceptable circumstances for themselves and 
their families. As international scholars argue, horizontal exclusionist populism relies 
on stressing the threatening image of immigrants (Oesch, 2008), a menacing phantom 
that manifests in dangerous out-groups putting at risk the inhabitant’s prosperity, 
culture, and physical security altogether (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Moreover, 
indirect ostracizing also appeared in Secretary Clinton’s tweets but again, in a specific 
way. She suggested that Trump desired that women, young people, African 
Americans, and the members of LGBTQ ignore voting and not participate in the 
election.  
Therefore, the exclusionist way of communication showed up as a phenomenon 
that was not part of the Democratic nominee’s tweets, but she highlighted that it played 
a crucial role in her opponent’s PPCS. Additionally, the harmful promises of Trump 
might manifest one day in the ruling practices. Notwithstanding, as the lack of 
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exclusionist PPCS showed, Hillary Clinton’s tweets suggested that there was one 
prominent person who should have been excluded from politics in the United States, 
namely Donald Trump, who was incapable of serving the Nation as a President, as a 
Commander-in-Chief, and as a diplomat. After the consideration of the horizontal 
exclusionist PPCS, there was a possibility to think about Clinton’s implicit and hidden 
suggestion as a vertical exclusionist communicational tactic. Despite the lack of 
explicit references to the disqualification of Donald Trump for running for the 
presidency, Secretary Clinton might have made voters feel that the Republican 
nominee should not have had any role in American politics. In other words, the man 
who opposed the opportunity for a better life by strict and severe regulations, was a 
dangerous entity attacking democracy and the people. As such, Clinton implicitly 
proposed that he should never be part of history as a decision-maker to prevent harmful 
consequences for people. 
6.1.6. The first and foremost task: balancing 
Based on the results, a balanced communicational strategy emerged in the 
portions of IP, EP, and NS. The dynamic of the campaign demanded unbalanced PPCS 
in terms of the dominance of specific groups in EP messages and the antagonist 
actor(s) in IP tweets. As international scholars argue: ‘To be more effective, therefore, 
political appeals must take into account the potential heterogeneity of their recipients, 
the more diverse an audience, the more likely it is that speakers will rely on inclusive 
and widely accessible messaging’ (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 1598). In this light, 
one possible explanation appears that might show how Clinton realized that she had to 
persuade distinct circles like women, African Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and 
veterans to vote for her because Trump insulted them verbally with his adversary style. 
On the other hand, Clinton endeavored to adjust to Donald Trump in terms of 
stressing the pivotal role of the dangerous political rival. In IP tweets, the antagonist 
perspective dominated the messages to keep voters remembering that the Republican 
candidate had no applicable programs but hate that separates the nation. Of course, the 
ability to keep the range of her voters as broad as it was possible seemed to be useful. 
However, it implemented the risk of not delivering specific messages with significant 
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frequencies. In other words, in the situation mentioned above, the effectiveness was at 
risk, because the more fragmented subgroups the political agent targets, the more 
divided and complex their communication might become. Therefore, the messages, in 
this case, the tweets, did not show a universal strategy, especially not in terms of PPCS, 
so the broadest group, in other words, the people, might have not perceived the 
concerns of the candidate intensively. As a result, the persuasive nature of tweets was 
not straightforward, clear, and emotion-based in Secretary Clinton’s messages. One of 
the main problems with Hillary Clinton’s universally balanced communicational 
strategy might have been that she attempted to reach and influence as many people as 
she could by utilizing simultaneously broad and fragmented discourse to target the 
ordinary citizens and isolated minorities.  
Similarly to populists, Hillary Clinton blamed her political rival in her tweets 
(Bracciale & Martella, 2017) by stressing Trump’s incapability of being the President 
of the United States. The Democratic politician made an effort to highlight that Trump 
had no experience in leading; therefore, he cannot be a successful President, but a 
dangerous and an unpredictable one. As such, he might ruin the American economy, 
and consequently, the ordinary, hard-working citizen’s lives. Moreover, the 
Republican politician lacked the proper attitude of a diplomat because his style was 
disrespectful and impolite. As a result, Clinton suggested both in explicit and implicit 
ways, that the approach discussed above might put the United States into a dangerous 
position in terms of diplomacy at an international level because Trump might insult 
foreign politicians. Consequently, insulted politicians will avoid co-operation in the 
future.   
The results supported that the utilization of the PPCS was balanced in Hillary 
Clinton’s tweets because she attacked her rival, but on the other hand, she made an 
effort to exploit Trump’s attacks that referred not to herself but specific groups. Along 
with this, Clinton employed one of the vital ingredients of PPCS, namely blaming, but 
she disregarded another essential element of populism, which is horizontal exclusionist 
PCS. One critical explanation might be that she intended to acquire votes from the 
fragmented groups by the emphasis of Trump’s exclusionist populist style, namely 
insulting minorities and promising strict bans against them. Clinton and her 
communicational team perceived that minorities like African Americans and Latinos 
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or extracted groups like veterans might vote for the Democratic leader if she persuaded 
them of the severe consequences that might appear in their lives if Trump’s ‘insult-
driven campaign’ was a successful one. Therefore, Clinton did not attack isolated 
people but appealed to them and tried to widen the distance between them and their 
primary antagonist enemy, namely the xenophobic, Islamophobic, egoistically self-
interested, Republican nominee.  
6.1.7. The lack of minimal explanations 
On the one hand, Hillary Clinton used the vital elements of the PPCS; on the 
other, she did not exploit the extra possibilities of it to discredit Trump’s campaign. 
For instance, the Democratic candidate attempted to characterize her Republican 
challenger negatively. Similarly to most of the leaders who utilize the PPCS, she 
blamed her rival,  (Laclau, 2005a) but did not focus on straightforward clarification 
and simplification (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). Secretary Clinton stressed that her 
opponent was a rebelling person who would not accept the outcome of the elections if 
he lost. In that sense, according to Clinton, Donald Trump was dangerous for the 
United States’ liberal democracy (Mudde, 2017), however, specific explanations were 
still absent in the tweets. Hence, Clinton’s followers could not realize what 
consequences might occur if the Republican politician wins the election. 
Simplification, which is a core part of the PPCS, did not emerge in the explanation of 
the exact threat that Donald Trump represented for the nation. Despite the lack of 
precise interpretations regarding of the Republican politician and his allies’ harmful 
activities, a specific exception emerged, namely, tax issues. According to Clinton, 
Trump’s possible tax scandals had a severe effect on hard-working citizens welfare:  
‘Millions of Americans work hard and pay their taxes. So why doesn’t Donald 
Trump pay his?’ Date: 2016-10-03. 
As the example presents above, the direct and explicit tone highlighted the 
illegal advantages that made Trump look like a dishonest man, who avoided standard 
taxes; fees that help to improve the United States’ public services. In that case, Clinton 
blamed Trump’s business issues; therefore, the Republican candidate was not 
mentioned as a politician but as a person who exploited his economic position 
141 
 
(Hameleers, 2018) and broke the law. Moreover, the Democratic nominee brought 
attention to another severe case that might ruin ordinary people’s lives, namely tax 
cuts in favor of the wealthiest minorities while simultaneously increasing fees, which 
will be apparent for the middle-class.  
One might say that the 140-character-limit prevented Clinton from tweeting in 
an explanatory and comparative way. As the fictive tweet below illustrates both 
elements above might be presented, even in a PPCS:  
‘As a President, Trump won’t support but despise working wives. He never 
helped them. I will provide tax cuts for working mothers.’  
The fictive tweet above consists of 129 characters, including spaces. It is 
important to mention at this point that Twitter counts spaces as characters (Storm). 
Despite the strict character limit, the fictive tweet stresses the fundamental dichotomy 
between the antagonist political elite and one of the broadest groups of citizens. In 
addition, it blames the prominent politician, introduces what he did in the past, and it 
suggests emerging problems in the future. In contrast, it promises to support the 
specific group; moreover, it gives a choice between the self-interested elite and the 
other political force which takes care of people. 
6.2. Neutral sentences 
Even though this part of the analysis focused primarily on the explicitness and 
implicitness of Hillary Clinton’s PPCS via Twitter, a summary of Neutral Sentences 
was also provided. The dissertation was not explicitly designed to evaluate specific 
factors related to tweets in which words from the Populist Dictionary appeared but 
lacked the populist contexts. Although, in this scrutiny, a mixed-method examination 
supported the results, the discussions, and the conclusions, this subchapter lacked a 
detailed, in-depth explanation. As such, these limitations mean that findings related to 
NS need to be interpreted cautiously. Therefore, the quantitative aspect emerged at a 
minimal level, but qualitative observations occurred in this phase of the dissertation. 
The lack of multiple verifications signified the findings below in this subchapter as 
supportive but not reliable at a high level.  
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 The quantitative examination provided 67 agreements and, consequently, four 
disagreements which emerged in the analyzed tweets related to NS. The possible 
patterns in NS are threefold. First, Clinton tried to persuade people that she wanted to 
be the President of every American citizen. Along with this, the Democratic candidate 
emphasized that she would serve specific subgroups if she won the election:  
‘I really want to be president for all of the kids in America, to do everything I 
can to help you.–Hillary in Pittsburgh.’ Date: 2016-10-22. 
First, persuasion is a vital element of campaign communication (Baumgartner & 
Morris, 2010), so Clinton focused on ensuring voters about her concerns related to 
them. There was a comparable pattern between tweets in which EP or IP appeared and 
the messages in which they were absent. The similarity relied on the strategy 
characterizing Clinton’s effort in other persuasive as broad circles, including specific 
subgroups, as it was possible. Although the Democratic leader communicated that she 
wanted to be the President of every American, she targeted circles like women, parents, 
young people, and the ‘middle class.’ Clinton’s tweets suggested that she tried to affect 
the voter’s emotions by emphasizing positive messages (Compton & Hoffman, 2019) 
and her concerns for them to provide a humble character of herself, namely a servant 
who supports ordinary people’s lives. Also, the Democratic politician assured her 
followers that she would never abandon them. 
Second, similarly to Trump, mobilization of the masses took place in the tweets 
that consisted of populist-like words but disregarded PPCS. The main focus of the 
mobilization was to make people vote on Election Day. Secretary Clinton tweeted as 
it follows: 
‘Are you ready to vote tomorrow, Michigan? Are you ready to help get your 
friends to vote?–Hillary’ Date: 2016-11-07. 
Mobilization is also an essential part of campaign communication; making 
people remember what their decisions at the ballot is about (Lahusen, 1996), probably 
on the most important day of the United States every four years, a vital topic to 
emphasize. To take advantage of Donald Trump, the Democratic nominee encouraged 
her followers to activate their friends on the day of the election. Hillary Clinton might 
have trusted her follower’s supportive attitude, and she might have predicted that the 
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more citizens who vote on Election Day, the more votes she acquires. Indeed, as the 
results of the 2016 Presidential Election showed, Secretary Clinton gained 2,868,686 
more popular votes than Donald Trump did; however, she collected only 227 electoral 
votes while her rival reached 304 (Sides et al., 2017). 
Finally, a modest irony and sarcasm appeared in specific NS in which Secretary 
Clinton tried to make fun of her opponent:  
‘I’ve had to listen to Donald Trump for 3 full debates I have now stood next to 
Donald Trump longer than any of his campaign managers.’ Date: 2016-10-21. 
As international research shows, the utilization of political irony is an applicable 
asset in PPCS, even via Twitter (Pal et al., 2017). The Democratic nominee suggested 
that campaign experts could not work with Trump. There could be different reasons 
for the rapid changes in Trump’s communication staff. For instance, the aggressive 
attitude of the Republican politician, the lack of co-operation, or the stubborn form of 
decision-making might have been among the causes that supported Clinton’s implicit 
suggestion. Although Hillary Clinton tweeted about the internal problems and chaos 
within the Team Trump, she did not implement any (hidden) references to ordinary 
people, and therefore, the tweets with similar suggestions lacked the PPCS. Despite 
the missing dichotomies, the Democratic leader still suggested that Donald Trump was 
imperfect in co-operating. This might be a critical problem if he wins the election and 
becomes the President of the United States because leaders should work together with 
experts or other colleagues to make successful decisions for the nation.     
6.3. Limitations  
This section had some limitations that need to be considered. First, the investigation 
did not provide a comprehensive analysis of Hillary Clinton’s PPCS via social sites 
because the scrutiny examined her tweets only. To present more detailed research, 
further data from different sources like Facebook and Instagram should be part of 
distant research. Second, this section of the thesis only focused on texts written by 
Secretary Clinton but disregarded her re-tweets, pictures, videos, and shared 
hyperlinks. Hence, further investigation is required regarding the contents above to 
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provide an in-depth analysis. Third, the bigger the examined sample, the more detailed 
results can be provided. Therefore, a re-analysis with a higher random sample might 
support more profound outcomes. Finally, despite the relatively high intercoder 
reliability, human coding procedures in social sciences have only a supportive nature 
(Aslanidis, 2018) because different codebooks, divergent interpretations of the coders, 
and deviating training time might severely influence the results, and consequently, the 
conclusions.  
6.4. Conclusion of Chapter 6 – A non-populist female politician’s effort on 
implementing populist political communication style 
Scholars point out and mostly accept that the text-based contextual analysis is the core 
element of measuring populism (Aslanidis, 2018). As such, several scientific studies 
emerged that focused on the measurements of populist communication style in the 
contemporary years (Aslanidis, 2018; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Bracciale & 
Martella, 2017; Pauwels, 2011; Ribera Payá, 2019; Tóth et al., 2019; van Kessel & 
Castelein, 2016).  
The research field of populism already started to focus on female politicians 
such as Marine Le Pen, Pia Kjærsgaard, and Siv Jensen (Geva, 2020; Meret et al., 
2017). All of them have been the leaders of populist parties: Le Pen in France (National 
Rally), Kjærsgaard in Denmark (Danish People’s Party), and Jensen in Norway 
(Progress Party). As scholars point out: ‘Their media strategy is often characterised by 
counterbalancing the image of strong authoritarian female leaders who might estrange 
voters with an alternative image: by presenting themselves as the loving mother and 
caring housewife (Kjærsgaard), the self-made woman (Jensen) or stressing that they 
belong to a new and younger entrepreneurial generation (Le Pen), these women have 
successfully followed decades of male-dominated leadership without dramatic 
changes in political profile and form’ (Meret et al., 2017, p. 144). In contrast, Clinton 
tried to seem like an expert who intended to care about fragmented groups, mostly 
women. Similar to Clinton, the three leaders above also focused on women’s situations 
but from different perspectives: Kjærsgaard and Jensen claimed that Nordic countries 
accomplished gender equality; therefore, there is no need to focus on that anymore. 
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On the other hand, Le Pen used the topic of gender to criticize French politicians, who, 
according to her, marginalize differences between males and females (Meret et al., 
2017). As this scrutiny supports, Clinton attempted to appeal to female voters, because 
they might have felt insulted by Trump’s hostile expressions and disrespectful style. 
She also suggested that Trump will not support women with his discriminating 
policies. In contrast, there were essential and straightforward explanations by which 
Clinton could have attacked Trump which were mostly absent in the analyzed sample.         
The investigation of Hillary Clinton’s campaign communication from the 
perspective of PPCS emerged relatively rarely in the research field above. Therefore, 
the thesis attempted to provide this chapter to support analyses referring to populism 
from a new perspective and supplied a comparative approach below. According to 
international researchers, both candidates’ campaigns were populists, but Secretary 
Clinton’s PPCS was not as intensive as Trump’s (Nai & Maier, 2018). Scientists point 
out that blaming the antagonistic political opponent is a vital communication tool in 
PPCS (Hameleers, 2018; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). As the 
results support, Hillary Clinton utilized attacks against Donald Trump to make a clear 
distinction between herself and the Republican candidate (Benoit et al., 2003). 
However, the Democratic leader could not blame Trump by exploiting the antagonist 
role of the challenger political elite (Mudde, 2004) because the Republican nominee 
had no history in politics at all. In her tweets, Clinton used PPCS by referring to the 
broadest range of the nation, namely the people (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), 
and made an effort to gain significant support from specific groups that might reject 
Trump’s ‘insult-driven’ campaign like women, African Americans, Latinos, Muslims, 
and veterans.  
Despite the balanced structure of the blaming tweets, Clinton did not aim to 
focus primarily on why the fragmented groups should have avoided voting for her rival 
in her EP messages. Nevertheless, she highlighted implicitly the threat that Trump and 
Mike Pence represented. Although the emphasis of the two critical factors in populist 
thin ideology (Mudde, 2004), and the utilization of PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 
2017), Secretary Clinton brought attention to clear explanations neither directly nor 
indirectly. Moreover, direct comparisons between the two politicians occurred 
insignificantly. Besides this, blaming lost its fundamental goal by disregarding simple 
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answers, and the influence of people’s anger and fear. In other words, Clinton utilized 
PPCS, but she was not a populist politician because her communication did not rely 
overly on emotions like fear (Jerit, 2004) and anger (Hameleers et al., 2017), but 
instead on balance between addressing people and stressing the adversary style and 
inexperience of her rival. Consequently, Secretary Clinton chose neither the universal 
persuading nor the cruel blaming form of communication in her IP messages while she 
lacked the comparison between herself and Trump in the EP tweets to make people 
vote for her. Hence, her campaign via Twitter became a well-structured, fragmented 
communicational strategy, but not a straightforward, simple chain of messages in 
which the voters could perceive a clear alternative represented by her compared to 




7. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DONALD TRUMP’S AND 
HILLARY CLINTON’S EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT PPCS IN THE 
CAMPAIGN  
The former chapter concluded that Secretary Clinton employed individual instances to 
present how severely specific groups might suffer if Trump wins the elections. As a 
result, she does not utilize exclusionist PPCS. However, she suggested implicitly that 
her rival was the only person who should be excluded from leading. Balancing the 
frames within tweets depicted Clinton as an expert who did not want to play a vulgar 
blame-game. On the other hand, behaving like an expert might have created an impact 
of being less passionate on specific issues, thus the distance between Clinton and 
uncertain voters might have become greater (Meyer, 2017). She also disregarded 
simple explanations in her messages by which Trump’s harmful features and 
incapability could have been demonstrated. In sum, Clinton intended to keep a 
considerable distance from the Republican politician.  
This part of the thesis provides a vital comparison between Donald Trump’s and 
Hillary Clinton’s PPCS from the perspectives of EP, IP, and NS tweets. In order to 
analyze the possible differences or similarities between the two politician’s Twitter 
communications, the following examination proceeds from the overall results to the 
specific outcomes.  
Before comparison starts, there is a need for an important note. One might ask 
why this dissertation lacks the examination of Hillary Clinton’s tweets in P2. The 
answer is twofold: first, the doctoral thesis intends to focus primarily on Donald 
Trump’s PPCS. In this analysis, multiple methods were utilized to provide 
comparative aspects. Modifications within a specific politician’s communication (van 
Kessel & Castelein, 2016) and adjusting to the prominent opponent’s messages might 
present supportive results if someone intends to employ an in-depth analysis. Even 
though the dissertation has several limitations, multiple comparisons emerged in this 
work to characterize the contexts of EP and IP tweets in the communication of both 
leaders. Second, after the defeat in the Presidential Election, Hillary Clinton tweeted 
merely 75 times in P2. Hence, the sample size referring to the Democratic Politician’s 
tweets was too small for contributing a comprehensive examination.  
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The main chapters already provided the essential results and the possible 
interpretations referring to the two politicians. Hence, this section does not present the 
results again but characterizes the emerging differences and similarities between their 
PPCS below. 
7.1. The discussion of the universal patterns   
There were several differences and only very few similarities between Donald 
Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s PPCS via Twitter in P1. The analysis presents the 
former, and then it brings forth the latter. 
 First, Donald Trump utilized IP with a significantly higher frequency than 
Hillary Clinton did. The weighted results (dividing by 2.11) also supported the 
dominance of implicit PPCS in Trump’s tweets compared to his opponent. Whereas 
the Republican candidate used IP 158 times, the Democratic nominee applied it 27 
occasions if one employs the weighted outcomes. Consequently, Trump made an extra 
effort to emphasize the suggested PPCS compared to Clinton in P1. The Republican 
leader presented a much more intensive communication in terms of blame attributions 
or appealing to the people in the campaign period.  
 The proportions of explicit PPCS between the two were almost the same in the 
campaign, but the weighted results supported that Donald Trump stressed the direct 
dichotomy between political rivals and the people on increased occasions. Even 
though Hillary Clinton still attempted to persuade people about Trump’s incapability 
of being the President of the United States by highlighting the spectacular elements of 
PPCS. Despite the critical emergence of EP tweets in Clinton’s tweets, the 
explanations were missing from her messages. The followers did not know why 
Donald Trump would be a threat to American democracy (Demeter, 2017); however, 
the Democratic candidate declared that the former celebrity was the most dangerous 
person for the inhabitants and the world’s future.  
 Both politicians utilized Neutral Sentences in which populist words appeared, 
but Clinton’s communication mostly relied on the NS. In contrast, Trump used NS 
tweets with a lower frequency compared to EP or IP messages. The results supported 
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the dominance of Hillary Clinton’s NS tweets over Trump’s neutral messages. The 
key outcomes presented that the Democratic nominee employed NS 67 times while 
her opponent delivered it 40 occasions in P1. Yet, as the weighted results showed, 
Clinton’s NS tweets had a frequency of 31.75.  
 Consequently, both leaders pledged all of the possible perspectives in terms of 
utilizing populist words (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). Trump and his 
communicational team assumed that the usage of unbalanced blaming attributions 
might be sufficient to defeat Clinton. The oppositional side focused on a balanced 
strategy to keep the follower group as broad as it is possible. Although Secretary 
Clinton endeavored to make people remember that they should not vote for Trump, 
she still attempted to keep a considerable distance between herself and the Republican 
nominee (Demeter, 2017) by focusing mostly on the neutral messages. Moreover, the 
portion of Clinton’s populist tweets was significantly lower than Trump’s. Compared 
with Hillary Clinton’s communicational patterns in terms of PPCS, Donald Trump’s 
populist messages relied on an unbalanced strategy by utilizing IP with a dominant 
and significant frequency. The contribution of an unbalanced PPCS assisted as a 
communicational asset, which by targeting one essential element of populism, namely 
either people-centrism or antagonism (Canovan, 2002), appeared in order to praise 
people and attack the enemy in separated contexts. 
 The similarity between the two politician’s EP and IP tweets referred to the 
primary opponent. Both candidates paid attention to each other during the campaign 
period. Hence, the blame features were connected mainly to each other to stress the 
harmful effects of the corrupt establishment and the lack of experience to lead the 
United States.  
7.2. Antagonism 
As mentioned above, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton referred to each other as the 
most dishonest and dangerous people whose primary goal was to proceed with the 
harmful policies of the current administration (Ribera Payá, 2019) or acquire the power 
to construct a new, intolerant, ruling elite. On the one hand, the Republican leader 
targeted Clinton by the emphasis of the disregarding attitude represented by the 
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Democratic candidate. In other words, according to Trump, Secretary Clinton did not 
serve the people but abused power. On the other hand, Clinton brought attention to her 
rival’s xenophobic, excluding promises by which only the wealthiest elite would 
realize a substantial profit, but the people in need, including the middle-class, would 
suffer from the poor decisions of Donald Trump. 
 First, even though Donald Trump primarily attacked the Democratic candidate, 
he still mentioned other culprit out-groups that might deprive people of the jobs, 
prosperity, and safety (Hameleers, 2018). Second, the Republican leader blamed 
Barack Obama for creating a healthcare plan that provided a severe cut to the American 
economy; therefore, the nation had no opportunity to ‘Make America Great Again.’ 
Third, Trump drew attention to the political allies of the two mentioned above. 
According to the Republican politician, the Democrats were also interested in 
maintaining the power to proceed with their dishonest policies. Therefore, Donald 
Trump highlighted the oppositional party’s role in depriving the hard-working citizens 
of the chance to earn wealth. Fourth, the misleading media (Pauwels, 2014) also helped 
them by spreading false allegations about the Republican nominee and being friendly 
and tolerant with the culprit political elite. Fifth, antagonist countries like Mexico and 
China realized a massive profit on trade deficits, so the people of the United States did 
not have a real chance for the reconstruction of the glorious past. However, the citizens 
worked hard and attended to labor if they had proper jobs. Yet, the jobs within the 
country are ceased by other foreign lands exploiting interests. Finally, terrorists and 
dangerous organizations supplied by criminal activities meant to be a severe threat to 
the nation: they killed people because of their radicalized perspectives or sold drugs 
and weapons nationwide. 
 Compared to Donald Trump’s antagonist PPCS, Hillary Clinton focused on 
only two enemies. The first is Donald Trump, whose campaign, according to Clinton, 
was based on hate. The second is Mike Pence, who ‘lies’ to people in the campaign to 
support the populist Republican candidate. The emphasis of the vice-presidential 
nominee’s lying attitude was also part of the Democratic candidate’s antagonist tweets 
in which she made an effort to bring attention to the two oppositional politician’s 
dishonesty. Moreover, she suggested a dilemma in which a relevant question might 
have arisen implicitly: Why does Mike Pence support such an untalented person in 
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politics like Donald Trump? Hence, another question might appear: Does Pence or his 
allies somehow benefit from the support of Trump, whether they win the elections or 
not? Nevertheless, Clinton did not answer the questions. Moreover, and most 
importantly, she suggested the issues in a hidden away, but she lacked the possible 
answers and references to them.   
7.3. Negative labels 
Negative labels that might have affected anger and fear (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) also 
occurred in both politician’s PPCS in P1, but Donald Trump utilized them with 
significantly higher frequency. He highlighted his opponent’s dishonesty and, 
additionally, stressed that the United States needs a new political establishment by 
tweeting the hashtag ‘#DrainTheSwamp.’ In contrast, Clinton brought attention to the 
Republican leader’s lies and declared that Donald Trump had to be stopped.  
 There might be a couple of reasons why Donald Trump attacked (Benoit & 
Harthcock, 1999) his opponent more intensively by the usage of harmful labels. First, 
he intended to differentiate himself from the culprit political elite with moral reasoning 
(Mudde, 2017). Therefore, he did not avoid utilizing the negative labels related to 
Clinton. The more Trump tweeted about Secretary Clinton in an adversary way (van 
Kessel & Castelein, 2016), the more dynamic his tweets seemed to be. Besides this, he 
acted as a person who unmasked the corrupt elite’s faults (Bonikowski & Gidron, 
2016) and dishonesty. The Democratic candidate also utilized negative labels, but 
according to the computer-assisted results, she did not attach them directly to Trump 
predominantly. Therefore, Secretary Clinton seemed like a person who suggested the 
incorrectness of her rival but failed to expose it by pinning the appropriate blame 
attributions (Hameleers et al., 2017) to the Republican politician.  
 Based on the supportive outcomes, two different perspectives emerged in 
negative labels that might be considerable elements of blame attribution. The first was 
Donald Trump’s tactics by which the new challenger attempted to make people 
identify Hillary Clinton as a dishonest and failed politician who should have been not 
being trusted anymore. The second was Hillary Clinton’s perspective, which made an 
effort to resist Trump’s political goal, namely becoming a President. Hence, Clinton 
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avoided the severe affecting on anger and fear but suggested that the man whose policy 
is based on the two above emotions was not fit for the presidency.  
7.4. People-centrism 
As the results of this dissertation supported, both candidates employed different means 
of praising the people (Aslanidis, 2018). Donald Trump focused on the broadest group 
of the citizens, but he also appealed to states and cities in his tweets. He lacked the 
care of isolated minorities as Hillary Clinton did; however, he practically attempted to 
win swing states. Secretary Clinton tried to acquire the trust of people who might have 
been felt verbally insulted by Donald Trump. As a result, the Democratic nominee 
stressed the role of women, young people, veterans, Muslims, African Americans, 
Latinos, and other isolated minorities (Nai & Maier, 2018) to collect as many votes 
from the specific circles above as she could.  
 Although Hillary Clinton did not provide the emphasis of particular states as 
intensively as her rival did, she still focused on three specific territories, namely 
Carolina, Florida, and Ohio. Interestingly, the states mentioned above also appeared 
in the Republican candidate’s tweets. One possible explanation might be that the three 
peculiar territories were swing states (Kenski & Kenski, 2017) in which extra electoral 
votes could have been acquired for both politicians. Therefore, both nominees focused 
on them, but there was only one absolute winner of the former land’s electoral votes, 
namely Donald Trump. By winning the territories in question, he collected 71 electoral 
votes, including the states of North and South Carolina.    
 If one takes into account the cumulative results, it is apparent that Donald 
Trump appealed to every people in his PPCS (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) 
and also in his Neutral Sentences while Clinton focused on the fragmented groups. The 
Republican politician did not intend to divide the nation into large groups when he 
appealed to the citizens, whereas Clinton highlighted the vital role of specific smaller 
groups. According to Trump, there was only one essential contrast between the people 
of the United States, namely the ‘blameless’ ordinary citizens and the ‘corrupt’ 
political elite (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) supported by the media (Van Aelst 
et al., 2017). 
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 As Trump suggested, mostly implicitly, dishonest politicians controlled the 
innocent people by utilizing the misleading media system. No one but Trump intended 
to serve the inhabitants, who did not deprive them of jobs but provided a chance to 
earn money. Trump made an effort to characterize himself as a businessman who cared 
about people by hiring them while his opponent had not done anything for the people 
for decades but let large corporations leave the country and let countries like Mexico 
and China realize a massive profit on the companies that abandoned the United States.        
7.5. Conclusion of Chapter 7 – Similarities and differences between the two 
candidates’ populist political communication style  
The international literature supported that the new and inexperienced challengers in 
politics tend to utilize PPCS more intensively than experienced incumbents in the 
United States presidential campaigns (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). Republicans tend 
to go negative with higher frequency than Democrats because GOP agents are more 
inclined to use strategic attacks (Nai, 2018b). Due to the comparison, this study 
suggests that Donald Trump fitted the categories above. As the comparative 
interpretation of the two candidates’ PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 2017) supported, 
Donald Trump was the person who utilized EP and IP messages more intensively than 
Hillary Clinton. However, both politicians employed tweets with a minimal definition 
of PPCS: appealing to the people directly or in an abstract way. Still, the aggregated 
portion of IP dominated the analyzed database. Trump and his strategists might have 
trusted in the ‘demobilization hypotheses’ that connects to attacking the opponent 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). In other words, he employed more negative labels to 
attack his rival for ‘reducing the probability of voting for the target (as intended) but 
also for the sponsor, and indirectly by lowering political efficacy and trust’ (Nai, 
2018b, p. 2). 
 As the results supported, both candidates focused primarily on each other by 
highlighting antagonism. Trump completed his antagonist and adversary language 
with several culprit out-groups (Oesch, 2008), while Clinton only brought attention to 
Mike Pence’s dishonesty. The negative labels functioned as direct, explicit, and close 
characterizations in the Republican leader’s tweets. In contrast, the Democratic 
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nominee attempted to make people remember the most vital task in referring to Trump  
(Nai & Maier, 2018), which was stopping him in order to avoid a man’s universal 
decisions whose promises were based on hate.  
 The exclusionist attitude, which is a typical feature of right-wing populists 
(Tóth et al., 2019), was a remarkable part of Trump’s PPCS in which the Republican 
challenger declared that dangerous out-groups must be banned to protect the 
homeland. Clinton did not focus on exclusionism except in one perspective that 
suggested avoiding Trump’s presidency. In other words, Secretary Clinton emphasized 
that Donald Trump must be rejected because he had no experience in politics. 
Therefore, according to Clinton, Trump was not a cautious man in terms of making 
difficult decisions. Moreover, he had nothing to offer but the increase of the wealthiest 
economic elite’s financial income (Rooduijn, 2018). Finally, as Clinton suggests, the 
Republican candidate did not care about women, young people, isolated groups, and 
minorities but insulted them verbally.  
 Appealing to the people occurred in both analyses; however, the nominees had 
different aspects of praising them. Donald Trump made an effort to persuade the 
broadest group of citizens, whereas the aggregated results referring to Clinton’s tweets 
presented that the Democratic politician endeavored to collect support from the voters 
who might have felt insulted by the Republican challenger (Wang et al., 2016). 
Although both politicians attempted to employ different strategies to persuade the 
people, they also sought the opportunity to win swing states but with deviating 
frequencies. Donald Trump focused more on the states mentioned above than his 
opponent, and finally, he collected enough electoral votes to defeat Clinton by earning 
the crucial battleground states trust.     
 Even though both candidates utilized the PPCS (Bracciale & Martella, 2017) 
in P1, Donald Trump was the one who used it intensively. The two nominees 
interpreted the communication style above differently. As a result, Donald Trump’s 
strategy was based on a direct, clear, easy-to-understand, and targeting style while 
Hillary Clinton used balanced language in which she did not communicate 
consequently. The former adjusted to the actual political situation, and for that reason, 
he lacked the balanced way of utilizing EP, IP, and NS. The latter implemented the 
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elements of PPCS but avoided using them as intensively as her exploitative rival did 
during the last months of the 2016 Presidential Elections in the United States.     
 The most differing tactics in the two rivals PPCS might have been their 
grassroots in the emerging contrasts among Trump’s and Clinton’s supporters. Oliver 
and Rahn suggested in their study (2016), that the majority of Clinton’s supporters 
embraced asylum seekers or immigrants, while Trump’s were frightened of them. 
Clinton’s vast supporters did not see conspiracies, while Trump’s did. The former 
politician’s supporters were optimistic about their financial status; the latter were 
rather pessimistic about that issue (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Trump’s PPCS was adjusted 
to his supporters in a straightforward way: he focused on the individual elements of 
PPCS almost equally in his IP messages in a dual aspect. He attempted to keep the 
voter’s range as broad as possible to gain more votes from the swing states but targeted 
the primary foe in a concrete way. In contrast, Clinton did not choose the ‘appropriate’ 
PPCS when she attacked Trump. She provided abstract antagonism instead of simple 
dichotomies and failed to emphasize the differences between herself and Trump to 
persuade voters in crucial swing states.  
 A relevant question might arise at this point. What is the difference between 
politicians who utilize PPCS to some degree like Clinton, and political agents who are 
considered to be populists like Trump? First, according to the supportive results of the 
thesis, the Democrat candidate did not implement adversary style based on 
exclusionism, welfare state chauvinism, and in-group superiority (Hameleers, 2018), 
while the right-wing populist Republican nominee used the features above. Second, 
there were significant differences between the two politician’s main promises and their 
planned regulations. Whereas Clinton had only one populist-like promise related to 
resisting the Republicans’ attack on Obamacare, Trump had several promises against 
antagonist agents who were responsible for the crisis within the United States. 
Consequently, he wanted to make Mexico pay for the wall on the southern border, 
reconsider ‘the deal with Iran,’ banning Muslims (temporarily) from the country, 
imposing tariffs on China and Mexico, replacing Obamacare, and bombing ISIS 
(Collingwood et al., 2018; Qiu, 2016). Third, it is important to consider whether the 
politician in question tries to ratify their promises, which might fit the PPCS, by bills 
and regulations. Trump had several attempts based on his populist promises, such as 
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(1) suspending specific Muslim-majority nations’ citizens entry into the United States, 
(2) reversing China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, (3) replacing 
Obamacare, and (4) establishing new immigration control to hire American workers 
instead of cheap, foreign laborers.24 In other words, besides the promises relying on 
PPCS, the intention and attempts on regulations by which populist promises can be 
fulfilled are features that might help to differentiate between candidates who use the 
style above only for rhetorical purposes and politicians in charge who make an effort 
to apply their promises into the legislation. Finally, populists try to create solid 
relationships between other populist leaders; therefore, they do not criticize each other 
for making remarkable restrictions on ‘liberal democracy,’ while specific politicians 
who solely use PPCS to some degree, stand against autocracy and illiberal democracy. 
It is important to note that the degree of PPCS, the portion of promises, the number of 
attempts that imply populist policies, ratified regulations, praising populist leaders, 
and restrictions on liberal democracies’ elements are perceivable, and most of times, 
measurable features. Therefore, there is an opportunity, even if it is a limited one, to 
differentiate political agents who utilize only PPCS, from populists who intend to 
launch their promises by legislation.     
 
24 The list is non-exhaustive. 
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8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS: THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF 
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT POPULIST POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION STYLE IN FURTHER ANALYSES 
The chapter above supported that Trump referred to the people consistently in a 
universal way, while Clinton attempted to gain votes from specific groups who might 
have felt insulted by the Republican nominee. Clinton kept a distance from Trump, 
while the latter differentiated himself from the Democratic candidate on a moral basis 
(Mudde, 2017). Clinton balanced her EP-IP PCS, while Trump employed mostly IP in 
the last phase of the campaign. Both politicians primarily attacked the other in tweets 
where antagonism was apparent. However, Clinton added only one specific foe to her 
tweets, namely Mike Pence, while Trump focused on several failed, fake and 
dangerous villains. The final conclusion of the thesis sums up the most significant 
findings of the dissertation in the following paragraphs.   
As the literature review of this dissertation supported, the minimal definition of 
populism relied on appealing to people and the emphasis of the antagonist out-groups 
(Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004). In other words, according to international 
experts, there is no PPCS without the homogenous masses (Canovan, 2002). The 
scholars who examine populism also argue that almost every politician utilizes the 
PPCS to some degree, whether the politician is populist or not (Aslanidis, 2018). 
Moreover, Aslanidis argues (2018) that PPCS cannot be understood only from the 
perspective of direct ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies because different languages and 
contexts might refer to hidden populist messages. Therefore, as this thesis suggests, IP 
can also be part of PPCS, but there is a need for concealed or imagined antagonist 
agents in the coding units. In line with the literature, the mere mentioning of the people 
is not a sufficient tool in several contexts of IP. Tweets in which showing gratitude 
and mobilizing the voters emerged might lack the suggested antagonism. Again, it is 
essential to note that the core concept of populism relies together on people-centrism 
and antagonism (Abromeit, 2017). As a result, the tweets in which the politicians refer 
to citizens but disregard the proposal of hidden entity are not parts of IP. 
In contrast, tweets that consist solely of blaming the culprit out-groups 
(Hameleers et al., 2018), which might threaten the people’s interests, fit the category 
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above. Blame attributions referring to politicians, parties, and the media might 
function as tools that help politicians to differentiate (Benoit & Harthcock, 1999) and 
defend themselves. However, blaming also suggests that the corrupt elite should serve 
the people instead of exploiting them by their false policies and misinformation. 
 In contemporary years, scholars have struggled with analyzing PPCS by 
employing quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods (Aslanidis, 2018; Bonikowski 
& Gidron, 2016; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Ribera Payá, 2019; Tóth et al., 2019). As previous research presented, there is no 
perfect procedure by which PPCS can be measured with complete reliability and 
validation (Aslanidis, 2018). Nevertheless, the idea of employing EP and IP might 
provide a new opportunity to weight the expected results more precisely. 
Unfortunately, perfect reliability and validation cannot be contributed by the method 
above, but there is an opportunity to test the formula again, whether it can provide 
more reliable and valid results. As this examination supports, there is a higher chance 
to present a relatively universal characterization of EP than IP. Besides, based on the 
contexts and the political situations, the sole explicit emphasis of the enemy or the 
people can also vary. Therefore, to characterize IP, researchers must be aware of the 
above sufficient factors to provide an in-depth analysis. 
 The dissertation aimed to create a feasible concept of measuring the PPCS to 
move forward and sharpen the mixed-method analysis of the examined phenomenon. 
Further tests and utilizations of EP and IP are needed for validating the possible 
reliability of the outcomes in future studies which focus on the analysis of PPCS. The 
method and concept utilized in this work have their limitations, but there is always an 
opportunity to reconsider and refine the current methodological approach to provide 
accurate, detailed, and supportive concepts of EP and IP for the sake of further 
examinations in the relevant research field.  
 The results of the dissertation supported some remarkable patterns related to 
Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s PPCS. As presented above, both leaders utilized 
EP and IP. The latter dominated the Republican leader’s communication in both 
periods. Even though international scholars do not refer to Hillary Clinton as a populist 
politician, she still utilized EP and IP with proportionate shares in the investigated 
tweets. After all, if one takes into account the aggregated amounts of the two concepts 
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above, and focuses on the populist-like-words, it is apparent that she employed more 
populist messages than neutral expressions in the campaign stage. However, the 
separated findings related to the three categories supported that NS appeared with the 
highest frequency compared to EP or IP in Clintons tweets.  
 In contrast, Donald Trump’s PPCS was more intensive than his rival’s. In other 
words, the Republican politician targeted his opponent by precisely utilized negative 
labels in P1. As the computer-assisted method supported, the adversary 
characterizations were attached carefully to Hillary Clinton from Trump’s aspect, 
while the Democratic candidate occasionally completed her tweets with direct and 
explicit negative labels to keep a moral distance from her rude opponent. 
 In the campaign period, Donald Trump attacked the culprit out-groups to 
differentiate himself from the dishonest and dangerous others, mostly by utilizing 
tweets that might have affected voter’s anger. The position of Trump changed after the 
victory, so the primary antagonist enemy and the function of the attacks also had to be 
modified. In the second examined phase, Trump targeted the media to defend himself 
from the false allegations spread by television channels and newspapers, which 
supported the oppositional, corrupt politicians. Donald Trump utilized IP dominantly 
to stress that none of his enemies worked appropriately for the country. In other words, 
according to the Republican leader’s suggestions, the culprit out-groups were not only 
his, but the people’s enemies. According to Trump, the antagonist out-groups 
disregarded the ordinary citizens desire, namely acquiring prosperity and being safe. 
The new challenger in American politics sent three pivotal messages to the people by 
utilizing IP on the antagonist entities. First, the culprit elite deprived the ‘blameless’ 
people of prosperity and fair provision of information. Second, the elite’s harmful 
activity had consequences that risk the nation’s security. Finally, according to Donald 
Trump, only he listened to the nation’s voice and wanted to serve the people honestly 
to ‘Make America Great Again.’ 
EP and IP might be a useful method in order to support further textual analyses. 
To achieve analytical precision and comprehensive findings, several coding units 
encompassing the PPCS are given careful scrutiny (Aslanidis, 2018): 
i) The sentence in which specific populist words appear, 
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ii) The sentences before and after the central sentence (i.e., the coding unit 
where the particular terms occur),  
iii) The paragraphs containing populist expressions. 
As such, there might be three different coding units: a micro-contextualized, a 
macro-contextualized, and an uncontextualized one. One of the future core aims is to 
measure to what extent political agents utilize EP or IP in the micro-contextualized, 
macro-contextualized, and uncontextualized method. As Aslanidis argues (2018) in 
his methodological overview, quantitative research on populism can be divided into 
three categories: dictionary-based analysis, holistic grading and traditional thematic 
text scrutiny. Every method might have different types of coding units; therefore, all 
of the methods above have their limitations. This research method attempts to provide 
three different coding units to reduce the limitations that can emerge from one specific 
coding unit. Whilst there is no perfect method in textual analysis that might produce 
results without limitations, this approach aims to avoid as many limitations as possible 
to provide an in-depth research. The multiple levels of coding units examined in future 
studies might also supply new perspectives that allow the research community to more 
clearly see how PPCS operates to capture media and follower attention while 
reinforcing the social narratives that bind followers to leaders by clearly demarcating 
in-group and outgroup members and threats. In this way, the subsequent research 
which utilize the specific concept above should yield new insight that produces a more 
complete understanding of the potency of populism in today’s volatile political 
climate.   
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Table 10. Tweets from Hillary Clinton’s campaign. The analysis of EP, Implicit 
Populism and Neutral Sentences 
1. Today, let’s show the world that love will always trump hate. 
2. If you believe we should never write discrimination into our laws...you’ve got to vote!–
Hillary 
3. It s not just my name or Donald Trump s name on the ballot it s the kind of country we 
want. Hillary 
4. We don’t want to shrink the vision of this country. We want to keep expanding it.–
Hillary’ 
5. I am betting that tomorrow, you will reject fear, and you’ll choose hope.–@POTUS’ 
6. Every single one of us has something to contribute to this great country.–Hillary 
7. Are you ready to vote tomorrow, Michigan? Are you ready to help get your friends to 
vote?–Hillary 
8. "Women’s rights are human rights" and 132 more reasons Hillary should be our next 
president. 
9. What’s really on the ballot is what kind of country we want for our children and 
grandchildren.–Hillary 
10. We should all be grateful that this remarkable family decided to make America their 
home.–Hillary on the Khan family’ 
11. My son was Captain Humayun Khan ... and he was a Muslim American. I want to ask 
Mr. Trump: Would my son have a place in your America? 
12. America is great because America is good, and if we lift each other up, instead of tearing 
each other down, we can be even greater. 
13. I love our country, and I believe in our people, and I will never, ever quit on you. No 
matter what.–Hillary in Ohio’ 
14. ‘We are better than bigotry, fear, and hate. Share this if you agree. 
15. Five women older than their right to vote share why they’re with Hillary: 
16. Donald, you don’t want to go there.–Hillary on Trump asking what she’s done for the 
past 30 years 
17. If you believe in a better, stronger, fairer America: Vote. 
18. Trump wants to give the biggest tax breaks in history to the super-wealthy and raise 
taxes on the middle class. We can’t afford that. 
19. If you elect me on Tuesday, that’s the kind of president I will be: listening, working, 
finding common ground. 
20. "I’m also honored to have the greatest temperament that anybody has." – Donald Trump 
About that: 
21. More than 31 million Americans have already voted. Be a part of this: 
22. Everything I’ve done started by listening to people working to bring people together, to 
find common ground.–Hillary in North Carolina’ 
23. Donald – his father Fred – and their entire company were sued by @TheJusticeDept for 
discriminating against African Americans and Latinos.’ 
24. The reporter and I have the same condition. When Mr. Trump made fun of him, that hurt 
my feelings." 
25. About half of the people he wants to deport they’ve paid more taxes than Donald Trump 
has paid.–Hillary in Arizona’ 
26. I will do my best to bring people together, not pull them apart...let’s make sure we win 
on Tuesday and prove that love trumps hate. 
27. Imagine that it’s January 20, 2017. Ask yourself, what will life be like for you under 
President Trump? 
28. She believes we can summon what’s best in each of us and make this country better for 
all of us.–@POTUS on Hillary’ 
29. This guy is temperamentally unfit to be Commander-in-Chief and he’s not equipped to 
be president.–@POTUS on Trump in North Carolina 
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30. Watch live: @POTUS hits the trail for Hillary in North Carolina with just 6 days to go . 
31. Most of us learned by elementary school that it’s not OK to insult people’s looks. Donald 
calls women fat, ugly, and disgusting. 
32. I’m reaching out to Republicans and Independents as well as Democrats because I want 
to be president for all Americans.–Hillary’ 
33. There are a lot of reasons to vote against Donald Trump. Maybe, for you, it’s his 
dangerous statements about using nuclear weapons. 
34. It’s really clear that he does not respect women. He just judges us on our looks.–
@MachadoOficial on Trump’ 
35. Donald Trump’s equal pay plan for women: "You’re gonna make the same if you do as 
good a job." 
36. With just 8 days left, this can’t wait. RT if you agree Trump should immediately disclose 
all of his ties and connections to Russia. 
37. When it comes to handling a crisis, we’ve seen in this campaign, Donald Trump loses his 
cool at the slightest provocation.–Hillary’ 
38. Dozens of former nuclear launch officers agree: "Donald Trump should never be in 
charge of America’s nuclear weapons." 
39. Trump’s already threatened our national security. That’ll be the tip of the iceberg if he 
becomes president. 
40. As secretary of state, Hillary restored our reputation around the world and made us safer. 
41. "Most of them deserved it." —Donald Trump 
42. If you’re voting for Hillary, don’t stop there. We need to support Democrats down the 
ticket. Here’s why: 
43. Trump has a history of boasting about his donations to charity and little history of 
seriously donating to charity 
44. With just 10 days until Election Day, Hillary is on the trail in Florida.Watch live: 
45. While Trump is making an unprecedented attack on democracy, millions of Americans 
are voting. Join them 
46. Trump’s campaign strategy: Get women to stay home. Get young people to stay 
home.Get people of color to stay home. 
47. More than 16.5 million people have already voted in this election.–Hillary Join them: 
48. Glad to hear @mike_pence, his staff, Secret Service, and the crew are all safe. -H 
49. We can never forget how Trump disrespects our military families, like the Khans. 
50. Would my son have a place in your America?" —Khizr Khan, father of a fallen 
American hero, to Donald Trump 
51. Trump said he’s "very proud to lead the birther movement to discredit @POTUS." 
Here’s how he spread the racist lie: 
52. More than 10,000,000 Americans have already voted in this election.You can make it 
10,000,001: 
53. More than 10 million people have already voted in this election and two million of them 
are right here in Florida. 
54. Donald Trump is unqualified to be Commander-in-Chief. A president doesn’t call our 
military a total disaster 
55. As Trump makes an unprecedented attack on our democracy, millions of people are 
registering and voting early. 
56. FACT: Donald Trump’s company systematically denied housing to people of color 
dating back to the 1960s and 70s. 
57. "My name is Mae Wiggins. I was denied an apartment in the Trump buildings based on 
the color of my skin." 
58. Get this, Donald: Nasty women are tough.Nasty women are smart. And nasty women 
vote. 
59. If Donald Trump condones discrimination against his own employees, how would he 
lead our country? 
60. Last night, Trump called a military effort to push terrorists out of Mosul a total 
disaster.That’s dangerous. 
61. While Donald Trump is assaulting our democracy, millions of people are standing up for 
it registering, voting early, and volunteering. 
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62. Donald Trump refused to say that he’d respect the results of this election.That’s a direct 
threat to our democracy. 
63. The game is rigged for guys like Donald Trump. I say, it’s time to fight back! 
64. Donald Trump says he’d deport 16 million people. How do you even begin to quantify 
that? 
65. I really want to be president for all of the kids in America, to do everything I can to help 
you.–Hillary in Pittsburgh’ 
66. When the middle class thrives, America thrives.–Hillary in Cleveland 
67. Donald Trump refused to say that he’d respect the results of this election. By doing that, 
he’s threatening our democracy. 
68. Want to know if Donald Trump is lying? Just Google it. 
69. I’ve had to listen to Donald Trump for 3 full debates I have now stood next to Donald 
Trump longer than any of his campaign managers. 
70. Hillary has comprehensive policies to help people. Her opponent has tweets.You 
decide.–@FLOTUS 
71. "He thinks we should be afraid of our Muslim brothers and sisters because he has no idea 
who they really are." –@FLOTUS on Trump 
72. Donald Trump doesn’t have anything to offer but anger, and grievance, and blame.–
@POTUS 
73. At last night’s debate, Trump showed again and again that he doesn’t have a clue about 
what makes America great. 
74. Show Trump his tweets come at a cost because Hillary supporters are pledging to donate 
every time he tweets: 
75. Donald Trump wants to compare his last 30 years with Hillary’s. Let’s do that. 
76. Nobody respects women more than me." – Donald Trump earlier tonight"Such a nasty 
woman." – Donald Trump just now #DebateNight’ 
77. Trump on losing the Emmy tonight: "I should’ve won." #DebateNightTrump on losing 
the Emmy in 2012, 2013, and 2014 
78. Here’s how Trump reacts when he loses an Emmy, the Iowa caucus, a primary, and 
polls. So yeah, he seems fit for the presidency. 
79. In 2011, Hillary advised @POTUS on the mission to take out bin Laden. Trump was on 
the Apprentice. 
80. We are not going to build a wall and deport 16 million people. That’s not happening. 
#DebateNight" 
81. Trump doesn’t know what he’s talking about when it comes to women’s health. He 
shouldn’t be making the decisions. #DebateNight" 
82. Maybe there’s a reason Donald Trump refuses to release a real plan to combat ISIS. 
#Debate 
83. Donald Trump is good at one thing—driving his companies into the ground. And now he 
wants the keys to the U.S. economy. 
84. Automatically donate every time Trump tweets something offensive with our new tool: 
85. We make our country greater when we widen the circle of opportunity and invite more 
people in: 
86. It is our obligation as Americans to dig deep in doing whatever we can to build the kind 
of future we want for ourselves—and our children. 
87. He may be up at 3am, but it’s because he’s tweeting insults at somebody who got under 
his skin.@POTUS on Trump 
88. She’s in the arena for you, fighting every day to make sure everybody gets a fair shake. 
@POTUS on Hillar 
89. Hillary Clinton has never quit on anything in her life. @FLOTUS 
90. Hillary Clinton has the potential to be an excellent president of the United States. 
91. If Trump wants to compare what he and Hillary have done for the last 30 years, by all 
means: 
92. The violence transgender Americans face—particularly transgender women of color—is 
a rebuke to all of us. We have to do better. 




94. Every single American deserves full equality under our laws no matter who you are or 
who you love. #NationalComingOutDay 
95. Trump is the worst major-party candidate this republic has ever produced. 
96. @ForeignPolicy has never endorsed a candidate for political office. Until now: 
97. Never heard of a “blue collar worker” losing nearly $1 billion in a year and cheating 
hundreds of other workers in the process. 
98. We’re going to make public colleges like Wayne State tuition-free for working families.–
Hillary in Detroit 
99. If Trump wants to make America great again, he should start by buying American steel 
for his construction projects. 
100. Last night, Donald Trump spent his time attacking when he should have been 
apologizing. - Hillary’ 
101. Ryan is still endorsing Trump. 
102. If Trump stands by what he said about women as “locker room talk,” he’s clearly not 
sorry. 
103. Many people are saying Donald Trump doesn’t have the discipline, temperament, or 
vision to be president. #debate" 
104. "I will be a president for all of the people." – Donald Trump* *Except women, people 
of color, LGBT people, Muslims... #Debate’ 
105. Trump would give millionaires (like him) and billionaires the biggest tax cuts they’ve 
ever had. #Debate 
106. Donald always takes care of Donald and people like Donald. #Debate 
107. Our vision for America is a country where everyone has a place, including, of course, 
Muslim Americans. #Debate 
108. The vast majority of Muslim Americans want to help fight terrorism. We are not at war 
with Islam. Trump is playing into terrorists’ hands. 
109. Trump owes President Obama an apology for his years-long racist conspiracy. And by 
the way: "Sorry if you were offended" doesn’t count. 
110. Trump has said that the video doesn’t represent who he is. Anyone who heard it knows 
it’s exactly who he is.But that’s not who we are. 
111. Chip in to help make sure Donald Trump never becomes president: 
112. It should concern every American that Russia is willing to engage in such hostile acts in 
order to help Donald Trump become president. 
113. Women have the power to stop Trump 
114. To everyone in the path of Hurricane Matthew: Stay safe, and know that America is 
with you. 
115. Even Mike Pence can’t defend Donald Trump’s insult-driven campaign. 
116. The many, many lies Mike Pence told at last night’s debate. 
117. If we had a dollar for every time Mike Pence lied last night, well... 
118. Great move by Chobani. Every parent deserves access to paid family leave. 
119. When pressed about Trump insulting and demonizing Latinos and immigrants, Mike 
Pence had a...telling response 
120. When pressed about Trump insulting and demonizing Latinos and immigrants, Mike 
Pence had a...telling response. 
121. Can [Pence] look back on the debate as a success after he repeatedly lied in order to run 
interference for Trump?" 
122. It’s unclear exactly whom Mike Pence was defending last night, but it sure wasn’t 
Donald Trump. The @NYTimes: 
123. "We trust American women." - @TimKaine on a woman’s right to abortion. 
124. Mr. Pence simply ignored the Donald Trump we have seen on the trail for more than a 
year.@NYTimes 
125. In Mike Pence’s defense, we wouldn’t want to defend Donald Trump, either. 
#VPDebate 
126. At the #VPDebate, Mike Pence tried really, really hard to deny pretty much everything 
Donald Trump has said and done. Let’s replay the tape: 
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127. Seems like Pence forgot a lot of the things Trump has been saying throughout his 
campaign! Here to help: #VPDebate 
128. We trust American women." Thank you, @TimKaine. #VPDebate’ 
129. The Trump Foundation has spent "virtually every cent on charitable causes." —Mike 
Pence #VPDebate 
130. Tim Kaine is right: We should stop praising Putin. #VPDebate 
131. Mike Pence claiming that Trump supports our troops and veterans when he insults them 
and probably doesn’t pay taxes is laughable. #VPDebate" 
132. Wonder if Trump has shown Pence his "secret plan" to defeat ISIS. We’re still waiting. 
#VPDebate 
133. Yes, Trump and Pence are running an insult-driven campaign.Donald’s literally doing it 
right now. #VPDebate 
134. @timkaine just reminded Mike Pence of the bigoted things Trump has said about 
millions of Americans – and Pence couldn’t defend it. #VPDebate" 
135. When Mike Pence says he and Donald Trump won’t raise taxes, he’s lying. 
#VPDebate" 
136. Reminder: Donald Trump may not have paid any federal income taxes for 18 years, but 
wants to give his family a $4 billion tax cut. #VPDebate’ 
137. If you can’t spot the difference between Pence and Trump on their disastrous economic 
plans, it’s because there isn’t 
138. "I can’t imagine how Governor Pence can defend the insult-driven, selfish, me-first 
style of Donald Trump." –TimKaine #VPDebate’ 
139. Thanks for the kind words, Mike. #VPDebate 
140. Tonight, Mike Pence is going to prove he’s got Trump’s back no matter what. Follow 
@TheBriefing2016to hold him accountable. #VPDebate 
141. Number of times Trump has tweeted at @Rosie: 65Number of times Trump has 
tweeted in support of Mike Pence, his running mate: 21 #VPDebate’ 
142. TimKaine’s spent his whole life fighting for working families, so I have no doubt he’ll 
do the same tonight. Go get ‘em, Tim. -H 
143. If Trump’s decisiveness in choosing Mike Pence as his running mate is any indication, 
he’ll be great at making hard decisions as president. 
144. Mike Pence has actually signed into law hateful policies like those touted by Donald 
Trump 
145. Before Mike Pence takes the debate stage to defend his running mate, remember the 
time Trump couldn’t decide whether he wanted him at all. 
146. Post-traumatic stress isn’t something strong people can handle & weak people can’t. 
Trump’s comments aren’t just ignorant, they’re harmful. 
147. I learned that preparation is important.–Hillary on what she learned by debating Donald 
Trump 
148. He was a failure at business and by wrecking his business, he wrecked the lives of his 
workers. – Hillary on Trump 
149. @TimKaine is going to finish this campaign the same way he started his career – 
fighting for working families. 
150. Our veterans and military families deserve better than what Donald Trump says about 
them 
151. Tim is a good man. He’s a true progressive. And he will make a great vice president." – 
@POTUS on @TimKaine 
152. Tonight, Mike Pence will either have to leave Trump out to dry or try to justify the 
things they both believe. #VPDebateNight 
153. Under Hillary’s plan, if your family earns $125,000 or less, you’ll be able to go to a 
public college tuition-free. 
154. Imagine Donald Trump’s most hateful rhetoric signed into law. Mike Pence’s record 
shows that it could happen. 
155. A person who implies that veterans suffering from PTS are not "strong" is unfit to be 
Commander-in-Chief. Period 
156. We both believe every child should have the chance to live up to his or her God-given 
potential–Hillary on LeBron 
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157. Trump’s child care "plan" is really just a tax cut for the wealthy while giving working 
families almost nothing 
158. ‘Trump’s campaign is bragging that not paying taxes makes him a "genius." What kind 
of genius loses $1 billion in a single year?’ 
159. It doesn’t look like he paid a dime of federal income tax for almost two decades.–
Hillary on Trump’ 
160. Millions of Americans work hard and pay their taxes. So why doesn’t Donald Trump 
pay his? 
161. In one week, Trump has: Lost a debate - Attacked a woman at 5 am on Twitter - Had 
his net worth downgraded and more: 
162. It would be reckless not to consider the damage Mr. Trump might wreak.@ 
WashingtonPost: 
163. Trump apparently got to avoid paying taxes for nearly two decades while tens of 
millions of working families paid. 
164. Hillary teamed up with @BernieSanders on a plan to make college debt-free for all 
Americans. 
165. Too many talented young people pass up on programs like @Peacecorps because of 
student loans. Let’s use GOOD JUDGMENT & lighten that burden. 
166. Trump stood on a debate stage and lied to millions of Americans.Chip in to make sure 
he never becomes president: 
167. Make sure @realDonaldTrump’s bullying never reaches the White House. Chip in now: 
168. Trump admits he "can’t say" he treats women with respect. 
169. Trump stood up at his convention and described a hopeless, broken nation – one that in 
no way resembles the strong, vibrant America we know. 
170. While Donald continues day 5 of his Machado meltdown, we’ll be in Florida talking 
about national service. You’ll want to watch. 
171. Trump on equal pay: "Do as good a job" as men. Abortion? Should be 
"punished."Pregnancy? An "inconvenience." Wives working?  "Dangerous."‘ 
172. ‘To Donald, women like Alicia are only as valuable as his personal opinion about their 
looks 
173. Alicia deserves praise for courageously standing up to Trump’s attacks. And he has the 
gall to blame her – and say he "helped"?’ 
174. Trump "can run his campaign however he chooses...I’m going to keep talking about the 
stakes in this election. 
175. Trump appears to have broken the law and acted against our nation’s interest, all so he 
could line his own pockets. 
176. Let’s make college tuition-free for any family whose income is $125,000 or less and 
debt-free for everyone. 
177. Donald Trump may lie, but the tape doesn’t. 
178. We should make public colleges tuition-free for working families and debt-free for 
everyone. 
179. Trump’s plan:Cut taxes for billionaires & millionaires like him. Raise taxes for millions 
of middle-class families. 
180. In its 120-year history, @azcentral has never endorsed a Democratic.Here’s why the 
paper just endorsed Hillary: 
181. When Donald Trump goes low...register to vote: 
182. I love this country. I’m proud of this country. I want to be a leader who brings people 
together. – Hillary #LoveTrumpsHate’ 
183. We don’t want to turn against each other. We want to work with one another. We want 
to set big goals in this country. #StrongerTogether’ 
184. One candidate made it clear he wasn’t prepared for last night’s debate. The other made 
it clear she’s prepared to be president. 
185. I’m really glad my dad never had a contract with Donald Trump.– Hillary 
186. Hillary was the winner of the first presidential debate – and newspapers across America 
agree. #SheWon 
187. Let me tell you who built this damn country: the middle class. @JoeBiden Let’s keep 
building it, together: 
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188. Trump on Alicia, 1996: "Miss Piggy."This morning: "She gained a massive amount of 
weight...it was a real problem." 
189. "Maybe he didn’t do a good job." – Donald Trump. Looks like you "loved" it at the 
time. #DebateNight 
190. "That’s called business." – Donald Trump on the housing crash. For millions of 
Americans it was called "losing their home." #DebateNight 
191. There’s only one candidate on stage who will support working families. #DebateNight 
192. "Donald Trump is a man who dwells in bigotry, bluster and false promises." – 
@NYTimes #DebateNight 
193. Our veterans and their families deserve a president who doesn’t disrespect and 
disparage their sacrifices. 
194. Not one living president has said they believe Donald Trump has what it takes to be 
Commander-in-Chief. 
195. We know all too well who Donald Trump is. Let’s make sure he never becomes 
president: 
196. Republicans are once again turning their backs on the people of Flint who have waited 
far too long for help. It’s wrong, unfair, and unjust. 
197. "Hillary Clinton would make a sober, smart and pragmatic president. Donald Trump 
would be a catastrophe." @LATimes 
198. When Donald Trump speaks about women, our daughters can hear him. 
199. Very concerned about the outage in Puerto Rico and the millions of families who don’t 
have power. Hoping it’s restored quickly. -H 
200. "You would think there is almost, like, something wrong." —Donald Trump on Mitt 
Romney failing to release his tax returns, 2012 
201. Trump’s calls to torture and mistreat prisoners go against the very values we are 
fighting to defend. We’re better than this. 
202. Like all Americans, my thoughts are with those who were wounded, their families, & 
our first responders – Hillary on this weekend’s attacks’ 
203. So how exactly did Donald Trump build his own bank account? On the backs of 
American taxpayers: 
204. I am thrilled to be here today to support the next president & vice president of the 
United States, Hillary Clinton & Tim Kaine! @FLOTUS 
205. What Trump just did is a disgrace. 
206. I learned from my family and my Methodist faith that we’re each called to do all the 
good we can for all the people we can. – Hillary 
207. I’m running for young people like so many of you who dream of changing our world 
for the better. – Hillary 
208. To what extent are you and your family currently contractually tied to payments from 
foreign business partners, or governments? 
209. 7 questions we have about the Trump Foundation (and how Donald used it to stop 
investigations into his fraud): 
210. The reporting on Hillary’s emails has left the basis of facts and veered into dangerous 
territory. 

















Table 11. Tweets from Donald Trump’s campaign (P1). The analysis of EP, Implicit 
Populism and Neutral Sentences 
 
 
1. @CNN is so disgusting in their bias, but they are having a hard time promoting Crooked 
Hillary in light of the new e-mail scandals. 
2. #CrookedHillary gives Obama an ‘A’ for an economic recovery that’s the slowest since 
WWII... #BigLeagueTruth#DrainTheSwamp  
3. #DrainTheSwamp ! 
4. HillaryClinton channels John Kerry on trade: she was for bad trade deals before she was 
against them. #TPP #Debates2016 
5. HillaryClinton has been doing this for THIRTY YEARS....where has she been? 
#BigLeagueTruth D8i University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
6. A lot of call-ins about vote flipping at the voting booths in Texas. People are not happy. 
BIG lines. What is going on? 
7. Amazing rally in Florida - this is a MOVEMENT! Join us today 
8. Amazing rally in Reno, Nevada- thank you. Make sure you get out on 11/8 & VOTE 
#TrumpPence16 . Together, we will put & #MAGA !  
9. Animals representing Hillary Clinton and Dems in North Carolina just firebombed our 
office in Orange County because we are winning @NCGOP 
10. Bill Clinton is right: Obamacare is ‘crazy’, ‘doesn’t work’ and ‘doesn’t make sense’. 
Thanks Bill for telling the truth. 
11. Join us today! Together, we will #MakeAmericaGreatAgain !  
12. Thank you Florida - we are going to MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! Join us: 
#AmericaFirst  
13.Thank you for your support Greensboro, North Carolina. Next stop - Charlotte! #MAGA  
14.Clinton Campaign Tried to Limit Damage From Classified Info on Email Server’ 
#DrainTheSwamp 
15. Crooked Hillary Clinton deleted 33,000 e-mails AFTER they were subpoenaed by the 
United States Congress. Guilty - cannot run. Rigged system! 
16. Crooked Hillary Clinton likes to talk about the things she will do but she has been there 
for 30 years - why didn’t she do them? 
17. Crooked Hillary colluded w/FBI and DOJ and media is covering up to protect her. It’s a 
#RiggedSystem ! Our country deserves better! 
18. Crooked Hillary’s V.P. pick said this morning that I was not aware that Russia took over 
Crimea. A total lie - and taken over during O term! 
19. Crooked’s camp incited violence at my rallies. These incidents weren’t "spontaneous" - 
like she claimed in Benghazi!  
20. Dem Gov. of MN. just announced that the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) is no longer 
affordable. I’ve been saying this for years- disaster! 
21. Disloyal R’s are far more difficult than Crooked Hillary. They come at you from all 
sides. They don’t know how to win - I will teach them! 
22. Donald J. Trump’s History Of Empowering Women #BigLeagueTruth 
23. Donna Brazile Shreds Obama Economy - Acting DNC chair says ‘people are more in 
despair about how things are 
24. Drugs are pouring into this country. If we have no border, we have no country. That’s 
why ICE endorsed me.  #BigLeagueTruth 
25. Food Groups’ Emails Show Clinton Campaign Organized Potential VPs By Race And 
Gender:  
26. Get out and vote! I am your voice and I will fight for you! We will make America great 
again!  
27. Great day in Colorado & Arizona. Will be in Nevada, Colorado and New Mexico 
tomorrow - join me! Tickets: 
28. Great night in Denver, Colorado- thank you! Together, we will MAKE AMERICA 
GREAT AGAIN! #ICYMI watch rally here:  
29. Great poll out of Nevada- thank you! See you soon. #MAGA #  
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30. Heading to Pennsylvania for a big rally tonight. We will MAKE AMERICA GREAT 
AGAIN! 
31. Henry McMaster, Lt. Governor of South Carolina who endorsed me, beat failed @CNN 
announcer Bakari Sellers, so badly. Funny! 
32. HILLARY FAILED ALL OVER THE WORLD. #BigLeagueTruth LIBYA SYRIA 
IRAN IRAQ ASIA PIVOT RUSSIAN RESET BENGHAZI University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas 
33. Hillary Clinton just had her 47% moment. What a terrible thing she said about so many 
great Americans! 
34. Hillary Clinton’s weakness while she was Secretary of State, has emboldened terrorists 
all over the world.. 
35. Hillary is the most corrupt person to ever run for the presidency of the United States. 
#DrainTheSwamp  
36. Hillary is too weak to lead on border security-no solutions, no ideas, no credibility.She 
supported NAFTA, worst deal in US history.  
37. HillaryClinton- you have failed, failed, and failed. #BigLeagueTruth Time to  
#DrainTheSwamp 
38. HILLARY’S HEALTH CARE POLICIES #Debate  
39. Honored to receive an endorsement from @SJSOPIO - thank you! Together, we are 
going to MAKE AMERICA SAFE & GREAT AGAIN!#LESM #MAGA 
40. I am going to repeal and replace ObamaCare. We will have MUCH less expensive and 
MUCH better healthcare. With Hillary, costs will triple! 
41. I hope people are looking at the disgraceful behavior of Hillary Clinton as exposed by 
WikiLeaks. She is unfit to run. 
42. I know our complex tax laws better than anyone who has ever run for president and am 
the only one who can fix them. #failing @nytimes 
43. I really enjoyed the debate last night.Crooked Hillary says she is going to do so many 
things.Why hasn’t she done them in her last 30 years? 
44. I visited our Trump Tower campaign headquarters last night, after returning from Ohio 
and Arizona, and it was packed with great pros - WIN! 
45. I will be live-tweeting the V.P. Debate. Very exciting! MAKE AMERICA GREAT 
AGAIN! 
46. I will do more in the first 30 days in office than Hillary has done in the last 30 years!  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas #Debate #BigLeagueTruth 
47. I will issue a lifetime ban against senior executive branch officials lobbying on behalf of 
a FOREIGN GOVERNMENT!  #DrainTheSwamp 
48. I will stand with police and protect ALL Americans! #Debates2016  
49. ICE OFFICERS WARN HILLARY IMMIGRATION PLAN WILL UNLEASH 
GANGS, CARTELS & DRUG VIOLENCE NATIONWIDE’ 
50. In addition to those without health coverage- those that have disastrous #Obamacare are 
seeing MASSIVE PREMIUM INCREASES. Repeal & replace! 
51. Instead of driving jobs and wealth away, AMERICA will become the WORLD’S great 
magnet for innovation & job creation!  
52. Is this really America? Terrible!  
53. ISIS has infiltrated countries all over Europe by posing as refugees, and @HillaryClinton 
will allow it to happen here, too! #BigLeagueTruth 
54. It is a MOVEMENT - not a campaign. Leaving the past behind, changing our future. 
Together, we will MAKE AMERICA SAFE AND GREAT AGAIN! 
55. Join me in Ohio & Maine! Cincinnati, Ohio- tonight @7:30pm:  
56. Join me live in Cincinnati, Ohio! #TrumpRally#MAGA 
57. Join me live in Hershey, Pennsylvania! #MakeAmericaGreatAgain LIVE: 
58. Join me live in Wilmington, Ohio!  
59. Join me Thursday in Florida & Ohio! West Palm Beach, FL at noon:  Cincinnati, OH this 
7:30pm: 
60. Join me tonight in Cedar Rapids, Iowa at 7pm: Phoenix, Arizona tomorrow night at 3pm:  
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61. Join us today! Together, we will #MakeAmericaGreatAgain !  
62. Just landed in Ohio. Thank you America- I am honored to win the final debate for our 
MOVEMENT. It is time to # & #MAGA !  
63. Just returned from Pensacola, Florida, where the crowd was incredible. 
64. Landing in Pennsylvania now. Great new poll this morning, thank you. Lets 
#DrainTheSwamp and #MakeAmericaGreatAgain ! TRUMP 42% CLINTON 40%  
65. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! #AmericaFirst #ImWithYou  
66. Mexico will pay for the wall - 100%! #MakeAmericaGreatAgain #ImWithYou 
67. My condolences to those involved in today’s horrible accident in NJ and my deepest 
gratitude to all of the amazing first responders. 
68. My lawyers want to sue the failing @nytimes so badly for irresponsible intent. I said no 
(for now), but they are watching. Really disgusting. 
69. My wife, Melania, will be interviewed tonight at 8:00pm by Anderson Cooper on 
@CNN . I have no doubt she will do very well. Enjoy! 
70. New national Bloomberg poll just released - thank you! Join the MOVEMENT:  
#TrumpTrain #MAGA  
71. Obama and Clinton told the same lie to sell #ObamaCare  
72. Obamacare is a disaster - as I’ve been saying from the beginning. Time to repeal & 
replace! #ObamacareFail  
73. Obamacare is a disaster! Time to repeal & replace! #ObamacareFail  
74. Obamacare is a disaster. We must REPEAL & REPLACE. Tired of the lies, and want to 
? Get out & VOTE #TrumpPence16 & lets #MAGA ! 
75. Our country is stagnant. We’ve lost jobs and business. We don’t make things anymore 
b/c of the bill Hillary’s husband signed and she blessed. 
76. Paul Ryan should spend more time on balancing the budget, jobs and illegal immigration 
and not waste his time on fighting Republican nominee. 
77. PAY TO PLAY POLITICS. #CrookedHillary 
78. People will be very surprised by our ground game on Nov. 8. We have an army of 
volunteers and people with GREAT SPIRIT! They want to #MAGA! 
79. Praying for the families of the two Iowa police who were ambushed this morning. An 
attack on those who keep us safe is an attack on us all. 
80. Record crowd in Tampa, Florida- thank you! We will WIN FLORIDA, 
#DrainTheSwamp in Washington D.C. and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!  
81. REPEAL AND REPLACE OBAMACARE! 
82. Russia has more warheads than ever, N Korea is testing nukes, and Iran got a sweetheart 
deal to keep theirs. Thanks, @HillaryClinton . 
83. Spoke with Governor @PatMcCroryNC of North Carolina today. He is doing a 
tremendous job under tough circumstances. 
84. State works hard, and illegally, for Clinton. #DrainTheSwamp 
85. Thank you America - great #CommanderInChiefForum polls!  
86. Thank you Colorado Springs. If I’m elected President I am going to keep Radical Islamic 
Terrorists out of our country! #DrainTheSwamp  
87. Thank you Florida- a MOVEMENT that has never been seen before and will never be 
seen again. Lets get out & #VoteTrumpPence16 on 11/8! #MAGA 
88. Thank you Governor @Mike_Pence ! Lets MAKE AMERICA SAFE AND GREAT 
AGAIN with the American people.  
89. Thank you Governor @TerryBranstad ! #AmericaFirst#Debates2016 
90. Thank you Maine, New Hampshire and Iowa. The waiting is OVER! The time for 
change is NOW! We are going to  & #MAGA ! #ImWithYou#DrainTheSwamp !  
91. Thank you Michigan! This is a MOVEMENT that will never be seen again- it’s our last 
chance to #DrainTheSwamp ! Watch: 
92. Thank you Naples, Florida! Get out and VOTE #TrumpPence16 on 11/8. Lets 
#MakeAmericaGreatAgain ! Full Naples rally:  
93. Thank you NH! We will end illegal immigration, stop the drugs, deport all criminal 
aliens&save American lives! 
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94. Thank you Novi, Michigan! Get out and VOTE #TrumpPence16 on 11/8. Together, WE 
WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 
95. Thank you Ohio! #AmericaFirst  
96. Thank you Ohio. Together, we will MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!  
97. Thank you Orlando, Florida! We are just six days away from delivering justice for every 
forgotten man, woman and child in this country!  
98. Thank you Pennsylvania- I am forever grateful for your amazing support. Lets MAKE 
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! #MAGA  
99. Thank you Pennsylvania! Going to New Hampshire now and on to Michigan. Watch PA 
rally here: The big vote tomorrow!  
100. Thank you Reno, Nevada. NOTHING will stop us in our quest to MAKE AMERICA 
SAFE AND GREAT AGAIN! #AmericaFirst  
101. Thank you South Carolina! Everyone has to get out and VOTE on 
11/8/16.#MakeAmericaGreatAgain 
102. Thank you to @foxandfriends for the great review of the speech on immigration last 
night. Thank you also to the great people of Arizona! 
103. Thank you to the great crowd of supporters in Newtown, Pennsylvania. Get out & 
VOTE on 11/8/16. Lets ! Watch: 
104. The attack on Mosul is turning out to be a total disaster. We gave them months of 
notice. U.S. is looking so dumb. VOTE TRUMP and WIN AGAIN! 
105. The economy cannot take four more years of these same failed policies.  
#DrainTheSwamp  
106. The failing @nytimes has gone nuts that Crooked Hillary is doing so badly. They are 
willing to say anything, has become a laughingstock rag! 
107. The Great State of Arizona, where I just had a massive rally (amazing people), has a 
very weak and ineffective Senator, Jeff Flake. Sad! 
108. The MOVEMENT in Portsmouth, New Hampshire w/ 7K supporters. THANK YOU! 
This is the biggest election of our lifetime- get out & VOTE on 11/8!  
109. The people are really smart in cancelling subscriptions to the Dallas & Arizona papers 
& now USA Today will lose readers! The people get it! 
110. The polls are close so Crooked Hillary is getting out of bed and will campaign 
tomorrow. Why did she hammer 13 devices  and acid-wash e-mails? 
111. The Republican Party needs strong and committed leaders, not weak people such as 
@JeffFlake , if it is going to stop illegal immigration 
112. The situations in Tulsa and Charlotte are tragic. We must come together to make 
America safe again. 
113. This election is being rigged by the media pushing false and unsubstantiated charges, 
and outright lies, in order to elect Crooked Hillary! 
114. This is what we can expect from #CrookedHillary . More Taxes. More Spending. 
#BigLeageTruth#Debates  
115. Today in Florida, I pledged to stand with the people of Cuba and Venezuela in their 
fight against oppression- con 
116. Together we can save American JOBS, American LIVES, and AMERICAN 
FUTURES!  
117. Truly honored to receive the first ever presidential endorsement from the Bay of Pigs 
Veterans Association. #MAGA #ImWithYou 
118.Tune in at and get the word out #BigLeagueTruth  Help us spread the TRUTH, stop the 
LIES!  
119. Unbelievable evening in New Hampshire - THANK YOU! Flying to Grand Rapids, 
Michigan now. Watch NH rally here:  
120. Under the leadership of Obama & Clinton, Americans have experienced more attacks at 
home than victories abroad. Time to change the playbook! 
121. Using Alicia M in the debate as a paragon of virtue just shows that Crooked Hillary 
suffers from BAD JUDGEMENT! Hillary was set up by a con. 
122. Very little pick-up by the dishonest media of incredible information provided by 
WikiLeaks. So dishonest! Rigged system! 
123. Voter fraud! Crooked Hillary Clinton even got the questions to a debate, and nobody 
says a word. Can you imagine if I got the questions? 
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124. Want access to Crooked Hillary? Don’t forget - it’s going to cost you! 
#DrainTheSwamp #PayToPlay 
125. We agree @POTUS - "SHE’LL (Hillary Clinton) SAY ANYTHING & CHANGE 
NOTHING. IT’S TIME TO TURN THE PAGE" -President Obama 
126. We have all got to come together and win this election. We can’t have four more years 
of Obama (or worse!). 
127. While Hillary profits off the rigged system, I am fighting for you! Remember the 
simple phrase: #FollowTheMoney 
128. While Hillary said horrible things about my supporters, and while many of her 
supporters will never vote for me, I still respect them all! 
129. Why didn’t Hillary Clinton announce that she was inappropriately given the debate 
questions - she secretly used them! Crooked Hillary. 
130. Why isn’t Hillary 50 points ahead? Maybe it’s the email scandal, policies that spread 
ISIS, or calling millions of Americans deplorables! 
131. Why isn’t President Obama working instead of campaigning for Hillary Clinton? 
132. WikiLeaks proves even the Clinton campaign knew Crooked mishandled classified 
info, but no one gets charged? RIGGED!  
133. WikiLeaks reveals Clinton camp’s work with VERY friendly and malleable reporters.  
#CrookedHillary 
134. Will be delivering a major speech tonight - live on @oreillyfactor at 8:10pm from 
Pensacola, Florida. 
135. With the exception of cheating Bernie out of the nom the Dems have always proven to 
be far more loyal to each other than the Republicans! 
136. Wow! I hear you Warren, Michigan. Streaming live - join us America. It is time to 
DRAIN THE SWAMP! Watch:  
137. Wow, @CNN got caught fixing their "focus group" in order to make Crooked Hillary 
look better. Really pathetic and totally dishonest! 
138. Wow, did you see how badly @CNN (Clinton News Network) is doing in the ratings. 
With people like @donlemon , who could expect any more? 
139. Wow, Hillary Clinton was SO INSULTING to my supporters, millions of amazing, 
hard working people. I think it will cost her at the Polls! 
140. Wow, now leading in @ABC  @washingtonpost Poll 46 to 45. Gone up 12 points in 















Table 12. Tweets from Donald Trump’s account from the 8th of November 2016 to the 1st of 
May 2017 (P2). The analysis of EP, Implicit Populism and Neutral Sentences 
1. #ThankYouTour2016 Tonight- Orlando, Florida. Tickets: Tomorrow- Mobile, Alabama 
2. ...country and with the massive cost reductions I have negotiated on military purchases 
and more, I believe the people are seeing big stuff 
3. An honor having the National Sheriffs’ Assoc. join me at the @WhiteHouse. Incredible 
men & women who protect &  serve. 
4. Another terrorist attack in Paris. The people of France will not take much more of this. 
Will have a big effect on presidential election! 
5. Anybody (especially  Fake News media) who thinks that Repeal & Replace of 
ObamaCare is dead does not know the love and strength in R Party! 
6. As your President, I have no higher duty than to protect the lives of the American people 
7. FAKE NEWS - A TOTAL POLITICAL WITCH HUNT! 
8. I will be speaking at 9:00 A.M. today to Police Chiefs and Sheriffs and will be discussing 
the horrible, dangerous and wrong decision....... 
9. being a movie star-and that was season 1 compared to season 14. Now compare him to 
my season 1. But who cares, he supported Kasich & Hillary 
10. Big announcement by Ford today. Major investment to be made in three Michigan 
plants. Car companies coming back to U.S.  JOBS! JOBS! JOBS! 
11. Big day on Thursday for Indiana and the great workers of that wonderful state.We will 
keep our companies and jobs in the U.S. Thanks Carrier 
 
12. Big increase in traffic into our country from certain areas, while our people are far more 
vulnerable, as we wait for what should be EASY D! 
13. Ungrateful TRAITOR Chelsea Manning, who should never have been released from 
prison, is now calling President Obama a weak leader. Terrible! 
14. Buy American & hire American are the principles at the core of my agenda, which is: 
JOBS, JOBS, JOBS! Thank you @exxonmobil. 
15. Chris Cuomo, in his interview with Sen. Blumenthal, never asked him about his long-
term lie about his brave "service" in Vietnam. FAKE NEWS! 
16. Chuck Jones, who is President of United Steelworkers 1999, has done a terrible job 
representing workers. No wonder companies flee country! 
17. CNN just released a book called "Unprecedented" which explores the 2016 race & 
victory. Hope it does well but used worst cover photo of me! 
18. Countries charge U.S. companies taxes or tariffs while the U.S. charges them nothing or 
little. We should charge them SAME as they charge us! 
19. Dishonest media says Mexico won’t be paying for the wall if they pay a little later so 
the wall can be built more quickly. Media is fake! 
20. especially how to get people, even with an unlimited budget, out to vote in the vital 
swing states ( and more). They focused on wrong states 
21. FAKE NEWS media, which makes up stories and "sources," is far more effective than 
the discredited Democrats - but they are fading fast! 
22. For first time the failing @nytimes will take an ad (a bad one) to help save its failing 
reputation. Try reporting accurately & fairly! 
23. Give the public a break - The FAKE NEWS media is trying to say that large scale 
immigration in Sweden is working out just beautifully. NOT! 
24. Going to Charleston, South Carolina, in order to spend time with Boeing and talk jobs! 
Look forward to it. 
25. Governor John Kasich of the GREAT, GREAT, GREAT State of Ohio called to 
congratulate me on the win. The people of Ohio were incredible! 
26. Great optimism in America  and the results will be even better. 
27. Gross negligence by the Democratic National Committee allowed hacking to take place. 
The Republican National Committee had strong defense! 
28. The Great State of Michigan was just certified as a Trump WIN giving all of our 
MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN supporters another  victory - 306! 
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29. I am working on a new system where there will be competition in the Drug Industry. 
Pricing for the American people will come way down! 
30. I don’t know Putin, have no deals in Russia, and the haters are going crazy - yet Obama 
can make a deal with Iran, #1 in terror, no problem! 
31. I have instructed Homeland Security to check people coming into our country VERY 
CAREFULLY. The courts are making the job very difficult! 
32. I met some really great Air Force GENERALS and Navy ADMIRALS today, talking 
about airplane capability and pricing. Very impressive people! 
33. I thought that @CNN would get better after they failed so badly in their support of 
Hillary Clinton however, since election, they are worse! 
34. I will be asking for a major investigation into VOTER FRAUD, including those 
registered to vote in two states, those who are illegal and.... 
35. I win an election easily, a great "movement" is verified, and crooked opponents try to 
belittle our victory with FAKE NEWS. A sorry state! 
36. If Russia, or some other entity, was hacking, why did the White House wait so long to 
act? Why did they only complain after Hillary lost? 
37. If the ban were announced with a one week notice, the "bad" would rush into our 
country during that week. A lot of bad "dudes" out there! 
38. If the election were based on total popular vote I would have campaigned in  N.Y. 
Florida and California and won even bigger and more easily 
39. Information is being illegally given to the failing @nytimes & @washingtonpost by the 
intelligence community (NSA and FBI?).Just like Russia 
40. Instead of driving jobs and wealth away, AMERICA will become the world’s great 
magnet for INNOVATION & JOB CREATION 
41. Intelligence agencies should never have allowed this fake news to "leak" into the public. 
One last shot at me. Are we living in Nazi Germany? 
42. It is the same Fake News Media that said there is "no path to victory for Trump" that is 
now pushing the phony Russia story. A total scam! 
43. Jobs are returning, illegal immigration is plummeting, law, order and justice are being 
restored. We are truly making America great again! 
44. Joined the @HouseGOP Conference this morning at the U.S. Capitol. #PassTheBill 
#MAGA 
45. Just leaving Florida. Big crowds of enthusiastic supporters lining the road that the 
FAKE NEWS media refuses to mention. Very dishonest! 
46. Just tried watching Saturday Night Live - unwatchable! Totally biased, not funny and 
the Baldwin impersonation just can’t get any worse. Sad 
47. Kellyanne Conway went to @MeetThePress this morning for an interview with 
@chucktodd. Dishonest media cut out 9 of her 10 minutes. Terrible! 
48. Look forward to seeing final results of VoteStand. Gregg Phillips and crew say at least 
3,000,000 votes were illegal. We must do better! 
49. Meeting with biggest business leaders this morning. Good jobs are coming back to U.S., 
health care and tax bills are being crafted NOW! 
50. Melania and I are honored to light up the @WhiteHouse this evening, for 
#WorldAutismAwarenessDay. Join us & #LIUB 
51. Mexico has taken advantage of the U.S. for long enough. Massive trade deficits & little 
help on the very weak border must change, NOW! 
52. NBCNews purposely left out this part of my nuclear qoute: "until such time as the 
world comes to its senses regarding nukes."  Dishonest! 
53. People must remember that ObamaCare just doesns’t work, and it is not affordable - 
116% increases (Arizona). Bill Clinton called it "CRAZY" 
54. Remarks at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s National Days of 
Remembrance. 
55. Republicans must be careful in that the Dems own the failed ObamaCare disaster, with 
its poor coverage and massive premium increases...... 
56. Serious voter fraud in Virginia, New Hampshire and California - so why isn’t the media 
reporting on this? Serious bias - big problem! 
57. Senators should focus their energies on ISIS, illegal immigration and border security 
instead of always looking to start World War III.’ 
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58. Somebody hacked the DNC but why did they not have "hacking defense" like the RNC 
has and why have they not responded to the terrible.... 
59. Such amazing reporting on unmasking and the crooked scheme against us by 
@foxandfriends. "Spied on before nomination." The real story. 
60. Thank you Louisville, Kentucky- on my way! #MAGA 
61. Thank you Michigan. We are going to bring back your jobs & together, we will MAKE 
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 
62. Thank you to Linda Bean of L.L.Bean for your great support and courage. People will 
support you even more now. Buy L.L.Bean. @LBPerfectMaine 
63. The debates, especially the second and third, plus speeches and intensity of the large 
rallies, plus OUR GREAT SUPPORTERS, gave us the win! 
64. The Democrats are most angry that so many Obama Democrats voted for me. With all 
of the jobs I am bringing back to our Nation, that number.. 
65. The Democrats had to come up with a story as to why they lost the election, and so 
badly (306), so they made up a story - RUSSIA. Fake news! 
66. The Democrats will make a deal with me on healthcare as soon as ObamaCare folds - 
not long. Do not worry, we are in very  good shape! 
67. The failing @nytimes does major FAKE NEWS China story saying "Mr.Xi has not 
spoken to Mr. Trump since Nov.14." We spoke at length yesterday! 
68. The failing @nytimes just announced that complaints about them are at a 15 year high. I 
can fully understand that - but why announce? 
69. The failing @nytimes writes total fiction concerning me. They have gotten it wrong for 
two years, and now are making up stories & sources! 
70. The Freedom Caucus will hurt the entire Republican agenda if they don’t get on the 
team, & fast. We must fight them, & Dems, in 2018! 
71. The Green Party scam to fill up their coffers by asking for impossible recounts is now 
being joined by the badly defeated & demoralized Dems 
72. The media has not reported that the National Debt in my first month went down by $12 
billion vs a $200 billion increase in Obama first mo. 
73. The so-called "A" list celebrities are all wanting tixs to the inauguration, but look what 
they did for Hillary, NOTHING. I want the PEOPLE! 
74. The super Liberal Democratic in the Georgia Congressioal race tomorrow wants to 
protect criminals, allow illegal immigration and raise taxes! 
75. The two fake news polls released yesterday, ABC & NBC, while containing some very 
positive info, were totally wrong in General E. Watch! 
76. The coverage about me in the @nytimes and the @washingtonpost has been so false 
and angry that the times actually apologized to its..... 
77. Today there were terror attacks in Turkey, Switzerland and Germany - and it is only 
getting worse. The civilized world must change thinking! 
78. Unbelievable evening in New Hampshire - THANK YOU! Flying to Grand Rapids, 
Michigan now.  
79. We had a great News Conference at Trump Tower today. A couple of FAKE NEWS 
organizations were there but the people truly get what’s going on 
80.We must fix our education system for our kids to Make America Great Again. 
Wonderful day at Saint Andrew in Orlando. 
81. When will Sleepy Eyes Chuck Todd and @NBCNews start talking about the Obama 
SURVEILLANCE SCANDAL and stop with the Fake Trump/Russia story? 
82. Where was all the outrage from Democrats and the opposition party (the media) when 
our jobs were fleeing our country? 
83. Why doesn’t Fake News talk about Podesta ties to Russia as covered by @FoxNews or 
money from Russia to Clinton - sale of  Uranium? 
84. Why isn’t the House Intelligence Committee looking into the Bill & Hillary deal that 
allowed big Uranium to go to Russia, Russian speech.... 
85. Yes, it is true - Carlos Slim, the great businessman from Mexico, called me about 




Table 13. Coders’ results in Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s tweets (0 - Neutral, 1- 













2 2 2 2 0 0 
2 2 2 2 0 0 
0 0 2 2 2 0 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 0 0 
2 1 2 2 0 0 
2 2 2 2 1 2 
0 0 2 2 0 2 
2 2 2 2 0 0 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 2 2 2 1 2 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 1 2 2 1 1 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
0 0 2 2 1 1 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 0 0 
1 1 2 2 0 0 
2 2 2 2 0 0 
0 2 0 0 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
1 1 2 2 1 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
1 1 2 2 2 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
2 1 1 1 2 2 
1 1 1 1 2 2 
1 1 1 1 1 2 
2 2 1 1 2 2 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
2 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
 
25 The abbreviation of  C1 refers to Coder One while C2 refers to Coder Two. 
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2 2 1 1 1 1 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
1 2 2 2 1 1 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
1 1 2 2 1 1 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
2 2 2 1 0 0 
1 2 2 2 1 1 
0 0 2 2 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 2 0 0 
1 1 0 0 2 2 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
2 1 0 0 2 2 
1 1 0 0 2 1 
1 2 0 0 2 2 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
1 1 2 2 0 0 
2 2 0 0 0 0 
1 1 2 2 1 1 
0 0 2 2 2 2 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
1 1 0 0 2 2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
1 1 2 2 1 1 
1 1 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
1 1 2 2 1 1 
0 2 1 2 2 2 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
1 1 1 2 2 2 
0 0 2 2 1 2 
2 2 0 2 0 0 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
2 1 1 2 2 2 
2 1 2 2 2 2 
1 0 2 2 1 1 
1 1 0 0 2 2 
0 0 1 2 2 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 0 1 1   
2 0 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
0 0 0 0   
0 0 1 2   
0 0 1 2   
2 0 2 2   
0 0 1 1   
0 0 2 2   
1 1 0 0   
0 0 2 2   
1 2 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
1 2 0 0   
2 2 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
1 1 2 1   
1 2 0 0   
1 1 1 1   
1 2 1 2   
2 2 2 2   
0 0 1 2   
1 1 0 0   
2 1 1 1   
1 1 2 2   
1 2 2 2   
1 1 2 2   
1 1 2 2   
0 0 1 1   
2 2 1 1   
2 2 2 2   
2 2 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
1 1 0 0   
1 1 1 1   
2 2 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
0 0 2 2   
2 0 1 1   
2 0 2 2   
2 2 1 1   
2 2 1 1   
0 0 1 1   
0 0 2 2   
2 1 1 1   
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1 1 2 2   
2 2 2 2   
2 2 2 2   
1 1 0 0   
2 2 2 2   
1 2 1 2   
2 2 2 2   
2 2 2 2   
0 0 1 1   
2 2 2 2   
0 0     
0 0     
2 0     
2 2     
2 2     
1 1     
0 0     
1 1     
0 0     
1 1     
0 0     
2 2     
0 0     
2 2     
1 1     
0 0     
1 1     
2 2     
2 2     
1 1     
1 1     
2 2     
1 1     
0 0     
0 0     
1 1     
2 2     
1 1     
2 1     
2 2     
1 1     
1 1     
1 1     
0 2     
1 1     
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0 0     
2 2     
0 0     
1 1     
0 0     
2 2     
2 2     
2 0     
2 2     
2 2     
0 0     
0 0     
2 2     
2 0     
1 1     
2 2     
2 2     
2 2     
2 2     
2 2     
2 1     
2 2     
2 2     
0 0     
2 2     
1 1     
0 0     
1 1     
0 0     
2 2     
0 0     
0 0     
2 2     
2 2     
2 2     
2 2     
 
